

JPRS 75614

2 May 1980

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2108



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

2 May 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2108

CONTENTS

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

Paper Fears Arab Split Could Allow Camp David Intervention ('Irfan Nizam Ad-Din; AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, 17 Apr 80)....	1
PLO Lauds Moroccan Support for Palestinian Struggle (LE MATIN, 1 Apr 80).....	3
Writer Responds to Magazine Charges Against the PLO (Munir Shafiq; AL-DUSTUR, 17-23 Mar 80).....	4
Briefs	
Attack American Interests	9
UAE Aid to Lebanon	9

AFGHANISTAN

Massive Soviet Troop Build-Up Reported (MORNING NEWS, 16 Apr 80).....	10
Popular Opposition Mounts Against Russians, Communists (Thomas Ross; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 10 Apr 80).....	13

IRAN

Embezzlement Charges Against Shah Presented to UN Commission (NAME-YE RUZ, 27, 28, 29 Mar 80).....	17
Foreign Policy Outlook Becomes More Intransigent (Various sources, 15 Mar 80).....	28
Protective Role in Region	
Strong Impacts on Arabs	
Worldwide Anti-Imperialism, by Seyyed Ahmad Kazemi Musavi	

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
Ayatollah Montazeri Calls for World Revolution (KEYHAN, 26 Mar 80).....	35
ISRAEL	
New Poll Shows Drop in Begin's Popularity, Peres on Upgrade (Mark Segal; JERUSALEM POST, 15 Apr 80).....	38
Egypt, Israel Must Rectify Concepts of Autonomy (HA'ARETZ, 24 Mar 80).....	40
Problems, Potentials of Gaza Strip Reviewed (Yehuda Litani; HA'ARETZ, 17 Mar 80).....	43
Alignment, NRP Cooperation on Rabbinic Law Explained (Dan Margalit; HA'ARETZ, 25 Mar 80).....	47
Convention of Reform Judaism in Israel Attacked (Editorial; HAMODI'A, 25 Feb 80).....	50
Shafir To Bolster Police Investigations Unit (Robert Rosenberg; THE JERUSALEM POST, 4 Apr 80).....	52
Tax on Capital Discussed (Aharon Yoren; HA'ARETZ, 6 Mar 80).....	53
Ways To Fight Tax Evasion More Effectively Explored (Baruch Lev; HA'ARETZ, 6 Mar 80).....	55
LEBANON	
Sarkis, Al-Huss Seek National Entente Government (AL-MUSTAQBAL, 8 Mar 80).....	58
Entente Principles Sought, by George Bashir Sarkis Seeks Compromise, by Ghassan Bayram	
'Beirut Radio' Carries French CP Leader's Statement (Beirut Domestic Service, 17 Apr 80).....	68
Canadian Wheat Deals Discussed (AL-NAHAR, 1 Mar 80).....	70
Industrial Exports Reviewed (AL-NAHAR, 6 Mar 80).....	72

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
Briefs	
Banks' Liquidity Problem	75
Four Reconstruction Loans	75
Numerous Housing Loans	76
Imported Industrial Machinery	76
MOROCCO	
Effect of Tripoli Resolution Discussed (Roland Delcour; LE MONDE, 17 Apr 80).....	77
PERSIAN GULF AREA	
Official Seeks Direct Oil Contracts With Gulf States (Peter Kjelstrup; BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 10 Apr 80).....	78
SAUDI ARABIA	
New Regulations To Govern Requests for Foreign Workers (AL-IQTISAD, Feb 80).....	80
Briefs	
Contractor Classifications	82
Development Plan Surveillance	82
Distribution of Uncultivated Land	83
SUDAN	
Exiled Opposition Leader Attacks Numayri (Al-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi; AL-DUSTUR, 3-9 Mar 80).....	84
TUNISIA	
Domestic Unrest Seen Behind Gafsa Incident (DEMOCRATIE, Mar 80).....	95
Conditions for Major Escalation Seen (DEMOCRATIE, Mar 80).....	98
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	
Abu Dhabi Loans 1.3 Billion Dirhams to Arab, Developing Countries (AL-ITTIHAD, 2 Jan 80).....	100
Emphasis on New Technology in Industrial Plan (Ahmad Sa'id; AL-ITTIHAD, 18 Jan 80).....	104

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
Briefs	
Balance of Trade Surplus	106
Overtime Compensation Regulations for 1980	106
Aid to Afghan Refugees	107
Executive Council Approves 1980 Budget	107
 WESTERN SAHARA	
SDAR Premier Discusses Ideology, Soviet Relations (Muhammed Lamine Ahmed Interview; THE MUSLIM, 26 Mar 80).....	108
POLISARIO Reportedly Inflicts Heavy Losses on Morocco (Daniel Junqua; LE MONDE, 18 Mar 80).....	110

PAPER FEARS ARAB SPLIT COULD ALLOW CAMP DAVID INTERVENTION

LD211501 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 17 Apr 80 p 5

[Article by 'Irfan Nizam Ad-Din: "After the Washington Meetings"]

[Excerpts] Following the separate meetings in Washington between President Carter and Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin, it is obvious that everything remains as before with regard to the autonomy negotiations.

By reviewing what took place in Washington from the time of President al-Sadat's arrival to the time of Menahem Begin's departure, the following observations can be deduced:

1--Israel wants to prolong the negotiations as much as possible, so as to implement its plans to Judaize Jerusalem and the West Bank and then impose a fait accompli;

2--The only thing that Begin could offer to appease al-Sadat was his agreement to start implementation of the autonomy plan in the Gaza sector. This will enable Israel to implement its aims and give Egypt more time to tackle its deteriorating domestic situation and the intensifying Arab-Islamic opposition to its policy;

3--Any formal declaration about progress or agreement made after the intensified negotiations would, according to the Camp David parties' concept, frustrate international initiatives, particularly the expected European initiative, and freeze them for a while.

It is therefore obvious that what has been achieved in Washington is to delay the historically inevitable and prevent collapse because, according to definite information, 90 percent of the discussions dealt with matters unrelated to autonomy but with drawing up plans to foment disturbances in the Arab states and bring about the so-called security alliance in the Middle East.

According to the same information, President al-Sadat and Prime Minister Begin asked Carter to wait and not rush into taking any new stand, because

the situation in some Arab countries is likely to explode and cause new changes that will make the implementation of the Camp David agreements very easy.

Although many Arabs want this information to be untrue, the current situation in the Arab world neither calls for optimism nor augurs well. Estrangement is deepening, disputes are resurfacing and dangers are threatening from all directions. As far as we are concerned, we can do nothing but pray that al-Sadat's and Begin's "prophesies" will not come true.

CSO: 4802

PLO LAUDS MOROCCAN SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIAN STRUGGLE

LD180931 Casablanca LE MATIN in French 1 Apr 80 p 1

[MAF report: "The PLO Pays Tribute to Morocco for its Material and Moral Support for the Palestinian Revolution"]

[Text] Rabat, 31 March--Abu Marwan, PLO representative in Rabat, has expressed his gratitude to Morocco and its king, government and people for the material and moral support it constantly gives to the Palestinian revolution.

In a statement broadcast by Moroccan radio and television on the fourth anniversary of land day, Mr Abu Marwan indicated that the resolutions which emerged from the last Jerusalem committee meeting in Marrakesh, under His Majesty King Hassan II's chairmanship, constitute a major step toward the liberation of the land and of the holy places.

He mentioned the Zionist plan in Palestine, which is aimed at annexing Palestinian lands, and the various UN General Assembly resolutions, notably Resolution 3236 which recognizes the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and to return to their land.

He specified that the Zionist machinations aimed at stealing Palestinian land have merely further strengthened the Palestinian revolution and in this connection he recalled the demonstrations which took place in 1976 when the Zionist governor of Galilee decided to Judaize this region, annex Palestinian land and establish Zionist colonies.

Following this demonstration, he added, the Arab nation decided to celebrate this day each year, thereby supporting the resistance shown by the inhabitants in the occupied territories and their determination to liberate this land.

Mr Abu Marwan reaffirmed that the Zionist entity is persisting in its segregationist policy, rejecting the international resolutions which denounce and condemn Zionist maneuvers which are incompatible with international rules and law.

These machinations, he added, merely increase popular demonstrations hostile to the Zionist policy and strengthen the Palestinians' determination to free their lands and set up their independent state under the leadership of the PLO--the Palestinian people's sole legitimate representative.

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

WRITER RESPONDS TO MAGAZINE CHARGES AGAINST THE PLO

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 17-23 Mar 80 pp 24-25

[Article by Munir Shafiq: "Professor 'Umar al-Talmasani Wronged the PLO"]

[For related material see JPRS 75476, 10 April 1980, No 2100 of this series, pp 89-94.]

[Text] Professor 'Umar al-Talmasani wrote an article in the 46th issue of AL-DA'WAH, of March 1980, entitled "Israel Will Either Desist or Come to an End." It included, among other things, an unjust attack on the PLO. It was, in fact, harshly unjust, for is there anything harsher than the accusation of "treason" leveled at the freedom fighters of Palestine?

Included in this article was a paragraph entitled "The PLO's Treason." But what was the reason for it? Did the PLO do what al-Sadat did? Or did it do even more than that to deserve the accusation of treason? The reason for this accusation was not this. It was [al-Ahram's report]. It was not based on Professor al-Talmasani's [own facts], as he said: "The greatest disaster that anyone could conceive of is for AL-AHRAM to publish news that the PLO had issued a decision for a cease-fire in southern Lebanon. Thus the PLO is volunteering of its own accord to stop the shooting, in a bid for peace. After this, who will stand by Palestine and defend it, if its leaders decide on a cease fire? Oh the shame of it! The high treason! For the sake of honor, manliness and religion, it would be better to execute all those in the PLO who are perpetrating this odious disgrace."

A calm, brotherly discussion in response to this accusation requires strong nerves, and a high degree of alertness, so that the response will not be neurotic, agitated, or based on counter-attack as the best means of defense in confronting the most serious accusation which could be directed at the Palestinian freedom fighters.

No, the reply will come calmly and fraternally, because it must help reveal the truth. Once the truth is revealed, the door is opened to justice. This is the way to Jerusalem, the land of Muhammad's midnight journey to heaven, the first of the two qiblahs, and the third Holy Place.

Professor 'Umar al-Talmasani is a Moslem scholar with a significant, leading position in Egypt and the Islamic world. It is also hoped that he and his brothers will play their part, with the rest of the noble, struggling, freedom fighter forces in the land of Canaan, in order to overthrow the policy of surrender and treason. Finally, within Egypt our brother has continued to be an opposition figure and the foundation for the ultimate determination of an anti-Sadat stand. Because of all of this, the response must be limited to revealing the truth, and then leaving it up to every man's conscience.

The question is: On what did he base his accusation of grand treason against the PLO? On news printed in AL-AHRAM saying that the PLO had ordered a cease-fire in south Lebanon.

If we assume for the sake of argument that such a decision was issued, is it "grand treason?" If there was such an order, does this verdict also apply to the rest of the Arab and Islamic leaderships, whether popular or official? And whether the shooting was stopped for one day or whether there were never any shots fired at the Zionist enemy? If this applies only to the PLO, it needs explanation. The question remains: Is this the right verdict in this case? Therefore, it is not right to accuse the PLO of one of the gravest sins, even if it did issue a cease-fire decision for southern Lebanon, even though the correct stand is to demand that all the fronts open fire on the Zionist enemy. We call on God to make this day come soon.

However, a deeper understanding of the situation in southern Lebanon requires that two points be noted. First, the south is part of the all-inclusive battle against the Zionist enemy, not the whole battle. Its arena is just one arena of confrontation, not the fundamental or central one. Therefore, the Palestinian revolution has treated, and is treating, the south as part of the battle and not the whole thing. This means that it has its own place in the PLO's overall, comprehensive strategy. This makes many of the decisions referring to the southern Lebanese situation pertain to it alone, arising from its specific circumstances and naturally entering into the general context of the battle but not constituting the general framework of that battle. For example, Palestine (the heartland) has always been and will always be the basic central point for launching the armed struggle against the Zionist enemy and firing upon it. As for the front lines, they are points of concentration for readying the forces, some of which might be dispatched into the heartland. They are also points for defending the territory exposed to aggression. Here the sublime saying might be applicable: "O you who believe, persevere, suffer patiently, take up positions and fear God--perhaps you will be successful."

The second point pertaining to southern Lebanon is that it is one of the Arabs' and Moslems' breaches in the confrontation of the usurping Zionist entity. Therefore, its Moslem population forms a cordon, and the Palestinian rebels in southern Lebanon are stationed there to ward off aggression as well as to concentrate on preparations for penetrating the borders into the heartland.

For this reason, the PLO has not gone into southern Lebanon to use it as territory for artillery bombardment, for these artillery bombardments are only one result of this entry, and when done irregularly they have had only a delayed result, especially these days.

Therefore it can be said that from the beginning, the basic decision to have the Palestinian revolution in the south was to have them stationed there, not to use southern Lebanon for artillery bombardment. The exchange of fire between the Palestinian revolution and the Zionist enemy never did and does not now mean bombardment from behind the southern borders. For the Palestinian revolution, firing means launching armed attacks deep within Israel, and having stations on the Tima lines, and confronting the enemy at those lines, at which time it may take the form of a war of attrition or the shape of a major battle like the al-Karamah battle in Jordan in 1968 and the 8-day battle in southern Lebanon in 1978.

There is another aspect to the situation in southern Lebanon which ought to be considered--that the persevering Moslem population of the south will not allow the Palestinian revolution to transform its guerrilla war into a war of bombardment from southern Lebanon, because in that case the result would not be in the interest of the freedom fighter people of the south. That is, the enemy's fire power is stronger and more intense, from sea, air and land, which requires the Palestinian revolution to look out for this situation and deal with it wisely, so as to not damage its relations with the southerners should the latter feel that their circumstances are not being regarded and the damage to them is not being alleviated as much as possible. Here we must be aware of the importance of such consideration for the sake of continuing the firing at the Zionist enemy on a general level. But this regard has not stopped the shooting from and in the south, because the Zionist enemy cannot sleep as long as there is a single rifle-bearing guerrilla fighter in that struggling land. There is the artillery and rocket bombardment, and the roar of airplanes, and then the revolution pays it back two-fold. Thus it is positive, practically speaking. On the one hand, the south lives in the midst of shooting without the people's holding the Palestinian revolution responsible for that because of the artillery shelling on its part. On the other hand, the forces of the Palestinian revolution, and with them the Lebanese fighters, are bringing fierce shooting to the Zionist enemy's settlements, and this has become an everyday occurrence.

The people don't want the Palestinian fedayeen to just fight from behind the borders, instead of penetrating the borders and striking deep in the Palestinian heartland. They want them to fight within Palestine and be stationed outside of it, and to perform the duties of the garrison in their full meaning--to be stationed against the enemy, with the people, looking out for their rights, being just in their decisions--a garrison which will plunge into defensive battle whenever the enemy attacks, a garrison which will shift to a general offensive to liberate Palestine when it is ready, once the Arab and Moslem brothers reach a position permitting a day like the Day of Hatin. Before the brothers on the other fronts get ready, God grant that the Palestinians and the southern Lebanese bear only what they can. So far, we cannot imagine that they have been negligent.

Therefore, we must first grasp the whole picture. If we do that with respect to the Palestinian revolution, we find that over the last 15 years it has waged a continual war which has known no cessation, not even to catch its breath, nor any relaxation. The victims are innumerable, and the difficulties have been harsh and merciless. This is what all the facts show, and the enemies cannot deny it. And if we ask about this war's situation during the last 2 years, or the last year, or the last 3 months, we find that it has reached a peak it had never attained before. There was the 8-day battle of 1978, and the war of attrition which followed the signing of the Washington treaty between al-Sadat, Begin and Carter, which has not stopped to this day. Nowadays, after the "normalization" and during the preparations to conduct the capitulatory agreement towards the so-called autonomy, the forces and the leadership of the Palestinian revolution are not sleeping at night. They are calling for battle in southern Lebanon up to Beirut on the coast and Biqa' in the heartland, anticipating a war of extermination which the Zionist enemy is preparing to launch, and to which Carter has given his support and his blessings--as they say, the green light.

This is on the southern Lebanese front. As for the front inside Palestine, the armed struggle has escalated in the Gazah Strip, the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Palestinian territory seized in 1948. The various forms of resistance by the entire people against the Zionist enemy have also escalated. After all this, can anyone say that the leadership which is leading these various struggles has stopped shooting, whether in the south or on the level of the Palestinian situation as a whole?

Since AL-AHRAM reported news with its true meaning distorted, which was not confirmed by facts, and since its purpose behind this was obviously and plainly to suggest that the Palestinian revolution had stopped firing on the enemy in order to permit al-Sadat's surrender, treachery, and collapse in the face of Carter's and Begin's reprimands, can 'Umar al-Talmasani possibly forget the sacred verse: "O you who believe--if a sinner comes to you with news, examine it carefully?"

In fact, there is news with which a sinner could deceive those who believe, if they don't ask for proof. But news like AL-AHRAM's is not that sort of news, even if all the news agencies report it, for it has collapsed in upon itself. One only has to listen to any news report, perhaps even that printed in AL-AHRAM itself, to find news of military operations in Palestine, or shelling in southern Lebanon. On this occasion, the Koranic verse pertaining to news spread by a sinner is completely applicable to the information released by the Sadatist authorities and by the international news agencies which manipulate the news to accentuate it and its implications.

There are two other points which 'Umar al-Talmasani raised in his article. First, he speaks of the millions of pounds given to the PLO leaders to make them satisfied with the stands of those Moslem states which don't want to establish a homeland for them. This statement also harms the Palestinian freedom fighters in two ways: one being that the Palestinian revolution's

need for these millions is not demonstrated, and no thought is given to the ways they are spent, beginning with buying arms, ammunition and various equipment, going on to supporting the perseverance of the occupied territories and southern Lebanon, and ending with care for the wounded and the families of martyrs. This alone makes the millions the PLO gets inadequate. The second way is the suggestion that the PLO leaders are accepting these millions as a substitute for a homeland. But is this the general or principal objective of the PLO leaders, the ones who are exposed to martyrdom at all times? A relatively large number of them have been martyred. This is not to mention the recurring facts which confirm the Palestinian leadership's desire for independent decision-making. For the sake of this independent decision-making, it has plunged and continues to plunge into battle after battle.

Actually, this does not mean that the Palestinian revolution or its leaders are above monetary concerns, or are infallible, or that there is nothing which must be done to reform policy, principles or morals. The suggestion here is that things must be put right. The entire leadership must not be accused as one man, nor must they be acquitted as one man. There is no call to emphasize the shortcomings of the revolution to the point of considering them apostasy, nor can it be defended to the point of considering it the foremost Islamic revolution. What is required is examination of its various aspects in their proper perspective, so that in essence this examination can be a just one, seeking guidance from the sacred verse "Assess the weight fairly, and don't lose the scales." When we do this, we see that the positive struggling aspect is predominant, as confirmed by its continuation and reinforcement over 15 years by the columns of martyrs. This examination must not overlook the organic link the Palestinian people, revolution and potentials have with their Islamic Arab environment, which has accompanied this people and their revolution for as long as the giant has not yet awakened. Perhaps the continuation of this ongoing Palestinian struggle will help this awakening.

8559

CSO: 4802

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

ATTACK AMERICAN INTERESTS--Kuwait, 17 Apr (KUNA)--A prominent Palestinian leader urged Arab countries to hit at American interests in order to bring about a solution to the Middle East problem, a Kuwaiti newspaper reported Thursday. AL-QABAS said that member of Central Committee of the Fatah movement, Salah Khalaf, accused the U.S. of antagonizing the Arab nation and hindering its development. He said that fighting, and not just threatening, the U.S. interests is a national responsibility that should be shouldered by the Arab masses. Khalaf, code-named Abu Iyad, added that a real threat to U.S. interests means a threat to Israel itself. He warned of American attempts to establish military and naval bases in the Middle East. Khalaf ruled out the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state at present, and described such a state as a "gate of hope to our people in their critical circumstances, especially those under Israeli occupation." "No one wants this gate closed" he said, adding that "views differ concerning how soon the hope can be realized." [Text] [LD171138 Kuwait KUNA in English 1115 GMT 17 Apr 80 LD]

UAE AID TO LEBANON--The United Arab Emirates Ambassador 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Shamisi has told Prime Minister Dr Salim al-Huss that his government has sent 45 million [as printed] to Lebanon. This is the UAE's share for 1980 according to the Tunisia summit resolution on aid to Lebanon. This was conveyed during a meeting between the prime minister and the UAE ambassador in Ad-Dawhah at 1700 today. [NC102130 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 2100 GMT 10 Apr 80 NC]

CSO: 4802

AFGHANISTAN

MASSIVE SOVIET TROOP BUILD-UP REPORTED

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 16 Apr 80 pp 1, 8

[Text] London, April 15: While attention has been focused on the guerilla war on Afghanistan's eastern frontier, the Russians have quietly built up a massive strike force of 56,000 combat troops along Afghanistan's quiet Western borders with Iran, according to a report published in the Sunday Times.

Their purpose is to pre-empt any American moves in the area, the paper said.

Of the nine regular Red Army divisions in the country, only four are engaged in counter-insurgency and in policing operations in the east, the north and central Kabul areas where Muslim guerillas are making life dangerous for the Russians.

But the remaining five divisions are in static positions all along the western border from Herat to Zaranj, and significantly four of them are packed into the "empty quarter" of southwest Afghanistan equipped with an estimated 850 tanks and 1,660 armoured personnel carriers.

These four highly mobile divisions are within helicopter range of the Strait of Hormuz and other part of south Iran.

Biggest Base

Shindand in Farah province, once a fall-back base for the Afghan Air Force, has since the middle of March, overtaken Begram, near Kabul, as the biggest military air base in the country and manned entirely by the Russians.

The report added that at least four Soviet frontline squadrons--one MIG 21, one MIG-23, and two SU-20 squadrons are now based at Shindand along with 60 MI-6 helicopters.

It also said that when the American hostages were taken last November, the Russians had demanded Shindand's military based from President Hafizullah Amin. Amin refused and in five weeks he was out and the Russians had taken over Afghanistan.

A Vietnam

A message from Washington adds: The Soviet Red Army is getting itself ever more deeply entangled in the Afghan quagmire and is confronted by growing difficulties similar to those once experienced by the United States in Vietnam, US officials believe.

The recent despatch to Afghanistan of 30,000 troops--stationed over the past few weeks just over the border--seemed to confirm US defence reports which indicated that the Red Army had underestimated the Afghan nationalist reaction.

The Soviet military staff in Kabul is confronted by the population's hostility, guerilla skirmishes, and the complete dislocation of the Afghan Army, reports indicated.

Soviet Plans

The Soviet plans to move more reinforcements into Afghanistan appear to have been stalled at least temporarily by the latest development in Iran.

Infuriated at the stalemate imposed by the Mujahideen, the Soviets were planning to bring in the elements of another five or six Divisions from their Central Asian reserves in a bid to overwhelm the freedom fighters with the sheer weight of numbers. In fact, they shifted a fresh rifle division to the Eastern front only last week to back up their spring offensive from Badakhshan South through Kunar and Nangarhar to Paktia and had earmarked more reinforcements to subdue the insurgency that has begun to embarrass them.

But a last-minute change of plans appears to have been forced on them by the sudden deterioration in the Iranian crisis, with Iran heading for confrontation with both Iraq and the USA, says PPI correspondent Ghani A. Erabi. USSR apparently wishes to retain maximum flexibility of movement, he added.

In a crush, the Soviets want to be able to pour down into Iran forces large enough to hold all vantage points....ostensibly to help Tehran against external aggression. Such an incursion will be in keeping with Russia's 200-year-old record of never missing an opportunity to push South to the sea.

Even if Russia does not actually move into Iran, she wishes to remain in a position to dominate it. Her Transcaspien forces are larger than what purely defensive needs would seem to warrant. The USSR is maintaining in a state of battle-readiness large ground and Air Forces in Azerbaijan and Turmenistan across Iran's Northwestern and Northern borders and they were put on an alert and held exercises two months ago when the Iran-American relations deteriorated. In addition, Moscow now has troops in Afghanistan which are so poised at Herat and Faran that they could pour into Iran at

a moment's notice. "Let's face the fact," adds the PPI correspondent, that "while Afghanistan is no more than a stepping stone to a prize, Iran is the prize itself, and as such deserving of top priority in any troop deployment."

In this context, it is easy to understand why the Soviets in Afghanistan have shuffled their priorities to send reinforcements to the Southwestern Sector. Although the number of insurgents in Qandhar-Faran sector is said to be no more than 5000, Moscow has ordered more troops to the area with instructions to rid the approaches to the Iran frontier of all insurgency.--APP/AFP/PPI.

CSO: 4920

POPULAR OPPOSITION MOUNTS AGAINST RUSSIANS, COMMUNISTS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 10 Apr 80 p 3

[Article by Thomas Ross: "We Will Drive Out the Russians and the Babraks or We Will Die"]

[Text] Kabul, in April -- "I believe in God, I am an Afghan patriot, I am not afraid of death," says the young intellectual in Kabul. "If I were to hold a weapon in my hands, you would consider me to be dangerous. You in the West have just as much fear of us as do the Russians because we are prepared to die for our faith."

The struggle in Afghanistan is a religious war; the first one on a national scale in this century: it is just as difficult for us to understand this as it is for the Russians. With each blow the resistance becomes stronger. The struggle in Afghanistan only took on the nature of a national religious war after the Russians invaded. The rioting in the cities of Afghanistan last February and the offensive by the Soviet and Afghan troops against the Mujaheddin in the Kunar Valley -- where fighting has once again flared up -- have ushered in a new phase in the Afghanistan conflict.

The commanders of the various rebel groups speak with absolute contemptuousness about the Soviet soldiers: "The moment they leave their tanks and helicopters and have to fight on foot, then they are like sheep -- they are like cows and dogs." Then follows the most derogatory name the Afghans know: "The Russians are like Hindus." The Afghans, from ancient times have regarded a Hindu more cowardly and more despicable than any animal.

There are some indications that the Soviet leadership underestimated the strength of the resistance by the Afghan people and did not understand their character. But the same is also true about how the West sees Afghanistan, especially the Americans, who are rapidly losing respect among the Afghans (and the Pakistani Pathans). Moscow is giving the impression of being confused at the present time and is considering what to do against the resistance, which has been growing since the invasion instead of being broken. If they had their way the Afghans would prefer to wage the war against the "pagan foreigners" all by themselves without any outside support.

We were told this very often in conversations on the way to Kabul and in Kabul itself by people of various ages and different social classes. But they all want one thing: weapons against tanks and helicopters and sufficient amounts of ammunition.

The Afghan spirit of resistance, having developed so dramatically in the last 3 months, is basically alien to us because of its absolute nature and because of its Islamic roots. That is why there is often a tone of contempt and profound mistrust when Afghans, whether they live in cities or rural areas, talk with westerners and Christians, whom they more or less view as emasculated cowards.

Agression From Abroad

"Afghanistan is finished," said a fiery-eyed young merchant in Kabul's market place. "But before the Russians finish us off, they will have to kill 99 percent of our people." He regularly travels to Kandahar, his birthplace, to Ghazni and Gardez to buy goods. On each trip he has to expect to be stopped by Mujaheddin or being shot at when driving his car. But still he says: "I love the Mujaheddin, I am on their side. It would not bother me at all if they were to kill me." Still others maintain the conviction that the Afghans will "drive out the Russians just as we drove out the British."

We only have piecemeal information on the resistance movement in Afghanistan and very often the information is unreliable. This is true for the journalists, the diplomats and the communications experts from the West -- the extent of erroneous information by the Americans, both intentionally and unintentionally, is a topic unto itself. One would also have to doubt whether the Russians and the Babrak Karmal regime put into power by them are even close to having a complete overview of the situation: apparently the Russians, and even more so the phantom Karmal regime, are victims of their own propaganda. Babrak Karmal only speaks of "agression from abroad."

The extent of Afghan resistance is by no means limited to armed conflict on the part of the various Mujaheddin groups, the mountain tribes in the East and there are plenty of men willing to fight who are now part of exile organizations in Pakistan Peshawar area. The soul of Afghan resistance is in the village. It has been estimated that 12 million people live in the villages with another 2 to 2.5 million in the cities and another 2 million are nomads. A village in Afghanistan is less densely populated than are those in India and Pakistan; estimates say that there are 20,000 to 30,000 villages in the country.

The Villages: Uncontrollable

Throughout the history of Afghanistan, no ruler and no invader have succeeded in really controlling the villages and in integrating them into the state. Neither the King (until 1973) nor the King's cousin Daud (President from 1973 to 1978) nor the communist rulers Taraki and Amin held

such control. Even the Russians and their charge Karmal have not come one step closer to this goal since the invasion. Villages were indeed bombed, especially under Amin, but in many cases the villagers had already taken refuge in the mountains; their huts, made of clay and shingles, could be easily rebuilt within a few days.

An Afghan village does not like strangers. A stranger can very often be a farmer from the neighboring village. What can be pieced together from the few reliable sources of information coming from rural areas is: any representative of the communist government, whether he be a civil servant, policeman, school teacher or soldier, has to adapt to the village if he wants to stay alive. And adaptation usually means that he has to work together with the resistance movement, either in arms or passively.

A recent example of what happened in the countryside: a small post occupied by Afghan soldiers cooperated with Mujaheddin in checking vehicles. It could not be established whether they were forced to perform these spot checks, because the vehicle passengers would have been endangered otherwise, or whether they made some sort of quiet deal with the Mujaheddin. In fact there is a large gray zone in which soldiers and the police, even entire garrisons, cooperate with the resistance movement, for short and long periods of time, without deserting. The zone already starts a few kilometers outside of Kabul and other cities and is obviously the rule in those areas of Afghanistan which are difficult to get to -- the largest portion of Afghanistan.

"In Kabul, a half of the population dares to join the resistance; black Friday (rioting on 21 and 22 February) showed us that," says a curly-haired Durani (one of the two largest tribes located in the south and southeast) who works in Kabul and studied here. "In Kandahar and Herat, 90 percent have joined and in the country, all are part of the movement."

It is true, Kabul is momentarily quiet; even in the marketplaces most of the stores are open, the shelves are full of goods. But reportedly in Kandahar and Herat, the next largest cities, most stores only open for a week and then close for 3 weeks -- just long enough to provide supplies for the inhabitants and to assure their own livelihood. Traveling Afghan merchants have reported this.

Kabul is the administrative center and here the number of people depending upon the government and state in one form or another is much larger than in other cities. Whoever wants to participate actively in the resistance leaves sooner or later and others try to emigrate. The capital is guarded and patrolled by Soviet tanks and soldiers and Soviet military bases form checkpoints on all major arteries. Afghanistan's military is visible but it only serves as a show piece. Houses have been and still are being searched.

The people in Kabul make no bones about expressing their hatred for the Russians and the communists. It seems paradoxical that there have been

fewer terrorist attacks and the iron fist of the police has been somewhat softer under the Babrak Karmal puppet regime than under this cruel, nationalist predecessor, Hafizullah Amin, but still the resistance movement has kept growing. "During Amin's rule I would never have dared to speak so openly with a stranger. An informer would have stood outside the door," says a young Basari. Then he adds on the credo: "We are Muslims, we will drive out the Russians and the Babraks or we will die." A high-ranking Afghan officer told us straight from the hip that he wants to kill the Russians as soon as he gets the chance. He, too, belongs to the gray zone.

Professors and students report that in the last few weeks 3,000 to 4,000 students have disappeared from the University in Kabul. No one knows exactly how many of these fled voluntarily or joined a resistance group or were arrested. Our sources informed us that of those still studying, a couple of hundred are supporters of the communist regime, a small group belongs to radical leftist movements and the overwhelming majority of the rest consider themselves to be fervent Muslims and opponents of the regime. Only Parchmaites (the ruling party wing of Karmal) are allowed to bear arms at the university and only they, we were told, can learn a martial art such as karate.

A Drain in Experts

The quality of Kabul University has diminished because of the constant bloodletting. One dejected student told us: "We students no longer have a future, don't have a good education and no chance for a good job," then he thought another moment and said: "and perhaps soon, no life any more."

But purportedly in the thousands upon thousands of villages there are hardly any gray zones of resistance, even though this varies from area to area. For no one has ever heard of a village being supportive of the government.

Foreign experts who have helped the Afghans for years in their efforts to establish industry, agriculture and forestry were forced out of the country this year because their very lives were endangered. As a result work is piling up, for example, at a cement factory in Herat (Czechoslovakian) and at a synthetic fertilizer factory in Baghlan (French). A West European project advisor, who a few weeks ago decided to stay (in a southern city) because he had such good relations with the Afghans, left the job he had been practicing for a number of years within 48 hours. One evening two bearded men, both of whom he knew, stood at his door and told him kindly: "You must leave. We no longer can or want to guarantee your safety." No one has yet counted how many Afghan experts fled after similar warnings or were killed. In Afghanistan today, anyone suspected of cooperating with the regime is constantly in danger of losing his life no matter where he is.

IRAN

EMBEZZLEMENT CHARGES AGAINST SHAH PRESENTED TO UN COMMISSION

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 27, 28, 29 Mar 80

[27 Mar 80, pp 11-12]

[Text] The oldest piece of documentation of the corruption of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi presented to the UN Commission of Inquiry and enclosed in his indictment file has been presented to the Panamanian judiciary officials and concerns 7 Mar 43 [16 Esfand 1321]. According to the preface to the document, this date was a few months after the expulsion of Reza Pahlavi from Iran by the British who had set him on the throne. In order to appease his son, who had just been seated on his father's throne, a \$1 million account was opened for him in the Guarantee Trust Bank [Bank-e Garanti Terast] of New York through Shahi Bank (British Bank).

In confidential letter No 9142 to this bank, dated 7 Mar 43, the director of Shahi Bank, sending two samples of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's signature, requests that \$1 million be withdrawn from Shahi Bank's account with Guarantee Trust and used to open a secret account for Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. He further adds:

"Please consider all correspondences concerning the aforementioned account absolutely confidential and on all envelopes sent to this bank containing letters concerning this matter mark the word 'confidential.'"

"Please confirm the opening of this account by telegram as soon as you receive this letter. Also, send a checkbook for the aforementioned account."

"For Shahanshahi Bank of Iran
Signed V. [or W.] L. Walter, General Director"

On 21 Apr 43 the Guarantee Trust Bank in confidential letter No 7F1 writes to Mohammad Reza Pahlavi:

"Your Majesty:

"In accordance with the request of Shahanshahi Bank of Iran, we have the privilege to have opened a new account in your name with the initial deposit of \$1 million. I would like personally to say that our institution and I are honored by the opening of this account and we sincerely hope that a strong and enduring relationship will come to exist between us.

"Your Majesty may rest assured that we will do our utmost to serve you.

"Respectfully,
Signed (Paulen Convey)
Chairman of the Board of Directors"

Continuing Deposits

In the files of payment documents of the Chase Manhattan Bank there is evidence to show that payments have been made to the account of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in this bank in New York from the former Imperial Court and the Pahlavi Foundation.

These payments are in amounts of \$50,000 and \$100,000 per month. These payments occurred between the years 1957 and 1961. After that, it appears that the account of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was changed to an absolutely secret, numbered account.

Payments After the Coup d'État

A few months after the coup d'état of 19 Aug 53 [28 Mordad 1332], the deposed shah deposited \$400,000 in his newly opened account in Chase National Bank. The receipt, numbered 5077 and dated 12 Feb 54, for this deposit was sent to the deposed shah by Chase National.

The Ex-shah's Swiss Union Bank [Bank-e Etehaddiyeh-ye Su'is] Account

Pahlavi Estates opened an account for Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in a Swiss bank by the order of Behbahaniyan who was trusted by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The opening deposit to this account consisted of a check for 81,000 Swiss francs, which Behbahaniyan sent to open the account on 30 Oct 57. The deposed shah used this account for secret payments to foreign dignitaries.

Opening a New Account in New York

In a letter dated 15 Apr 46, Harold Anderson, the vice president of Guarantee Trust Bank of New York, informs Mohammad Reza Pahlavi that Hoseyn 'Ala', the ambassador of Iran to the United States, has opened a "special" new account for him in addition to his current account. According to existing documents, Hoseyn 'Ala' made regular deposits to this account.

According to existing documents, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi used this account primarily to conceal his acquisitions during the years before the coup d'état of 1953.

Morgan Guarantee, Capital Investor

On 28 May 59, Morgan Guarantee Bank informed the deposed shah in a letter numbered 71189 that it had purchased for him the following shares:

- 800 gas company shares
- 1000 Portland Cement Company shares
- 500 Edison Company shares
- 600 Tampa Electric Company shares
- 300 Parke-Davis Company shares
- 600 Cleveland Clift Company shares
- 200 American Home Company shares
- 100 Armco Steel Company shares
- 700 Hooker Chemical shares
- 400 Anaconda Company shares
- 500 Standard Register Company shares
- 200 Donnally and Sons Company shares

Capital Investment Companies

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi has invested great sums of money ~~amounting~~ to hundreds of millions of dollars with American investment companies. The deposed shah is a stockholder in 672 different companies around the world.

[28 Mar 80, pp 9-10]

The Pahlavi Foundation first fraudulently gained ownership of the land which the government had nationalized, then sold these lands to companies which were being established, paying part of the money in cash to the shah and using the remainder to buy shares in these companies. Here are a few samples:

Fars and Khuzestan Cement Corporation

Subject: Securing the lime resources needed by the aforesaid company for building the Behbahan Cement Factory

1. Mr Salur's letter to Sharif-Emami concerning 200 hectares of the nationalized land of Roshanmehr to be put at the disposal of Fars Cement to secure the lime resources required by that company [as published].
2. Mr Sharif-Emami has written a letter to Mr Ruhani stating that the 200 hectares of Roshanmehr land is needed by the Pahlavi Foundation and must be declared nationalized according to Article 37 of the Forests and Pastures of the Country Law and be put at the disposal of the Pahlavi Foundation.
3. The aforesaid land was declared nationalized and following registration procedures was put at the disposal of the Pahlavi Foundation, the deed of ownership being registered in the name of the Pahlavi Foundation.
4. The aforesaid 200 hectares were then sold to Fars and Khuzestan Cement Company for 150 rials per meter, that is, a sum of 30 million rials [as published], and in return, 193 shares of said company were given to the Pahlavi Foundation.

Iran Duct Company

The Pahlavi Foundation wanted to buy up 10 percent of the Iran Duct Company, a sum of 160 million rials. It paid 35 percent of this 10 percent share as follows:

1. Sharif-Emami ordered Mansur Ruhani, the minister of agriculture, to declare the piece of land the company needed nationalized and put it at the disposal of the Pahlavi Foundation.
2. Two hundred hectares of the land needed by the Iran Duct Company were declared nationalized according to Article 37 of the Forests and Pastures of the Country Law.
3. The land which was declared nationalized was transferred over to the Pahlavi Foundation through the Registration Office.
4. The Pahlavi Foundation sold 60 hectares of the aforesaid nationalized land to the Iran Duct Company for 150 rials per square meter, a total of 90 million rials.

5. According to documentary evidence, the Pahlavi Foundation considered 56 million rials of the aforementioned sum as its share in the Iran Duct Company and received the remaining sum of 36 million rials [as published] in cash.

Atisaz Company

The Atisaz Company was a company formed with the initial investment of 10 million rials on 19 Mar 63 [28/12/41] with the 50-50 participation of Pahlavi Estates and Supran Corporation. In 1964-65 [1343] the Office of the Pahlavi Estates bought off the 50 percent shares of Supran Company. As a result, all the shares then belonged to the Office of the Estates, which is in reality the shah himself.

On 22 Apr 67 [17/2/1346] the shah created the Private Accounting Office by decree and presented it as the legal representative of Pahlavi Estates appointing Mohammad Ja'far Behbahaniyan as its director.

What is of immense importance is that according to Article 22 of the constitution of the Atisaz Company, all the documents, checks, and correspondences concerning the financial affairs and commitments of the company are to be signed by three members of the board of directors; however, Mr Behbahaniyan has ordered the execution of financial crimes in the interests of the shah, including all withdrawals and sending foreign currency abroad, within this company through Omran Bank, which belonged 100 percent to the Pahlavi Foundation, in effect the shah, using only one signature in his own handwriting even though he had several private secretaries. According to documents obtained from the Atisaz Company, this company, with an initial investment of only 10 million rials, has a deficit of 9.7 billion rials against its Omran Bank accounts, which, with the calculation of interest, of course, reaches a total of about 10 billion rials. To cover the debt of the Atisaz Company to Omran Bank, Mr Behbahaniyan signed an agreement with Mr Hushang Ram, the director of Omran Bank, putting up as collateral the Tehran Taj Hyatt Hotel, which according to existing documents is worth a maximum of only 2,540 million rials, against its 10 billion rial debt to Omran Bank. Thus, with the cooperation of two of the collaborators with the shah, one of the greatest frauds in the Iranian banking system was perpetrated.

Since according to Article 22 of the constitution mentioned above, all the transactions of the Atisaz Company were to be carried out with three signatures and the collateral that Mr Behbahaniyan put up to cover his debt to Omran Bank has

only one signature, this collateral is from a legal standpoint unlawful, and at the present time the debt of Atisaz, in effect the shah, to Omran Bank is a total of 10 billion rials, which he must pay from his possessions abroad.

Iran Sipurks Company

In 1973-74 [1352] Sipurks Production and Industrial Company, which was established on the initiative of Mohammad Ja'far Behbahaniyan in 1972-73 [1351], requested from the Pahlavi Foundation that some land from the nationalized lands be transferred to Sipurks Company for the needs of the factory.

1. On 16 Dec 73 [25/9/52] the Pahlavi Foundation following registration procedures handed over 300 hectares of Maskuk and Jamburak lands valued at 10 million rials receiving 100 blank shares of 100,000 rials each.
2. On 28 May 75 [7/3/54], the Pahlavi Foundation received 50 blank shares upon transferring the remaining lands of Maskuk and Jamburak valued at 5 million rials to Sipurks Company.
3. On 28 Aug 74 [17/6/53], Mr Salimi wrote a letter to Mr Sharif-Emami, the deputy trustee of the Pahlavi Foundation, stating that Iran Sipurks Factory intended to build its second unit in the Sa'adatabad region of Shiraz. Hence, the aforesaid factory requested that the matter be presented to his majesty and that 10 million square meters of the aforesaid region be nationalized and the value be put into shares for the Pahlavi Foundation.
4. Mr Sharif-Emami, the deputy trustee, wrote a letter to Mr Mansur Ruhani, the minister of agriculture, advising him to consider the aforementioned land nationalized under Article 37 of the Land Law and to transfer it to the Pahlavi Foundation.
5. According to a letter dated 11 Apr 58 [22/1/37] [as published], the land was nationalized. The official document for the direct sale of the land to Sipurks Factory was drawn up, then Sipurks Company presented the Pahlavi Foundation with 70 blank shares at a value of 7 million rials and a check for 6,449,265 rials as a reward.

It must be noted that according to Mr Behbahaniyan's letter, all the deposed shah's children as well as the Pahlavi Memorial Foundation [Moqufeh-ye Aramgah-e Pahlavi] held shares worth 60 million rials in Sipurks Company.

Uncovered Checks

The former shah has written uncovered checks on his Omran Bank checking account to a sum of 3,350,758 rials, which is his debt to Omran Bank alone. Also, the debts of the Pahlavi family to the country's banks have been determined and a list of them has been appended to the lawsuit.

Furthermore, based on the investigations of accountants and according to the existing books of the Private Accounting Office, which in fact fed on the treasury of the nation, the traitor-shah overdrew 8,340 million rials at the time of his exit from the country. The total foreign currency taken out of the country from the aforesaid withdrawal sum amounts to 3,260 million rials worth. Obviously, foreign currency may have been taken out of the country indirectly through checks made out to "cash," and this is being investigated.

Accumulation of Funds for Reza Pahlavi

From 1976-77 [1355] the deposed shah began accumulating government funds for his son, Reza Pahlavi. A sample of this embezzlement is provided in the lawsuit by the government of Iran as follows:

On 15 Sep 76 [24/6/55] the deputy prime minister in a confidential letter through the Plan and Budget Organization writes:

"His excellency, Mr 'Alam, minister to the royal court, has conveyed the strict decree of his majesty to his excellency the prime minister that in the next year's budget more attention be paid to the funds of the Reza Pahlavi Foundation.

"In carrying out the strick decree of his majesty the shahan-shah ariyamehr and in accordance with the commands of his excellency the prime minister, please order the necessary measures to be taken and have the results announced."

In addition to the 100 million rials from the official budget, Asadollah A'lam directly requested money from other institutions. The result of this "collection of contributions" for 1976-77 [1355] alone was 300 million rials. A sampling of such payments follows:

"Confidential 2/10091

Date: 1 Dec 76 10/9/2535

Your Excellency Mr Amir Asadollah 'Alam
Minister to the Royal Court

"In reference to correspondence No 227-1/M dated 22 Nov 76 [1/9/2535], in carrying out the strict decrees of his majesty, from the beginning of next year the financial aid of the Ministry of State to the Reza Pahlavi Cultural Foundation will increase from 30 million rials to 60 million rials.

"Sincerely,
Amir Qasem Mo'ini, Minister of State"

"Confidential-Direct
Date: 30 Dec 76 7/10/2535
Your Excellency Mr Asadollah 'Alam
Minister to the Royal Court

"In reference to correspondence No 227-1/M dated 22 Nov 76 [1/9/2535] concerning the increase of financial aid of the Organization of the Red Lion and Sun of Iran to the Reza Pahlavi Cultural Foundation from 10 million rials to 40 million rials, this is to respectfully inform you that in compliance with the decree, the difference will be included in the 1976-77 [2535] budget of the Organization.

"Respectfully,
General Director
Confidential for his excellency Dr Kani"

"Confidential 653/100/M
Date: 30 Nov 76 [9/9/2535]
Your Excellency Mr Asadollah 'Alam
Honorable Minister of the Royal Court

"I received Your Excellency's correspondence No 227-1/M dated 22 Nov 76 [1/9/2535] in which you convey his majesty's wishes concerning the increase of financial aid of the Royal Organization of Social Services to the Reza Pahlavi Cultural Foundation from 20 million rials to 40 million rials annually.

"This is to inform Your Excellency that in compliance with his majesty's orders the necessary funds have been anticipated in next year's budget and his majesty's strict orders will be carried out.

"Respectfully,
'Abdolreza Ansari
General Director of the Royal Organization of Social Services"

Similar letters included in the lawsuit against the deposed shah show that he has amassed great sums of money both officially and unofficially under the pretext of various

"family" "foundations" and has transferred great sums of money to accounts abroad.

[29 Mar 80, pp 11-12]

Omran Bank played three roles for Mohammad Reza Pahlavi: First, "purchasing property"; that is, it would pay him in cash for lands that Reza Khan had stolen from the Iranian people and would later be reimbursed by the farmers who were in fact the true owners of these lands. Second, it was the principal embezzlement instrument for the Pahlavi Foundation, depositing the necessary funds in the account of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (like in the famous defraudation of Shahrak-e Gharb in which 34 billion rials of the people's savings were ripped off and transferred abroad). Finally, it would pay money in compliance with Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's orders to his relatives and to throneless and crownless kings whom he liked to gather around himself. During his time, his embezzlement through Omran Bank amounts to 186 billion rials.

Among hundreds of documents concerning Omran Bank there are decrees for "loans":

"Confidential 60906/M - 2 Mar 76 [11/12/54]

Your Excellency Dr Ram
Director of Omran Bank

"In accordance with the strict decree of his majesty the shahanshah ariyamehr, a loan of \$100,000 in addition to former loans is to be given to (Leka), the former king of Albania.

"Please give the necessary orders. Thank you.

"Asadollah 'Alam
Minister to the Royal Court"

Handwritten Note

"1 Mar 75 [10/12/53]

Your Excellency Dr Ram
General Director of Omran Bank

"In accordance with the strict orders of his majesty, Omran Bank is to extend an interest-free loan of 12 million rials to Mrs Louise Qotbi . . .

"In carrying out these orders, the appropriate measures should be taken.

"Signed"

Hundreds of similar orders were given to Omran Bank. Of course, the subject of these orders consists of billions of rials worth of loans which the "glorious" Pahlavi family pocketed before fleeing Iran and have invested abroad.

Usurped Lands

Property stolen by Reza Khan was transferred to the government after his capture; however, his son later regained them through wheeling and dealing, and following the coup d'état he distributed all of it (after receiving payments for it). During 1978-79 [1357], thousands of farmers complained that the Pahlavi family had taken their ancestral lands from them for the third time, although at the time of the "distribution" of these lands the farmers had paid the price in full. Following is a sample of the royal court's investigation (only a short time before Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's escape) of these complaints:

"Your Excellency Mr 'Ali Qoli Ardalan, Minister to the Royal Court,

"In reference to letter No 677-1-00H dated 30 Nov 78 [9/9/57] concerning a telegraphed petition from Mr Abdollah Shokri and a number of other herdsmen of Tameshkati Pasture of Surben Village of Sari stating that they have been engaged in raising herds in that pasture for many years and that according to the orders of his highness Prince Mahmud Reza Pahlavi the afore-said were transferred from the possessed lands to Surben Village and consequently their livestock has been destroyed and they have lost their ancestral trade as herdsmen, the conclusion of the inquiry is as follows:

"1. The disputed pasture is located within the limits of Surben Village, the deed of which village was issued in the name of his late majesty Reza Shah the Great, then came into the possession of his majesty the shahanshah ariyamehr. Later, the ownership of said village, with all its properties including the Tameshkati Pasture, was transferred to his highness Mahmud Reza Pahlavi in an official deed. Therefore, the ownership of his highness Prince Mahmud Reza Pahlavi of said pasture is indisputably attested.

"2. Surben Village has been incorporated in the first phase of the Land Reform Law and said disputed pasture was also included among the lands eligible for transaction by the owner or the government; before the execution to the Land Reform Law said pasture was transformed into agricultural

land, and essentially no nationalized pasture named Tameskati has appeared on the records.

"3. Conclusion: The ownership of his highness Mahmud Reza Pahlavi of Tameskati Pasture is indisputably attested.

"4. Suggestion: With regard to the joblessness and large families of the peasants, some land is to be leased to them or a farm from the personal property of his highness Prince Mahmud Reza Pahlavi in the village of Surben or some other village is to be given to them in order that they may begin making a living through agriculture.

"General Fardust, Director of Royal Investigations"

Foundation for the Sacred Shrine of Imam Reza [Astan-e Qods-e Razavi]

The deposed shah regularly took funds from the Foundation for the Sacred Shrine of Imam Reza and there exist many documents concerning this. For example, in one of these documents, Behbahaniyan, the private treasurer of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, writes a note to Valiyan: "Following our telephone conversation, please send 50 million rials immediately."

The total sum of the embezzlement of the properties of the Foundation for the Sacred Shrine of Imam Reza has been estimated at 10 billion rials.

9593

CSO: 4906

FOREIGN POLICY OUTLOOK BECOMES MORE INTRANSIGENT

Protective Role in Region

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 15 Mar 80 p 12

[Text] In an article on the importance of the Iranian revolution and its impact on the region, the newspaper ULUS MELLAT in Turkey says: "Iran can play an important and effective role in the victory of the progressive elements over the forces of reaction in the region. An independent and nonaligned Iran can, while preserving its national unity, play a vital role in eradicating the vestiges of imperialism in the area." The article concludes by saying: "We salute an independent, nonaligned, revolutionary and uncompromising Iran."

In an article in the newspaper AYDINLIK written by Nuri Cholakoqlu, who had visited Iran during the first anniversary celebrations of the Islamic revolution, under the title of "Neither Western nor Eastern, but an Islamic Republic," he says: "The Iranian revolution began with Imam Khomeyni and continues under him. The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran that was approved recently by the people of Iran heralds more freedom for them. Imam Khomeyni is fighting against the imperialism of the two superpowers and for that reason his followers have chosen the slogan of "Neither Eastern nor Western but (for) an Islamic Republic."

While describing the new constitution and the freedom it insures, the article says: "With the policies adopted by Abdol-Hassan Bani Sadr the wheels will begin to turn, and with the actions taken by him political stability will return to Iran."

Cholakoqlu further adds: "The Soviet Union and her supporters can no longer make any headway in Iran because Imam Khomeyni and Bani Sadr have stated their stands regarding that country. With the coming to power of Bani Sadr and with authority gap being filled, there is no more room for these people [Soviet supporters] in Iran."

Strong Impacts on Arabs

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 15 Mar 80 p 6

[Text] "The Arab nation will be the political inheritor of the current struggle between Iran and the United States, regardless of the causes, aims and its related facts and presumptions."

This is the opening sentence of a wickedly written article in the 8 February issue of the Arabic language magazine AL-MUSTAQBAL, printed in Paris. The writer of the article, a Lebanese Christian, tries, in his thinking, to turn Arab public opinion against Iran's Islamic revolution. Such efforts, no doubt, are directed as usual by the reactionary Arabs whose aims are preparation of a series of actions Arab reactionary elements intend to take against Iran. The writer continues:

"No matter where the war is, in Iran, Afghanistan or elsewhere, Arabs are the targets and it is directed against them. The Arabs too do nothing in the face of the events and are just waiting and expecting the uncertain future. The reason for the general paralysis is perhaps the position they have adopted toward the Iranian revolution. In other words, they have taken no position at all. The Iranian revolution is a genuine national movement of the people. It was able to overthrow a repressive regime destroying an important base of imperialism and deposing an oppressive ruler. But the deposing of the shah was neither the most important international event nor the only one of its kind. Other dictators and rulers have been overthrown before. The important event has been the rise of "Khomeynism." "Khomeynism" is not the Iranian revolution. It is an event within the revolution giving it an Islamic dimension which has, altogether and completely, changed its national course and direction. It is this dimension which gives it an exceptional and specific characteristic. This, not because Islam has penetrated three continents, but because of the special bond between Islam and Arabism...and that is where the danger of "Khomeynism" lies and the Arab nation, now facing this phenomenon, must take a position. It must do so not just because "Khomeynism" ignores Arabism and accuses it of racism and fanaticism but it is also because it wants to destroy the special characteristics of the Arab people and, in the name of Islam, deprive the Arab nation of its role."

This nonsense is written by a well-known Lebanese journalist which has been praised by another writer from whom we hope to hear more in the future. At the moment, let us just stick to the first one who believes, or thinks it serves him to pretend that he believes that whatever happens anywhere in the world is because of the Arabs. The writer has missed the boat. At the same time, his diagnosis of the official paralysis in the Arab countries, that is the paralysis of the Arab leaders as regards the Iranian revolution is correct though he has, intentionally or unintentionally, misplaced the cause and the effect. Not taking a position by Arab leaders, or their inability to do so, has not been the cause of the general paralysis but

rather its effect, and the general paralysis has been the effect of the psychological condition of the Arab leaders created by the Iranian revolution. These leaders, with the exception of a few, are of the same type that were trampled by the Iranian revolution. They are the accomplices and the servants of the same master, floating deep in corruption. The one trampled by the Iranian revolution appeared to be in a more secure position than the rest, and it is only natural that when the ruler of the "Island of Peace" is forced, by the will of the people and not the order of the master (the United States), to leave and find a new resting place, his colleagues become jittery. This is what caused the general paralysis, and when these people realized that they could not do anything against the Iranian revolution, they were unable to take an immediate position against it. If the writer of the article really believes that the Iranian revolution was a genuine people's revolution, having been able to overthrow a cruel system and an important bastion of imperialism, then why is he so worried about the Arab nations not having adopted a position against that revolution? Does he not know that all or most of the leaders of the Arab nations are reactionary elements of the type of the former Iranian dictator, the puppet of Western imperialism? The author of the article knows that and admits it. It is unfortunate for the writer to believe that he could deceive his readers. But it is unlikely that they could be so easily deceived. Is it not wicked and vicious for a writer to consider the fall of the shah as unimportant and the rise of "Khomeynism" as dangerously important, and to try to prove that it is dangerous he reasons that it has taken an Islamic dimension and thus has deviated from its course, that it not only disregards and does not take into account Arab nationalism but it also accuses it of racism and is trying to prevent it from playing its role. Where and which one of us ever accused Arab nationalism of being racist, or maybe some Arab nationalists are not so sure of themselves. Is that not the same person who declares "humbly" in the same article that "among the nations of the Third World the Arabs are the most progressive and should assume leadership of the Third World." Or "the Arab nation is not Iran, Afghanistan or Indonesia...but a nation which now and throughout history has been something different." Is this not racism? Is this shameful statement not the opposite of another statement by the same writer where he claims that Arabs reject racism and the idea of national superiority? Why is it that Arabs are not supposed to be chauvinistic, but at the same time they are looked upon differently when they are compared with other people? No doubt anyone holding such a belief is nothing but a racist and his fear of Islam and the Islamic revolution of Iran is because Islam rejects racism. He does not want to admit this out of expediency and tries to picture the Islamic revolution of Iran, which he deplores, as "Khomeynism" that has deviated from its course and is against the Arab nation. He has taken the wrong way and has betrayed himself.

The writer further continues: "The campaign of the 'Khomeynists' against Arab nationalists is not something new. The Ottoman sultans had also carried out similar cruel campaigns against Arabs and so had the colonial West, following the awakening of the Arabs, which is still continuing."

It is true that the Ottoman sultans had, for the purpose of the continuation of their domination of Arabs, and the West, for their colonial objectives, had done everything to suppress Arab nationalist movements, but to compare those efforts with that of the Islamic revolution of Iran and its fight against Arab racist chauvinism and fanatical nationalism is cowardly and even more so trying to put the Iranian revolutionaries on the same level with the expansionist Ottomans and the colonialist West.

Worldwide Anti-Imperialism

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 15 Mar 80 p 10

[Article by Seyyed Ahmad Kazemi Musavi]

[Text] Our revolution, with its humanitarian and anti-imperialistic nature, contains the conflicting characteristics of isolationism and acceptancy.

To be frank, despite its vast internal legality, our revolution lacks worldwide legitimacy and is faced with the threat of isolation even by the Third World.

One year has passed since our revolution triumphed. Even though the principles of our foreign policy were clear we have not yet described and defined the direction it will follow in the world. Slogans such as "one degree above the negative balance policy," "in international policy Iran will follow the middle road," "neither East nor West" are indications of what course our foreign policy will take but they do not describe its content. Nothing describes its content better than the statements, directives and the actions of the leader of our revolution, Imam Khomeyni. The order to break diplomatic relations with Egypt, the cancellation of the military agreements with the United States, the discontinuation of political and economic dependency on the United States and mobilizing and preparing to face the results through the support of the militant students in the taking of the former staff members of the U.S. Embassy hostage, have all worked as a lever for pressure on the United States not only to bring the shah back but also toward the acceptance of our independent policy by the United States and the West. At the same time, we assured the safety of the hostages, accepted the kind of relations protecting the best interests of the nation, protested the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, warned against offers of military assistance to Iran, convened the conference of the world's liberation movements and the celebration in Iran of the 14th century of Islam, joined the movement of nonaligned nations and finally participated in the Islamic conference in Pakistan. In view of the above-mentioned facts, characteristics of our foreign policy could be summarized as follows:

1. The foreign policy of our revolution is more directed by the best interests of the Moslem people of Iran and the world than by regard for balanced relations with the Eastern and Western nations.

2. We depend more on our strong faith and the unity of the oppressed rather than on good relations with unpopular governments.
3. In the carrying out its humanitarian goals, we feel committed and sympathetic to the oppressed and underprivileged people of the world and in giving assistance to them.
4. While keeping aloof from various powers, it believes in the power of Islam and the joys and benefits that it offers.
5. It opposes efforts by the superpowers for political and economic domination and is specially opposed to Western imperialism because it is, due to its past aggressive policy, trying to play with Iran's political fate.

In view of the above-mentioned characteristics, the first principle of the revolution's foreign policy could be described as being: "Islamic, based on people's self-reliance, sympathetic with the underprivileged and opposed to imperialism." The second and third principles of our foreign policy are, of course, based on respect for the sovereignty of other nations and the maintenance of good relations with friendly countries but priority lies with the revolutionary aspects of our foreign policy and not the principles of the preservation of the status quo and the maintaining of normal relations.

Historic Stand of Our Foreign Policy

If our approach to our foreign policy is a correct one, let us now examine where it stands in history and whether a precedent could be found. The study of our Islamic inclination in the framework of our relations with both the West and the East is, no doubt, something that the Western analysts will carry out. But, to study it as a spontaneous and self-reliant Islamic force, which is free from taking the middle line between the superpowers, will help us achieve our goals much sooner.

This is a very high and unique stand for which it is difficult to find a precedent. But trying to classify it, it belongs to the forces and groups that are not aligned with any of the superpowers. In other words, it is in the middle. In international relations, to be in the middle is not something new. China's foreign policy during the Mao period was based on the need to form the "middle region" made up of countries in three continents. Earlier, Nasser, Nehru and Tito, as heads of nonaligned countries, had been able to agree on an independent and nonaligned policy with regard to the superpowers.

The first person able to add something new to the "negative balance" policy of Dr Mossadeq in Iran was the late Khalil Maleki. By forming "the third force" in Iran, he not only broke away from the great powers but also tried to make Mossadeq's foreign policy more positive and more effective. At the present time, the ideals of the people of Palestine and the international policy of the Libyan Government run closest to our Islamic world perception

and, judged by current events, these two could be considered our normal allies more than anybody else.

Our Isolation in World Politics

With its humanitarian characteristics and its anti-imperialism, our revolution enjoys the conflicting qualities of isolationism and of being committed. It is for the Foreign Ministry to reduce the danger of foreign plots against our revolution while it is in the unsettled stage, or at least to try to keep the public aware of it. At the same time it should prepare plans aimed at making our revolution and its humanitarian goals known to the world. The fact is that our revolution, despite its tremendous popularity at home, does not enjoy international legality and the danger of becoming isolated, even by the Third World, remains strong. This had been pointed out by several informed and sympathetic individuals, such as Hassaneyn Heykal (during his visit to Iran in Azar 1358, 21 Dec 79-21 Jan 80).

We can easily deny the effect of any role for the world acceptance of our revolution. This is perhaps because of our fiery youths who have given our revolution vitality and impetus, but responsible government officials cannot sacrifice the genuine interests of our revolution for the sake of extreme slogans. This is the same tactic by which the Prophet was able to open up the gates of Mecca. The expedient difference between the verses of "your religion is yours and mine is mine" (chapter Infidels), and "destroy the infidels" (chapter Repentance), is known to all. By the virtue of the same tactic Imam Khomeyni was able to expell the shah and lead the revolution to its anti-imperialist heights. In his writings in 1918, Lenin described as lunatics and conspirators the Trotskyites, communist extremes and all others who believed that the interests of the world revolution required that the revolution should be pushed forward, and that this could be done only by war.

What is at issue for us now is the future of our revolution. If the revolution is not properly presented (specially to the Third World), and if it failed to win friends, it could face the danger of falling into the traps of one of the blood-thirsty powers.

The Need To Gain International Legitimacy

Our revolution must prove its legality and legitimacy to the world--the West, the East and the Third World. The victory of the Vietnam lies in the legitimacy it was able to attain among friend and foe alike. The victory of Hosseyn in Ashura lies in the legitimacy it could achieve following that unequal battle. The legitimacy issue is not something to be dismissed so easily. On a worldwide basis, our propaganda and publicity must be based on our emphasis on the ideological aspect of our revolution. It is true that our revolution has even denied the principle that governments represent their people, but even this could be ignored and set aside whenever it is in the interest of the revolution to do so.

We cannot continue antagonizing all the governments of the world because of the way they look upon us, something even the October revolutionaries of Russia did not do. How could we expect that from our very young revolution?

One of the effective ways for introducing and publicizing our revolution is setting up international conferences or taking part in them. There were two conferences in Iran during the past year (World Liberation Front Conference and the 14th Century Conference of Islam). We also participated in two conferences (the Nonaligned Summit Conference and the Islamic Conference in Pakistan), the results of which requires more time and must be discussed elsewhere.

Another method by which we can present our revolution to the outside world is to send goodwill missions to various countries and especially to the countries of the Third World. No doubt, preparation, translation and distribution of the revolution's ideology and its outlook on foreign policy remains the foremost responsibility of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of our diplomatic missions.

9561

CSO: 4906

AYATOLLAH MONTAZERI CALLS FOR WORLD REVOLUTION

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 26 Mar 80 p 5

[Text] The message of the high-ranking religious jurist Ayatollah Hoseyn'ali Montazeri was ready by Haj Aqa-Rastgari, Head of the Office of Friday Prayer Service, in the first Friday prayer of the new year. The message was as follows:

"In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate; Moslem Brothers and Sisters; As the establishment of the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the creation of the legislative power of the Islamic Republic draws near, the Imam of the nation by forceful statements and clear shouts is pulling the curtain up from over the imperialistic plots of the West and East and the intrigues of world Zionism. Furthermore, in these days of the epical Islamic Revolution, the zealous Iranian nation, after years of enduring cultural and economic poverty, has raised its head in glory and through unity, awareness and commitment has brought down to its knees, the horned, bloodsucking criminal superpower, the U.S. At this point in time it is fitting that the dutiful Iranian people devote more attention to the prophetic messages of their own history. Particularly those doctors bound by contract, who have up to now played effective roles in the furthering of the Islamic Revolution, must show more regard for the duties and responsibilities of this stage of the Revolution.

Our Islamic Revolution is at the stage during which political flexibility, unity in decision-making and strict discipline in action is required. However, the fact that one of the prophetic messages of this movement was the creative spirit of free, progressive and committed human beings, and some time has passed since then, must not permit the fiery enthusiasm of the revolution to cool and go out. Rather, everyone, like bright torches and roaring cries, must strive to reorder the internal conditions of the country as soon as possible and begin efforts to export the revolution to the deprived and colonized peoples of Africa, Asia and America." Ayatollah Montazeri's message then pointed to the responsibility that God and conscience have thrust upon us: "Although the Idol in his political-military form has been overthrown, his culture and economy are still issues in our society. Therefore we must not imagine that the Islamic Revolution has reached its

ultimate goal; rather orderly and unremitting efforts must be begun towards the establishment of a just Islamic government in the whole dominant political, economic and cultural order. This is the duty of all Moslem people who, through the guidance and constructive, orderly criticism of officials, will bring about a movement towards a fundamental transformation of the existing system." Ayatollah Montazeri added: "One of the enemy's calculated stratagems in the present conditions is to profit from the dissatisfaction of some of the nation's classes for its own sinister objectives. The expectation of a learned, humanistic civilization after the victory of the Islamic Revolution was a natural matter. Now, under the exceptional economic and social conditions of the present, some groups have been afflicted with a kind of disillusionment and frustration; the roots of this anxiety must be gradually cut off. But the enemy is lying in ambush for us. Western colonialists and U.S. imperialists have aggravated this discontent with their lousy deceptions and are striving to lay the foundations of a kind of rebellion and revolt by means of their own mercenaries. Our noble and informed nation knows that some of these groups were formed years ago, occasionally shed crocodile tears for the 'people,' seize onto the blood of martyrs for their own legitimacy. The designs and agents of imperialism created these groups in Iran, and the theorists of national enslavement control the affairs of most of them. At the moment these anarchistic groups, without having any commitment to the Islamic Revolution or the pure blood of martyrs or the protection of the Revolution's achievements, are sowing the seeds of discontent in our country's factories, villages, high schools and universities and are laying the groundwork for a big political rebellion. It can be said that at this moment U.S. imperialism is in battle with the republic on three fronts:

- 1 - Economic embargo
- 2 - Military blockade
- 3 - Plans for civil war

On the economic and military fronts the mercenary governments in the region and locally allied rulers can also be reckoned as plotters. And on the third front some groups wearing leftist masks and nourished by the U.S. play the leading role. But the U.S. and the reactionary puppet governments of the region and their dependent domestic groupies must be warned that their desires for another Chile or Lebanon will always be still-born.

The brave Iranian nation under the guidance of the great leader, His Excellency Grand Ayatollah Imam Khomeini, may his shadow never grow less, God's great trust on earth, this always combatant and clamorous voice of Islam, presses forward the prophetic mission of the continuous victory of the Revolution with all its energy. It is incumbent upon all Moslems to follow the glorious path of this highest leader of Islam.

The political awareness, insight into character, and actions of you, the people, can, in these critical days, forever render the enemy of God and the people hopeless and despairing. In conclusion, I ask the attention of those respected representatives of the National Islamic Consultative

Assembly who have been elected by national vote: I draw their attention to this point that they must be completely aware that this position is a divinely entrusted responsibility which has been confided in them by the people. The constant expectations that the Moslem nation has of them are the continuation of the Islamic Revolution's movement and its expansion at every level and in every dimension of society, and the protection of the revolution's straight path from deviation to the left or right, and political, cultural, economic and military solidarity forever.

9597

CSO: 4906

NEW POLL SHOWS DROP IN BEGIN'S POPULARITY, PERES ON UPGRADE

TA15085 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 15 Apr 80 pp 1, 2

[Article by Mark Segal, POST political correspondent]

[Excerpts] Tel Aviv--Prime Minister Menahem Begin's standing continues to decline in the eyes of the electorate, the latest JERUSALEM POST poll shows. Only 21 percent of those polled now regard Begin as the man best suited to be prime minister. This is a decline of 3 percent in a month. Only Defense Minister 'Ezer Weisman remains untouched by the plummeting esteem of the Likud government, the poll shows, with the public either preferring opposition figures or opting not to choose.

Finance Minister Yigael Hurvitz's honeymoon is over, to judge by his drop in public favor.

Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir has so far failed to register on the public mind. Two of his predecessors, Moshe Dayan and Abba Eban, won more support than he did.

In the premiership stakes, Labor Party leader Shim'on Peres is on the upgrade, with former Premier Yitzhak Rabin not too far behind apparently because support for the late Yig'al Allon is swinging in his direction.

The poll was conducted by the Modi'in Ezrahi Applied Research Center among a representative selection of 1,300 adults.

Q. Who is best suited to be prime minister?

	March Poll	Feb. Poll
Menahem Begin	20.8	24.2
Shim'on Peres	17.6	16.5
Yitzhak Rabin	12.5	5.8
Yig'al Allon	-	4.4
'Ezer Weisman	5.6	6.5
Moshe Dayan	1.1	1.2
Others	4.2	3.5
Don't know/undecided	38.2	37.9

Q. Who is best suited to be defense minister?

	March Poll	Feb. Poll
Weisman	45.8	45.8
Arie'el Sharon	5.1	6.9
Dayan	44.2	2.7
Rabin	3.2	2.3
Peres	2.4	1.6
Allon	-	2.9
Hayim Bar-Lev	1.9	1.5
Mordekhai Gur	1.2	2.3
Others	2.7	2.1
Undecided/don't know	33.5	31.9

Center director 'Amiram Yarqon noted little difference between the preference of men and women in the premiership poll, while younger voters supported Begin more than the 51-60 age group. Peres was more popular among the 41-50 age bracket.

Both men enjoy more support along the lower edge of the education scale.

CSO: 4820

EGYPT, ISRAEL MUST RECTIFY CONCEPTS OF AUTONOMY

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 24 Mar 80 p 9

[Article: "A Plea for Frank Negotiations"]

[Text] Israel and Egypt are engaged in a political struggle. Each is trying to impose its own definition of autonomy. It is quite natural for both to make a strong effort to win sympathizers. Each of the two states is sticking to its own established position. Efforts are made [by each] to create a receptive atmosphere [for itself] and to increase the number of [its supporters.] The autonomy negotiations are interspersed with Egyptian propaganda. Egypt places Israel in a negative light. Salvos of dubious veracity are delivered as Israel attempts to dispel the clouds of Egyptian propaganda and to clarify the situation.

In their efforts to enlist sympathizers, the two sides do not tell the whole truth. Each side is playing for the favor of the international audience. The energy they are expending is misdirected and depends on the public's short memory. The weakness in the argument stems from a simple fact. From the time that the Camp David agreement was reached and the peace treaty was signed, both Israel and Egypt were fully aware of the provisions contained in these documents. Nothing is new to them. That is why their show of naivete and assumed surprise is so shocking. We strongly suspect that it is calculated.

Yesterday, in an interview with Amos Alon, Mustafa Khalil remarked that Israel has no special license to devise astonishing interpretations to the Camp David Agreement, "interpretations that never occurred to me at the time of the signing of the Camp David Accord." Khalil knows full well that every one of the provisions and conditions were part and parcel of the agreement. He realizes that the contents of paragraph 3 of the agreement that is enclosed in the famous parentheses was put there deliberately. Of the phrase "an independent administrative council," Usamali al-Baz, the Egyptian undersecretary for foreign affairs, said: "In this instance, I will make note of this concept of an administrative council." Accordingly, we should be able to apply this concept to the autonomous arrangement. Aaron Barak clarified it and noted that Israel intended to implement it.

Khalil should be aware that the Israeli mission's agreement at Camp David went far in helping to legitimize the aspirations of the Palestinian people. The understanding was that the negotiations will lead to a final disposition of Judea, Samaria and Gaza. According to his interpretation all legitimate aspirations are to be realized. [However], an independent Palestine is not in the realm of the possible and cannot be considered a viable option.

Egypt is well aware of the fact that the Israeli interpretation of the Camp David Agreements leaves no room for any other forces to exert pressure on Israel. Nothing can move Israel from, or interfere with Israel in its defensive arrangements for the West Bank. Many were the debates in the meeting at Camp David. Egypt wished to assume a role, but the offer was categorically rejected in the final agreement. The only concession made by Israel on this subject was expressed in its readiness to withdraw the IDF forces from clearly defined and designated locales in the autonomous zones.

Begin and his regime are not living to Sadat and Khalil as to the type of autonomy they are seeking to institute on the West Bank. For the past year and a half, it has been very clear to the Egyptian leaders what type of autonomy the Israelis are seeking to establish. The Egyptians know that it is to be a limited autonomy. Begin's concept of an independent council is one that is confined solely to administration, with only a limited authority. Khalil has no right to say that he is astonished at the Israeli interpretation. Jerusalem is [now] justified in complaining about the interpretations Egypt is mistakenly construing as being the Camp David Agreement. From the very start of the negotiations, Sadat and his aides sought to transform them into a banner to promote a Palestinian State.

The Israelis who took part in the Camp David meetings remember well the incessant struggle over versions and endless formulas. These were finally settled after much bargaining. At the very conclusion, the documents supplied a summary. The phrase "legitimate rights of the Palestinian People" has a shaded meaning bordering on the concept of independence. Other concepts such as the transfer of authority, full autonomy, and the withdrawal of the civilian military administration testify to Egypt's dubious perception of autonomy in 1978.

Begin is well aware of the schedule for the concluding date of the autonomy negotiations. Both Egypt and Israel had set for themselves a goal to conclude the negotiations in 1 year, in order that the Israeli elections could take place as quickly as possible. Whereas the original thought was to have the Israeli elections in December 1979, this had to be changed. At the time, the prevailing thought was that the negotiations about the Palestinian problem would begin in December 1978. This was perceived as providing ample time for the conclusion of the contacts necessary for the establishment of autonomy. For the past year and half. Begin did not know that Sadat did not schedule more than a year for the autonomy negotiations. Begin did not hear, even once from Sadat that he was seriously aiming for an all-inclusive treaty in the middle east. The solution of the Palestinian problem would be the centerpiece of the peace treaty by means of a clear definition of independence.

The spectacle of two astonished and deceived powers like Egypt and Israel is not very persuasive. The heads of the contending states are play-acting. Recently they have begun to lay down their cards. For the past year, Egypt has known that Israel is seeking to establish a limited independence in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Israel understands that Egypt desires, after a decent interval, to institute a completely independent regime in what are known as the autonomous zones.

The success attending the signing of the Camp David Agreement and the subsequent peace treaty was very gratifying. The actual signing did not flow from mutual misunderstandings. In their efforts to choose workable and palatable solutions they have provided more than one acceptable solution. There can be alternate ways of solving a problem. In the past few weeks, what has been happening is that both Egypt and Israel have moved to close out their options.

Israel has presented a model of an independent administration which has appalled the Egyptians. It [blurred] the achievement of the Egyptians at Camp David. The model of autonomy that is proposed by the Israelis is a type of municipal set-up which is distinctly patronizing. The autonomy planned by the Israelis is narrow and formalistic. To breathe new life into the Camp David Agreement, it is necessary to grant full and unqualified autonomy to the Palestinians on the basis of the complete transfer of military powers and authority.

On her part, Egypt proposes an image of a regime based on the full authority of a military power. Egypt would automatically grant full powers to the administrative council--judicial and legislative. Egypt would include East Jerusalem in the autonomous zones. Egypt overlooked the fact that no mention was made of East Jerusalem in the Camp David Agreement, and thus [tried to] rob Israel of a Camp David triumph. In that agreement, all mention of East Jerusalem was omitted. Also, the phrase "the military administration should be abolished," was changed to "the military government and the civilian administration should withdraw." Furthermore, [the agreements] made no mention of the thorny problem of the settlements.

If the two states wish to bring the negotiations on autonomy to a successful conclusion, they must pursue the direction they followed at Camp David. They must institute an order that will permit both parties to retain [certain] options. The attempt of Israel and Egypt to force their own interpretation of autonomy on one another may well endanger the atmosphere of mutual understanding that was woven into the fabric of relations between the two countries since March 1979. These relations are not impervious to splits or tears.

8995

CSO: 4805

PROBLEMS, POTENTIALS OF GAZA STRIP REVIEWED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 17 Mar 80 pp 9, 11

[Article by Yehuda Litani: "The Gaza Strip--a Bridge Over Troubled Waters; End of a Quiet Period"]

[Text] Ever since Shaykh Hassan Hussayndar was murdered last year near his home in Gaza by an assailant who has not yet been found, members of the pro-Egyptian faction in the Gaza Strip have been afraid to be too conspicuous. Shaykh Hussayndar was the recognized head of this group, and he expressed his opinions without fear. The essence of those opinions was support for Egypt in carrying out the peace agreement and in bringing about autonomy first to the Gaza Strip. Despite fears of political terrorism, this group feels good about the normalization process which has been proceeding rapidly in the past weeks and months.

At first, after 1967, residents of the Gaza Strip were allowed to travel directly to Egypt by land, a 5 hours' trip from Gaza to Cairo in an air-conditioned bus. Nowadays, an inflexible procedure is the rule, and only a few residents of the Gaza Strip are permitted to go to Egypt by way of the Ne'ot-Sinai pass without restrictions. Very soon, however, representatives of the military rule promise, and the pro-Egyptian faction in the Gaza Strip believes, every resident of the Gaza Strip will be able to go to Egypt by way of Ne'ot-Sinai without special difficulties.

An Egyptian consulate is to be established in Gaza, and, according to Gaza Strip residents who support Sadat's initiative, the consulate staff will not be met with a hostile attitude on the part of the residents.

A Center For Smuggling

"Do not forget," says one of the Egyptian supporters in the Gaza Strip, "that the Egyptians ruled us for about 20 years. Here everything is run according to Egypt's lead. Even the fast of Ramadan begins when the sages of Al-Azhar in Cairo decide. This is different from the West Bank whose practice is like the rest of the Moslem world and is in accord with what the religious leaders of Mecca determine. Our children study in

Egypt. We used to have well-developed commercial ties with Egypt which are now being renewed. We were cut off from our Palestinian brothers on the West Bank who were influenced greatly by Jordan, and from our Palestinian brethren in Israel who had begun to be contaminated by the State of Israel."

The same man continues: "We were especially influenced by Egypt, and today we must use the Egyptian peace initiative for the good of the Palestinian nation. I believe in Anwar al-Sadat. To my mind, he cares as much about the Palestinians as he does about Egypt. Here, Israeli interests dovetail with Egyptian and Palestinian interests." He believes that the Gaza Strip can serve as a bridge between opposing interests.

Many residents of the Gaza Strip want to make the new situation work to their benefit. The bridge being discussed is primarily economic. The Strip, which already changed its appearance completely a few years ago and which has been reaping substantial profits everywhere, including refugee camps, serves as a link in the communication between Egypt and Israel. This is where contraband goods are sold by both sides. And plenty of goods are smuggled—be it because of the long border which now exists between Egypt and Israel in the desert, or because the Bedouin tribes who live on the border, and who engage in smuggling, know both sides well and maintain close ties with both for the sake of smuggling.

In stores in the Gaza Strip, you can buy television and radio equipment smuggled from Port Said at prices that are much cheaper than those generally found in Israel. There is even a color television business here (an Israeli-Arab partnership!). The television sets are assembled in the Gaza Strip and are sold at bargain prices. Some believe that even the television sets which are assembled here are smuggled goods, and the demand for them is, therefore, great.

The military government and the police have recently appeared on the smuggling scene, and official sources say that its scope has been noticeably reduced. They admit, however, that it is impossible to stop it completely. Many Gaza Strip residents have requested and have received dealerships for various businesses in Israel (solar-heated boilers, carpets, etc.), and they hope that in the near future they will be the agents of these enterprises in Egypt. Others are maintaining ties with Egyptian businesses in the hope that they will be the agents of businesses in Israel.

On 26 February, the day of the exchange of ambassadors between the two nations, a general strike on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was announced in protest against the normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel. The strike was generally honored in the large cities on the West Bank. In Gaza, the security forces say with pride that the strike did not last more than an hour. The merchants of the city saw officers of the military government taking the names of striking merchants in their notebooks, and they hurried to open their businesses.

The security forces believe that reality is more powerful than slogans, and that the Gaza Strip differs from the West Bank in one respect. The military government rules with an iron hand and with self-confidence. Also, from time to time, when there is need for it, it reminds the residents that they can return to the old measures that were in force at the beginning of the seventies at the time of the big war on terrorism in the Gaza Strip. The stores that were closed in the area where Israelis were killed last month have still not been allowed to reopen despite repeated requests by the store owners.

Power Struggles

When needed, a curfew is imposed on an entire town, or blockades are set up at the exits and entrances to the Gaza Strip, so that searches may be carried out. This delays the large work force employed in Israel much to the annoyance of the Israeli employers and the Gaza Strip workers. In such instances, the workers arrive noticeably late to their places of employment, or do not arrive at all.

Four requests have been submitted to the military government to open a university in the Gaza Strip. Some of the requests have come from Jordanian sympathizers headed by the mayor of Gaza, Rashad al-Shawa, and from members of the PLO and the Left led by Dr Haydar Abd-al-Shafi. So far, not a single request has been answered. It does not look as though these requests will be answered in the future either. A well-known institute, a branch of the Cairo Al-Azhar University which was opened in Gaza in 1954, is [once more] operating in Gaza. It appears that as long as Israeli military rule exists in the Gaza Strip, it will prefer the development of a college with close ties to Egypt over any other college or university.

In the opinion of the security forces, the expansion and development of the Gaza branch of Al-Azhar will bring about a greater degree of normalization, and will also bring about the next step in the establishment of autonomous rule in the Gaza Strip, in the form desired by Israel. According to various factions in the Gaza Strip, the struggle of the religious group, headed by Shaykh Awad, was directed against the Left and against supporters of the PLO. The latter are based and concentrated in the organization, "The Red Crescent," which is headed by Dr Haydan Abd-al-Shafi, who wanted to change the administration of Al-Azhar and gain control of the institution from within.

This was the next step in the power struggle between the various factions of the Gaza Strip. In this case, it took on a violent character. One of those present at the meeting of the new administrative council for the Gaza branch of the university narrated what happened. "The religious group," he said, attacked us during the session, beat us up, and left me alone only after I told them that I was a devout Moslem."

Outbursts at the mosques preceded this attack. Offices of "The Red Crescent" on the main street in Gaza were burned down as well as several coffeehouses which, according to the religious faction, were also selling alcoholic beverages. In sermons in the mosques, it was said that the communists want to drive out the religious group from their positions.

A proclamation circulated in the streets of Gaza by the "Youth for the Islamic Struggle," the religious group which organized the recent disturbances in Gaza, said among other things that "the outbreak of recent events in Gaza points to the existence of conflicts between our people in Gaza and those Communist factions which are floating like foam on the surface of society and which represent only themselves and have no connection to our heritage or our past. They operate in opposition to our ways by forging an alliance with our enemies in Rakah, the Communist Party."

People from the Gaza Strip, identified as pro-Egyptian, complain, though, that it was under Israeli military rule that the Communists gained most of their power. Farid Abu Warda, director general of education of UNRWA, is considered to be the leader of the Communists in the Gaza Strip. The pro-Egyptian group says that Egypt knew how to deal with Communists. They oppressed them and did not allow them to gain much attention.

The pro-Egyptian faction complains about Israel. "We put all our hopes on the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, and every day you weaken our position," said one of the leaders of the pro-Egyptian faction in the Gaza Strip. "You appropriate lands, you establish settlements, you chase Arabs from their homes in the Old City in Jerusalem, you settle in Hebron. And you do all of this under the guise of normalization. How could we dare face the supporters of the PLO when you behave in this manner?"

That same man says that he prays to God that Menachem Begin's government will be ousted: "We have heard that the present government in Israel is, thank God, being undermined. I am glad that you have a democracy and can change governments. It is good that you are not like us, living under dictatorships in which the only chance for changing the government comes from revolution or rebellion. Begin has done what he could; now it is time for him to step down in order to make peace possible."

9348

CSO: 4805

ISRAEL

ALIGNMENT, NRP COOPERATION ON RABBINATE LAW EXPLAINED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 25 Mar 80 p 11

[Article by Dan Margalit, HA'ARETZ correspondent: "The Reward and the Investment"]

[Text] Rabbi Chaim Vidrovitz from Musarawa aimed high. Immediately after he came to the United States, he put in front of his office a big sign: "The Chief Rabbi of the United States." Irving Howe, who talked about rabbi Vidrovitz in his bestseller on American Jewry, "World of Our Fathers," said that the sign angered the Hassidim of another Rabbi. "Who gave you this title," they cried to Rabbi Vidrovitz. "The sign painter, of course," he answered.

For many years, the chief Rabbis in Israel were appointed in a way resembling the story in "World of Our Fathers." Legal patchwork protected the rabbinate and its two heads who were always quarrelling. Their sign painters initiated intrigues, strange votes, and meetings of the rabbis that were all meant for special interests. Everyone in the establishment who supported the central role of the rabbinate in religious life and in marital law, sought to replace the sign painter with an effective law.

Last week the Knesset witnessed the importance of such a law. One hundred sixty-six reservations regarding the law were presented, almost the same number as when the government budget was discussed. Short Wednesday stretched well into the night. The chairman of the constitution committee, David Geles (NRP) succeeded in achieving a waiver of the minimal waiting period required between the presentation of a law proposal and its approval.

This quick, somewhat nervous move, was not the first of its kind in the history of the Knesset, but it was not an everyday occurrence either. A law which has been waiting for years could not wait another 48 hours. The special waiver attracted immediate attention, not because of the special sensitivity to the subject, but because it was regarded as a first step in the practical cooperation between the Alignment and the NRP on the way to changing the government.

Time For The Reform Movement

The approved law basically perpetuates the existing situation. It set apart the two rabbis, Shlomo Goren and Ovadia Yosef. Rabbis would be elected for 10 years. During half of the period, one would be chief rabbi and the other president of the rabbinical court. In the second half, they would change roles. They will not be able to serve a second term.

The right to determine who can perform marriages remains in the hands of the rabbinate, but there is a change in who has the right to give a license to perform these functions. In the past, this power was in the hands of the minister of religious affairs; now it has been transferred to the rabbinate. Practically speaking, the difference is that up to now the reformists and the conservatives could appeal to the Supreme Court to make it order the rabbinate to give such a license to its men. The new law has made this impossible.

The quick action of the NRP could be explained by each of these articles. There was much excitement in the Alignment faction in the 24 hours before the vote. Its chairman, Moshe Shahal, had to tell the NRP that he will not be able to get in his party approval for the definition which gives special power to the rabbinate. This being the situation, the "cooks" in the NRP, Yehuda Ben-Meir and David Geles, were afraid that another delay in the approval of the law would give time to the reform movement to pressure the Alignment to demand more changes. The hasty action of the NRP could also be connected with Justice Minister Shmuel Tamir. The NRP was disappointed with the original law which he wanted to approve in the name of the government. It wanted quick approval while Shamir is abroad and cannot delay it. The quick action is also connected with Rabbi Goren. His chances for being elected again are not good, but the new law gives him another 3 years, and also another 3 years to his rival, Ovadya Yosef. [Rabbi Goren's] friends in the NRP and several important people in the Alignment who are close to him, such as Haim Bar-Lev, Menahem Hacohen and Yehuda Hashai wanted to give him that.

Goodwill

A difficulty was raised by the coalition. It was not only that the democrats opposed the law, but that Minister Without Portfolio Moshe Nissim was not satisfied. On the eve of the vote, he called Ben Meir and Geles and presented them with a government decision which required the appointment of another ministerial committee before final approval of the law. They reached a compromise, but the NRP was afraid of similar problems with the ministers of the Likkud.

Such explanations would usually be sufficient to explain why everything happened so quickly, but not last week when rumours were flying about joint action by the Alignment and the NRP to set the elections at an earlier date. The two sides claimed there was no connection between the two issues. The

Alignment did not ask for and did not get in exchange anything more than a little good will.

The cooperation on the rabbinate law has a long history: two years ago and one year ago, when the NRP wanted to delay the elections to the rabbinate, and the Likkud was powerless, [the latter] had to turn to the main opposition party. Thereupon, the NRP promised, even in writing, that when the rabbinate law is written, it would consult with the Alignment, and so it did.

In the Alignment, not everybody held MK Yossi Sarid's view, that the NRP should not be put in the government, if the Alignment gets an absolute majority. The NRP was afraid that the second generation in the Alignment does not have the same attachment to tradition that the first one had. Shahal wanted to convince them that they were wrong and did it through the rabbinate law. He took into account the existence of cooperation these last few weeks.

The chairman of the Alignment, Simon Peres, tried to allay the fears of the NRP regarding the possibility that the position of the reformists and the conservatives would be strengthened. He also talked to them of the future of the land of Israel, and reminded them that they were part of Alignment governments since the days of Golda Meir on the basis of the promise that should there be a possibility of peace with partition, a referendum would be called. (Apparently, it was not a promise but a picturesque expression for early elections).

It was convenient for the Alignment to accompany clarifications of principles whose final goal is to convince the NRP to agree to move the elections to an earlier date, with a practical reward such as quick approval of the rabbinate law.

At the end of the week, the heads of the NRP claimed that they did not promise anything in return. Education Minister Zevulun Hammer thought that the present government was very fair to his party and should be given another chance before it is toppled. If it does not function properly, it should be helped before it is thrown away. Those who were active in the approval of the rabbinate law did not have a common opinion on that issue. Ben Meir did not see any hope for the Likkud; Geles, who has dovish opinions, thought that too hasty a return of the Alignment to power would perpetuate its rule, against the interests of the country. The secretary of the NRP, Dani Varmus, who was also active on this issue, also does not pressure for moving the elections to an earlier date.

All the Alignment got so far is good will from the NRP. The quality of the investment would be clarified in the coming weeks.

9433

CSO: 4805

CONVENTION OF REFORM JUDAISM IN ISRAEL ATTACKED

Tel Aviv HAMODI'A in Hebrew 25 Feb 80 p 2

[Editorial: "The Reformists Have No Right in Israel"]

[Excerpts] There is a lot of symbolism in the fact that the international conference of Reform Judaism took place in the Knesset building, and none of the people concerned felt that there was provocation in this action. It was a provocation against Israeli law precisely in the house whose function is to make the law of the country. The conference of Reform Judaism which calls itself "advanced Judaism" tries to achieve recognition as a separate stream which has the legal authority to perform marriages and divorces, thereby undermining the law which says that in Israel marriages and divorces of Jews would be performed only according to the laws of the Torah. That was promised when the state was born and is anchored in several laws.

Reform Jews are angry because the rabbinate in Israel does not recognize conversions and divorces performed by them. But they ignore the fact that both conversions and divorces are deeply rooted in Jewish law and have no meaning without it. Reform conversion is not a conversion at all. What is required to get a certificate from a Reform Rabbi is less than what is required of somebody who wants to join a political party. It is certainly less than what is required of somebody who wants to become member of a Kibbutz. We are sorry to see what is done in this area in the United States and other western countries. We certainly cannot remain idle when the same sect which tore the Jewish law and tore itself from the whole of Israel tries to dig its claws into the soil of the land of Israel.

It is no use to remind this movement of its sins, such as omitting from the prayer book the prayers which mention Zion and Jerusalem. This sect carries the bug of assimilation, of the disappearance of Jewish communities in the diaspora. This sect has not done anything and cannot do anything against the wave of assimilation which threatens many Jewish communities in the west. What does it come to Israel for? Does it look for a "city of refuge"?

It is no coincidence that such a sect which is dangerous to Judaism gets enthusiastic support from non-religious circles, especially non-religious newspapers which oppose any manifestation of religious feeling and often fight against Judaism. It is no coincidence that the "ordination" of an Israeli born young man as a "rabbi," a ridiculous and provincial event, got the blessing of newspapers which always attack the rabbinate. The non-religious circles really need such a "rabbi" who has nothing to do with Judaism the way the Jews have practiced it for years.

There is nothing more ridiculous than the noisy publicity given to the "ordination" of one Israeli by the reform movement. This is good evidence of lack of roots here. The non-religious Israeli youth does not need this distortion. If he wants to find "advanced" Judaism, he does not need to look for it in the reform temple. The advanced Jews are somewhere else, and we do not need to tell him the address. It is known to every Israeli, even if he went to a non-religious school. If he looks for real Judaism, he will find it easily. He looks for it where he should look for it and where it is. There is no better evidence than the non-religious youngsters who found the way to real Judaism in the Yeshivas, in the studying of the Torah. Those who look for real Judaism do not need imitations and distortions. One cannot find the feeling of Jewish identity in tasteless ceremonies which have no basis in Judaism.

We ask the people who belong to this sect and grumble all the time, to please let Jewish youngsters find their way to Judaism on their own. It is enough what you have done to American Jewry which is facing extinction. We assume that no responsible public body in Israel would give them a foothold. Even those who made pompous declarations, will think twice before opening the door to reform in Israel. Allowing them to perform marriages and divorces and conversions not according to the law, would have serious implications on life in our country. It is not by chance that Mr Begin ignored the demand which was voiced in his presence at the beginning of the conference.

9433

CSO: 4805

SHAFIR TO BOLSTER POLICE INVESTIGATIONS UNIT

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 4 Apr 80 p 3

[Article by Robert Rosenberg]

[Text]

Police Inspector-General Hersh Shafir hopes to beef up his investigations branch by making the intelligence unit into a separate department that will coordinate its activities with investigations.

After a meeting yesterday with his senior staff, Shafir said he would make this a part of the reform programme he has been planning since he was appointed on January 1. Shafir still needs government authorization for the reorganisation, and police sources say he'll ask for it by mid-May.

The intelligence department will also include a special unit for field security, which will try to prevent classified information from reaching the hands of unauthorized persons. In the past there have been rumours and allegations that criminal elements had infiltrated the police, and the field security unit will operate to prevent any such infiltration.

Shafir's staff yesterday also decided to establish regional branches of the national fraud investigation unit, thus relieving

local commanders of such investigations.

Shafir has also decided on bolstering the unit that specializes in fighting serious crimes, adding to the unit the Nazi crimes division and the drug squad, which until now has been under the intelligence units in the police.

Finally, Shafir's staff yesterday decided to move the police internal investigations unit from investigations to the police ombudsman. Henceforth, only officers with investigative experience will sit on the board and will be rotated every year or two.

None of the reforms can go into effect until Shafir has submitted them to the government for authorization.

There already have been three decision-making sessions and three more are planned before the end of April, to decide on the reorganization.

Some of the proposed reforms will require additions to the ILAb. police budget. Others are organizational reforms that will require no further funding.

TAX ON CAPITAL DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 6 Mar 80 p 11

[Article by Prof Aharon Yoren, Chairman of the Institute for Law Research and Comparative Law in the Law School of the Hebrew University: "Statements of Capital Without Tax on Capital"]

[Text] The government's decision to make it mandatory to submit statements of capital, and the plan which was cancelled to tax the conversion of Liras to Shekels, have been criticized a lot. It is surprising that the tax they wanted to levy at the time of the currency conversion was a tax on cash assets (and probably also on bank accounts, bonds, and foreign currency), while the possibility of collecting a net tax on the basis of the statements of capital, was not even examined.

The tax on capital in Israel is property tax. The existing property tax is selective and discriminating. Only part of the property is taxed: real estate, vehicles, equipment and commercial stock. In addition, the tax is not based on net property, meaning the property minus debts. Two people who have identical apartments and identical cars would pay the same property tax, even though one financed it himself, and the other went into debt to finance it. It is a well-known fact that as far as tax policy is concerned, net capital tax which is based on the value of property minus debts, is more just.

We do not have a net capital tax, not because we do not know this basic fact, but because it was always said that in our country such a tax can not be enforced. In order to enforce a net capital tax, we must have the tools to know the amount of capital people have.

When the Alignment was in power, MAPAM often demanded such a tax, but it was not levied because it was thought that the extent of tax evasion which would accompany it would make it impractical. For that reason, the present property tax is based on real estate, vehicles, equipment and stock. Real estate and vehicles are registered according to the law (the office of real estate registration and the bureau of motor vehicles), and data on equipment and stock are known to the authorities

through income tax. In other words, the tax authorities have the fools to find the owners of properties and make them pay the tax.

What Is the Logic?

When it becomes mandatory to submit statements of capital, the following question needs to be asked: If the finance ministry thinks it can enforce the submission of tax statements, why does it not replace the unjust and discriminating property tax by a net capital tax? If it cannot enforce the statements and use the data contained in them, what do we need this tough law for?

What is the log'c for taxing an additional specific capital, cash, which happens to be in the hands of a person by chance at the time of conversion, instead of seriously examining the possibility of having net capital tax? It is improbable that it was thought in the finance ministry that this is the way to tax black capital, since it is usually not kept in cash. It would have made sense, if the purpose was to tax for once property which has not been taxed so far, but this is a very mistaken approach to deal with problems.

The basic issue which should be examined is whether the existing property tax can be replaced by a permanent tax on net capital. The capital tax would be determined by one short statement of capital submitted by each citizen once a year in which he would describe in detail the value of his property and his financial obligations. This tax would be much lower than the existing property tax, because the tax base would be much broader, and would include all property, not only specific things.

The fact that the tax is based on property minus financial obligations, reduces the tax base, but this is justified because a person's ability to pay taxes cannot be evaluated on the basis of capital financed by debts, but only on the basis of net capital. In order to evaluate net capital we don't need the long and detailed capital statements which the finance ministry requires a lot of people to fill out now. It would be enough to have a short report which would list the properties, their value and the financial obligations.

While the statement of capital demanded by the finance ministry would include a mixture of historical data on the cost of the properties in the past, which has nothing to do with its value in the present, the report for net capital tax would only reflect the present value of the property, and can be a hidden treasure of information for research and for determining policy regarding capital held by the public.

It seems that the finance ministry ought to give serious consideration to the issue of a net capital tax, and whether it can enforce it. It is possible that it would reach the same conclusion as previous governments. In that case, it should forget about the law regarding capital statements, as, given such a conclusion, it would be obvious that their only function is to hide the lack of proper plans to deal with the problem.

WAYS TO FIGHT TAX EVASION MORE EFFECTIVELY EXPLORED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 6 Mar 80 p 11

[Article by Prof Baruch Lev, Chairman of the Department of Business Administration in Tel Aviv University: "Malicious Joy, What Is It Doing?"]

[Text] "Adar [March] is a joyous month," and the joy, as usual, is at somebody's expense. They claim that the new finance minister has "slipped" on the issues of the Shekel, statements of capital [in old currency], and reports on cash deals. The "joy" is shared by everybody: the opposition, the coalition, the newsmen, the businessmen, and for the first time, I think, by the foreign press also. (A well-known British newspaper recently published a sarcastic article on the Shekel and the economy of Israel). In short, Israel is very happy!

In a moment of sobriety, you ask yourself: Why are we so happy? It is true that the issue of the Shekel and the dramatic way in which we were told about "The return to our origins" were a farce, and that the finance minister should better learn from this lesson. But what is wrong with the steps he proposes to fight tax evasion? Is there any other issue in our public life we agree on the way we agree that it is of prime importance to fight tax evasion? Was not Mr Hurwitz accused from the beginning that he puts all the burden on the poor people (through elimination of subsidies, the cuts in public services, etc.) while he does nothing against the tax evaders and the affluent? In addition, did the critics offer alternative ways to fight tax evasion and black capital?

I could not find evidence of that. [All I could see was] criticism centered on the present impotence of the tax authorities and their inability to deal effectively with the large numbers of statements of capital, and reports on cash deals. There is no doubt that under the present circumstances the tax authorities are not ready for an effective implementation of the steps that were agreed on. But does that mean that we have to give up the fight against tax evasion and black capital? This is the meaning of the proposal to cancel all regulations and laws decided on by the government. Instead of revoking these regulations we have to implement them more effectively.

Replenishing the Tax Offices

This process has to be based on two basic principles: Quick and effective processing of the data supplied by statements of capital and reports of cash deals, and verification of this data by comparing it with annual reports supplied by businesses.

In the age of modern computers this is quite a simple thing, but the use of computers in government offices is very ineffective--not only in the finance ministry, but also in the ministry of education where they can not do elementary things such as paying the teachers' salaries on time and reporting the results of the matriculation examinations. As we do not have enough time, we have to give this job to private service bureaus, while strictly protecting the secrecy of the information. The private sector has the manpower and the equipment needed to carry out this operation. The secrecy issue can be solved by checking first on those who get the job to see that they are reliable, and having them sign secrecy statements, which include strict sanctions.

The second principle has to be massive replenishing of tax offices so that they can carry out thorough checks of statements of capital, and use the great amount of information they obtain for more effective taxation. In order to achieve that, the hiring freeze in the tax system has to be revoked, and more money has to be allocated for training new employees. Qualified workers who lose their job in other branches of the government should join the tax offices. Especially qualified workers (accountants, economists, etc.) can be employed on a special contract basis for a limited period. These special contracts have to carry higher salaries than is usually the case in the civil service, but they would not offer job security. Those who are familiar with the labor market know that today there is considerable unemployment among administrators and economists, so it can be expected that enough people would jump on the opportunity offered in these special contracts. For this special operation of processing capital statements and the other reports, it may be advisable to consider employing retired workers of the tax offices for a limited period.

Favorable Public Opinion

The main difficulty in implementing these two principles of the operation is the opposition of the trade unions (with the support of the Histadrut) to the hiring of new workers on special contracts and to giving computer jobs to private service bureaus. This problem can be dealt with by creating massive public opinion in support of the steps to fight black capital. Public opinion has already toppled a government in Israel, and lately played an important role in "convincing" El Al workers to take a cut in salary. Destructive criticism and open disrespect towards new laws would only strengthen the unions which oppose any change in the present situation. At the same time, the finance minister has to convince the Histadrut which in principle supports the fight against the black capital, to support

a limited arrangement of special contracts in the tax offices, and to take away its support from the unions which oppose giving out computer jobs to the private sector.

To the point, it needs to be said that the fear of what would happen if black capital were smuggled out of the country as a reaction to the new regulations is basically unfounded. Would this money be used productively [at home] for investment in industry and export? Of course not, because the tax authorities would be aware of such transactions. This money would only contribute to more inflation and speculation in stocks. Therefore, we would lose nothing if it were to be taken out of the country. On the contrary, this would only help to block inflation.

Finally, the criticism of "shooting from the hip" and of lack of proper preparation of an administrative structure before issuing the regulations, is justified. The finance minister should pay attention to it, but this criticism should not weaken those who want to fight tax evasion or delay this fight. Instead we should support the finance minister in his efforts to fight tax evasion, and ask him to use more effective means. At the same time there should be constant pressure of public opinion on the trade unions and the Histadrut to make it possible to have special contracts to add people to the tax offices and carry out this very important task.

9433

CSO: 4805

SARKIS, AL-HUSS SEEK NATIONAL ENTENTE GOVERNMENT

Entente Principles Sought

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 8 Mar 80 pp 24-25

[Article by George Bashir Filed from Beirut: "Entente in Beirut Begins in Damascus"]

[Text] All those who stood around the confession seat at the B'abda Palace behind which sat President Sarkis and Prime Minister Al-Huss, concede that the two leaders managed all last week to traverse one of the most difficult and critical phases through which the government has had to go for the past four years, that is since the end of the two-year war. In addition to having to hear the confessions of representatives of political, partisan and parliamentary factions about national entente, they were able to insure the safe arrival of those representatives at B'abda and their safe return from the presidential palace. They also had to prevent reactions to the security setbacks that occurred throughout the period of consultations. It can thus be said that the consultations went peacefully and smoothly, but that entente is still rocky and shaky.

It appears that President Sarkis and Prime Minister Al-Huss were able to extricate the main outlines of entente from a "tangled mass," as one prominent minister put it, and have agreed to render them into the form of general principles upon which the representatives of political factions seem to agree. These are:

1--Lebanon is a sovereign and independent Arab state with a liberal system of government. It abides by the United Nations Charter, the covenant of human rights and the Arab League Charter. Lebanon is one state with one people whose representatives have unanimously agreed in consultation with the president and prime minister that they are committed to the unity of Lebanon and its people and the integrity of its territory. They are against any kind of partition. The enemy of Lebanon is Israel which has usurped the land of Palestine and made its people homeless. The Palestine problem cannot be solved unless

Israel withdraws completely from the occupied Arab territories and the Palestinian soil, the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council on the questions of Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, granting the Palestinians their legitimate rights and southern Lebanon should be implemented, and relations between the Lebanese state and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) should be regulated in accordance with the agreements and accords established between both parties.

2--The second part of those principles concerns the fact that representatives of all the political factions with whom President Sarkis and Prime Minister Al-Huss have consulted have conceded that the possession and use of arms throughout Lebanon be restricted to the legitimate Lebanese authority and its forces--the army and internal security forces--and the Arab Deterrent Forces (ADF). The representatives have also conceded that, in accordance with the concept of the cabinet's unanimous decision on the matter, only the Lebanese state has uncontested authority over all Lebanon and that no organization or power may have authority on any part of the Lebanese soil. The state calls for the return of the border strip along the border with Israel to its authority and for the deployment of its legitimate forces throughout Lebanon, including the strip. It condemns any secret or open dealings, directly or indirectly, with Lebanon's enemy, Israel.

3--The third part of the principles upon which the Lebanese have agreed concerns the question of establishing special political, economic and cultural relations with Syria by virtue of the historical relations between them on the basis of the principles of the Arab League Charter. The charter of the principles of national entente also proclaims the opposition of all the Lebanese people to the resettlement of Palestinians in southern Lebanon or in any other part of Lebanon, out of the belief of all the Lebanese people that the Palestinians should return to their homeland and that they should be helped in their endeavor to gain their full national rights within the framework of common Arab coordination. The Lebanese, of all political and spiritual groups, also declare their complete opposition to the provisions of the Camp David accords which they consider to be aimed at the resettlement of Palestinians where they are now and which they hold to be at variance with the resolutions of the various Arab summits calling for the settlement of the Middle East crisis and the Arab-Israeli conflict in a manner that would insure the return of the displaced Palestinians to their country and that also recognizes the PLO as the only legitimate negotiator seeking to regain the legitimate Palestinian rights.

At the latest cabinet meeting, which was held Wednesday, the president expressed satisfaction with the positive spirit which dominated the entente consultations with the representatives of the political factions and considered that spirit to be the cornerstone of efforts designed to find radical solutions for the problems which stand in the way of the

re-establishment of the state's authority and the re-establishment of security as well as obstruct the opening of the artificial barriers and borders among various Lebanese groups and areas. The optimism generated by President Sarkis in the country with regard to national entente, though cautious, has demonstrated that the president and the prime minister hold factors that are not possessed by many of those operating in the political and partisan fields, including even some of those who enthusiastically participated in the entente consultations at the B'abda Palace. Most prominent of those factors is that those who were betting on the negative aspect of the Syrian card were proved wrong by the information from and contacts with Damascus over the past few days. Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad has insisted on saying that Syria wants nothing from Lebanon, that it does not want to colonize the Lebanese people and that its utmost hope is that the Syrian forces return home to play their role inside Syria in defending the country's borders, that the Lebanese people should unite behind one legitimate authority and that a single Lebanese army should support legitimacy, defend the entire homeland and turn its guns on its enemy and the enemy of the Arabs, Israel. Syria is prepared with all its power, to support the legitimate authority so that its steps should be firm and steady.

From this point of departure, the regime pursued entente on two lines--internal and external. Internally, the regime did not recoil from conducting an unrestricted dialogue with all groups. Those who have taken part in the dialogue say that presence of Dr Salim Al-Huss next to President Sarkis on the confession seat lent to the consultations a national glamor that would have otherwise been lacking. It was reminiscent of Riyadh al-Sulh's role during the presidency of Shaykh Bisharah al-Khuri. The same persons concede that the awareness and consciousness displayed by the Lebanese in their reactions to the chain events of the last 20 days were characterized by prudence and reason. Their attitude was the result of the experiences and ordeals for which all the Lebanese without exception have paid a high price over the last four years.

The friends of the regime are divided over the exact direction and route of national entente. Some say that the regime should first turn to Syria and some of the Arab states which are active in the Lebanese arena, since their activities in the Lebanese arena are equivalent to national activities by Lebanese groups. The first step, however, should be made towards Damascus, the advocates of that approach suggest. The Lebanese and Syrian foreign ministers, Fu'ad Butrus and 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam, would meet--which has actually happened--in a candid and clear dialogue which would dissipate the dark clouds that hang over the two countries. They would draw up a draft agenda that would include the principles of a Lebanese-Syrian detente. That detente would in turn become the starter and nucleus of an inter-Lebanese entente, in the same manner in which the "constitutional document" set forth by Presidents Hafiz al-Asad and Sulayman Franjiyyah was the basis for ending the two-year war. All the

Arab states which are concerned with the Lebanese situation would be informed, since what is ultimately needed is to implement the resolutions of the Cairo and Tunis summits.

Others disagree. They say that a Lebanese-Syrian summit should come after an all-Lebanese summit at the B'abda Palace. All those Lebanese leaders who boycott that summit would be accountable before the people and history. This way Damascus would not have to bear the responsibility of the failure of a Lebanese entente. Officials in the regime recognize, however, that it is difficult to bring about a summit of all leaders in Lebanon at the present time because vestiges of the past, especially retaliatory notions, would still influence the attitudes and positions of some Lebanese leaders.

Thus, observers feel that a summit between Presidents Ilyas Sarkis and Hafiz al-Asad would remove most of the obstacles which stand in the way of a Lebanese entente, since implementation of the principles of entente remains the cornerstone of national rebuilding. The implementation of those principles, they feel, cannot be undertaken unless Syria helped the Lebanese government achieve the first step along that route, namely, to induce the national movement and the Lebanese front to cooperate within a new government forged by the principles of entente. This is the core of the give-and-take now occurring in the Lebanese field.

President Sarkis and Prime Minister Al-Huss feel that it is not for them to say who from the national movement or the Lebanese front is better qualified to enter the government. They feel that it is up to the two fronts to recommend representatives, after which the regime would select those with whom it can cooperate in the task of implementing the principles of entente.

On a lesser note, the most important thing that has happened was that those who were betting on a blowup in the Lebanese situation, have now become more optimistic and more convinced that a blowup would burn everybody's fingers. That danger has made the road of consultations over entente smooth--at least, up to now.

Sarkis Seeks Compromise

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 8 Mar 80 pp 25-27

[Article by Ghassan Bayram filed from Beirut: "The State Tries To Expedite Agreement Through the Method of 'Give and Take'"]

[Text] In his entente consultations with various Lebanese groups and forces, President Sarkis would always begin his remarks with a brief outline of the principles which can provide a general framework for agreement among the Lebanese and thereby a framework for regulating Lebanon's relations with Syria and the Palestinian resistance movement. President

Sarkis would also emphasize the difficult circumstances through which Lebanon is now going and the dangers which still threaten the Lebanese entity, in particular, and the region, in general. He would then note that the points of agreement and congruence among the various Lebanese groups are far greater than the points of discord. This, he would say, makes us hopeful that large strides can be made along the route of Lebanese entente leading us back to the Lebanon that we have known before the painful ordeal.

President Sarkis would also add: From the state's point of view, there are issues on which I cannot imagine that any two Lebanese would differ. For example, President Sarkis would say: "I cannot imagine that anyone would differ on the unity of Lebanese people and territories and on the need to return to the formula of coexistence among all Lebanese of all sects and persuasions, to re-establish the state's authority and sovereignty in all parts of Lebanon, and to stamp out the state of anarchy and unruliness. I do not think that anyone, deep in his heart, can disagree that Lebanon is an Arab country which has played and must continue to play a role in the Arab world within the framework of the Arab League and in compliance with its charter. I do not think that anyone would disagree that Lebanon and Syria have special relations and ties. I am not just saying that it is natural, but also that it is necessary, to have this relationship regulated on that basis, in a framework that would preserve and safeguard the common interests of the twin countries. Furthermore, I do not believe that the Lebanese should disagree among themselves about supporting the Palestinian question as a just cause which should be supported for the sake of upholding the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to establish their own state, or that the Lebanese should disagree about continuing the policy of understanding and coordination with the PLO."

President Sarkis would go on to say: In our view, Lebanon should be the first opponent of the Camp David policy because Lebanon, of all the other Arab states, is the main victim of that policy. The Camp David accords involve the danger of resettling Palestinians in Lebanon as well as the danger of dividing Lebanon and partitioning its territory. President Sarkis would then ask: On what else would the Lebanese possibly disagree? Would it be the army? If there are any misgivings about the army, these can be easily discussed in a natural fashion. If we detected faults that can be remedied, then we would do so and would also correct any other fault because we are seekers of reform and rebuilding and cannot be otherwise.

With such opening remarks during his consultations, President Sarkis sought to forestall any possible disagreement between him and any Lebanese group over the main points of a Lebanese entente. In so doing, President Sarkis, with the consent of the prime minister, Dr Salim al-Huss, sought to fashion a minimum consensus among the Lebanese groups as a first step toward the ultimate goal behind entente--the articulation of a new system in Lebanon.

Because of this, the two pillars of the regime, Sarkis and Al-Huss, avoided throughout the consultations getting bogged down in details, in the belief that conditions are still not favorable for discussing details and out of fear that disagreement over details might undermine a general accord and understanding about the principles. The people in power still believe that the Lebanese situation, because of all the external factors that impinge on it, is still incapable of accepting entente as a whole, and that it is, therefore, necessary to administer entente in small doses. They believe that the regime, in trying to extricate Lebanon from its ordeal, must adopt a policy of take-what-you-can-and-ask-for-more, even though it is impossible to get everything. Still, they recognize that something is better than nothing.

Some observers agree that this clever policy by the regime has dissipated some major fears which arose in Lebanon when the regime set forth to work out a formula for an entente. Some people had thought that giving priority to an inter-Lebanese entente might create problems which would place the regime before a hard choice: either the president would have to consider resigning when all avenues have been blocked in his face, whereby he would place every Lebanese group before its historical responsibility, or he would stay and turn to Syria from a position of weakness and powerlessness, thereby leaving it for Syria to determine what it wants for itself and for Lebanon.

Those risks were discussed between Premier Salim al-Huss and a number of political and social personalities when they met at the reception given by the Kuwaiti ambassador in Beirut 'Abd al-Hamid al-Bu'ayjan on the occasion of Kuwait's 19th national day. The large Lebanese contingent at that party brought back to mind the vitality and vigor which marked Lebanon before it was afflicted by its painful ordeal. It so happened that Dr Al-Huss came to the reception after attending the first round of consultations conducted by President Sarkis. The first question posed to Dr Al-Huss reflected criticism of the policy of assigning priority to an inter-Lebanese entente at a time when the situation required a Lebanese-Syrian detente that would solve the security problem and thus pave the way to a discussion of a political settlement.

Prime Minister Al-Huss said: "There was no possibility of providing an alternative to an inter-Lebanese entente. Although we are aware of the great difficulties which stand in the way of our attempt, we had no other choice in the circumstances. Believe me when I tell you that the regime approaches the question of entente with the same spirit with which it went to the Tunis summit." Prime Minister Al-Huss went on: "Lebanon's road to the Tunis summit was never paved with roses, but was a bumpy and rough road strewn with pitfalls and time-bombs. Yet, we steeled ourselves and went to Tunis because we had no other choice. Today, as we move toward entente, the road is strewn with the same pitfalls and time-bombs with which the road to Tunis was strewn."

Prime Minister Al-Huss was told that the government was embarking on an incalculable risk, indeed an incalculable gamble. The failure of the regime to achieve an entente would mean that it faced a serious deadlock with no other options open to it. What would you then tell the Lebanese, the Arabs and the world, he was told. Al-Huss answered with a question. Have we attained all our goals at the Tunis summit, he asked. We returned from Tunis with less than the minimum of our demands. Then, why do you look at the entente which we seek as a black-and-white proposition? We say that entente cannot be attained by law or decree and cannot come about in hours or days or even weeks. Entente is a long march. Every step we make in that march is a gain. Therefore, the success or failure of our present consultations will be relative, for if we achieved a 10 percent success, we would consider this as a gain. Something is better than nothing, after all.

One of the guests at the reception told Prime Minister Al-Huss: The circumstances which preceded and then accompanied the decision to propose an entente required above all the mending of relations with Damascus, restoration of the lost trust and the regulation of the Lebanese-Syrian relationship because this is tantamount to covering half the distance to an inter-Lebanese entente. Prime Minister Al-Huss replied: We cannot impose our will on anyone. I went to Syria twice and discussed the situation from all its aspects with President Hafiz Al-Asad and other senior officials. It was Damascus which recommended that any understanding be reached among all the Lebanese before relations between Lebanon and Syria can be discussed. Since it is Syria which is insisting on this, do we tell Damascus that it should either discuss relations with us or we would not be willing to propose an all-Lebanese entente? One person told Prime Minister Al-Huss: But Mr Prime Minister, giving priority and precedence to a Lebanese entente made some people say that the failure of the regime's initiative or failure to accomplish a minimum of entente means that President Ilyas Sarkis will go to meet with President Hafiz al-Asad from a position of weakness which would make him susceptible to accept all what Syria wants. Prime Minister Al-Huss replied: Who told you that President Sarkis will go to Damascus if he fails to achieve entente? I believe that President Sarkis will not go to meet with President Al-Asad if he failed to attain a minimum of entente, because a meeting between Presidents Sarkis and Al-Asad presupposes that its main topic would be the success achieved by the entente consultations.

This conclusion and line of reasoning advanced by Prime Minister Al-Huss, namely, that a Lebanese-Syrian summit is out of the question if President Sarkis failed to induce the Lebanese to accept a maximum or a minimum degree of entente, did not please any of those persons who debated this issue with the prime minister at the Kuwait Embassy reception. The politicians among them argued that this approach can never lead Lebanon out of its present predicament, and that it confirms the belief of some that priorities have been arranged in the wrong order. That is to say that

instead of coming after a Lebanese-Syrian and a Lebanese-Palestinian detente, entente among the Lebanese has been given first priority. Political figures who have recently visited Damascus say that the Lebanese government began to err when it decided to order the army to replace the ADF in the positions from which the ADF will withdraw. They feel that such a decision should have been preceded by an effort on the part of President Sarkis to call for an immediate meeting with President Hafiz al-Asad so as to reach an understanding on the steps that should be taken. Those same figures have information which confirm that Prime Minister Salim Al-Huss' first trip to Damascus after the announcement pertaining to the ADF withdrawals from Beirut and its suburbs was much more successful than the second visit which came after the Lebanese cabinet's decision to order the army to replace the ADF units. After the first visit, the problem could have been solved by a telephone call from President Sarkis to President al-Asad setting a meeting between them. But the situation changed when Prime Minister al-Huss made his second visit, for Damascus was now saying that President Sarkis should focus his attention first on bringing about a Lebanese entente before a Lebanese-Syrian summit can be discussed.

During his second visit to Damascus, Prime Minister Al-Huss tried to explain the cabinet's decision to deploy the army, saying that it was taken without any ill intention toward Syria because the Lebanese regime cannot substitute the ADF except with the Lebanese army, and this should be obvious. This explanation, however, did not persuade Damascus that there was no ill intention towards it. The Syrian government also recognizes in principle that the Lebanese army is the substitute for the ADF, but its objections were not related to the principle of the matter but to the political background of the Lebanese government's decision to deploy the army. It seems that Damascus had received information involving a large part of the discussion which took place among senior Lebanese officials after the decision to withdraw the ADF from Beirut. Based on that information, officials in Damascus concluded that the decisions pertaining to the deployment of the Lebanese army are a maneuver designed to create pressures aimed at forcing Lebanon to open the file of Lebanese-Syrian relations in order to regulate those relations in a series of treaties and agreements.

Some Lebanese circles admit that discussions among Lebanese officials did in fact pose the following questions: Will the Syrian forces withdraw and restrict their redeployment positions to the Al-Biqa' region? And does Syria want a security agreement with Lebanon or not?

At first, the state was convinced that the withdrawal of the ADF units was out of the question, and that the announcement of decisions to withdraw those forces was merely intended as a means of pressure. The state was also convinced that there was a serious tendency by Syria to conclude a security treaty with Lebanon. That belief was not based on personal deductions and conclusions but derived from probes in which the leadership sounded several sources within the government and in a number

of Arab and foreign states. Those security and diplomatic sources agreed that Syria would not withdraw from Lebanon and that the decision to withdraw some units would eventually be reconsidered. Views expressed by some Arab diplomats confirmed that assessment. Furthermore, the United States and some European states said that Syria intends to remain in Lebanon and that it wants a security treaty. The Soviet Union, through its ambassador in Beirut, did not give a clear opinion, however, but confined itself to generalities. Only a very, very limited number of friends of President Sarkis disagreed with that view and emphasized that Syria is determined to withdraw its forces from Beirut and redeploy them in the Al-Biq'a' area from now to the middle of May, that is just before the deadline set for the autonomy negotiations.

Understandably, the Lebanese president did not adopt the view of the very small number of friends who advised him otherwise. He based his position and calculations on the assumption that the ADF are in Lebanon to stay. Thus, the Lebanese government would continue to be in a position of strength so long as it would be required to provide an official cover in the Arab League for the extension of the ADF's mandate, and so long as it would be required to ask the United Nations Security Council for an extension of the United Nations forces in southern Lebanon. Accordingly, the state began to operate on the assumption that it is now engaged in a finger-biting battle. The more it can withstand pain and not flinch, the greater its chances of not having to make concessions, irrespective of whether it is capable of making the decision to offer concessions or not.

In the first phase, things continued to run in accordance with those beliefs and assumptions until question marks began to be raised about whether the regime, in its positions and calculations, was the victim of wrong information or whether there was miscalculation in the views and advice given to it.

Those doubts began to be raised following the return of Prime Minister al-Huss from his latest visit to Damascus and his remarks that Syria does not seek treaties with Lebanon but merely seeks political and military coordination and that there are now some Lebanese reservations with regard to the principle of military coordination with Syria.

The assertion that Syria is not seeking treaties brought into question the views of those who said that there will be no Syrian withdrawals from Lebanon. Doubts began to assail the credibility of such views and information. This made the state begin to entertain the idea that the withdrawals may be real and final and that, therefore, the question of entente acquires a special urgency since it would now be necessary to achieve the maximum possible degree of success in the entente efforts in order to overcome any adverse effects created by the withdrawal of the ADF, on the one hand, and so that the army and security forces of the legitimate regime become the substitute for the ADF.

In this atmosphere, things returned to normal. The urgent effort to bring about a Lebanese entente through negotiations with the various groups was accompanied by a parallel effort on the part of the Lebanese government to pave the way for a Lebanese-Syrian detente. This latter effort was encouraged by the results of the government's consultations, which showed that the various Lebanese forces--rightist, leftist, Christian and Moslem--advocate the need to establish distinct and special relations between Lebanon and Syria.

On the morning of 3 March, the Lebanese foreign minister Fu'ad Butrus, prompted by those new considerations and trends, went to Damascus to discuss ways to lay down the first brick in the edifice of Syrian-Lebanese detente and to make preparations for a summit meeting between Presidents Hafiz al-Asad and Ilyas Sarkis.

9254

CSO: 4802

'BEIRUT RADIO' CARRIES FRENCH CP LEADER'S STATEMENT

NC171450 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 1130 GMT 17 Apr 80 NC

[Text] At around 0945, French Communist Party Secretary General Georges Marchais left Beirut to return to Paris. Marchais has concluded a visit to Lebanon during which he held talks with Lebanese officials and leaders of the national movement and the Palestinian resistance.

On departing Lebanon Mr Marchais said: This visit enabled us to form several impressions of extreme importance to us. I reiterate that we had positive talks with the Lebanese officials and the resistance and national movement leaders.

He added: These talks have produced identical viewpoints on the situation, developments and the joint tasks. These tasks must be discharged in order to fulfill the clear-cut objectives of the Palestinian people and the Palestine Liberation Organization, which are the establishment of a Palestinian state on Palestinian soil and the recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Concerning Lebanon, Mr Marchais said: The most important goal is to unify Lebanon so that it can regain control [of] all of its geographical territory, its sovereignty and its internationally-recognized borders. In other words, this most important goal is the establishment of a democratic Lebanon. This is the primary conclusion which we draw from this visit. Furthermore, I believe that this visit will strengthen our ties of friendship and solidarity.

He added: I attach great importance to the talks I had with President Sarkis, speaker Al-As'ad and Prime Minister Al-Huss. These talks have been positive. We reviewed our stances and noted the causes for the tragic situation in Lebanon. We also noted Israel's clear responsibility for this crisis and the means for emerging from this state of affairs. We also expressed support for the principles of national reconciliation as announced by President Sarkis. Consequently, and of its own will, the national movement constitutes an important force on which one can depend to turn these principles into realities. We have no right to interfere in Lebanon's domestic affairs.

Mr Marchais called on the French Government not to head the stances of President Carter and his European friends, because France is a state with independent responsibility toward the solution of various topical issues, particularly the Middle East issue and the Lebanese problem. It is imperative to respect Lebanon's independence and to assign it a more effective role in order to resolve the Middle East crisis.

Mr Marchais said: This is the position of the French Communist Party. France should not remain silent. On the contrary, it should take stances so that it can play a special role as far as Lebanon, the Middle East and the Palestinian people are concerned.

CSO: 4802

CANADIAN WHEAT DEALS DISCUSSED

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 1 Mar 80 p 5

[Article: "Canadian Wheat Price Set for 1980 Quantities; Agreement Renewal About to be Signed"]

[Text] The office of grains and sugar beets yesterday fixed the price of Canadian wheat for the remaining 100,000 tons of the present agreement, which will be completed at the end of 1980. That occurred after deliberations between the minister of the economy and trade, Talal al-Mar'ubi, and the director general of the office, Munir Barbari.

This quantity was set, in total, at a price of 213.10 Canadian dollars, whereas the maximum price set in the contract was 221.45 Canadian dollars, i.e., a savings of about eight dollars per ton. Three dollars must be subtracted from that, because of the rise of the Canadian exchange rate. That leaves five dollars, or 500,000 dollars with respect to the entire quantity.

It is known that the Canadian wheat agreement stipulates a maximum price which cannot be exceeded in the event world prices rise, but can be reduced if prices drop below the average, which the grain office considers and then sets the deal on that basis.

A month ago, the grain office began to watch the development of world prices and their deterioration as a result of the American-Soviet crisis. When it fixed the price, it took into consideration the possibility of changing prices and the possibility of rising shipping rates.

Beginning with the last part of next April, it is possible that agreement will be reached on shipping dates for the Canadian wheat, to the port of Beirut.

Renewal of the Agreement

As regards to renewing the agreement for the years 1981-85, which is awaiting the signature of the minister of economy and trade, it was understood from the minister's sources that the approval to renew has been decided in principle; however, these sources did not clarify the reason for delaying the signing.

They reiterated that the AGRO Company, which represents the Canadian grain office, has informed the Canadian ambassador in Beirut that it still faces a short delay, until early March, after which withdrawal of the Canadian side would be a foregone conclusion.

Wheat Bidding

Bidding on a deal for 100,000 tons of wheat, of both the coarse and the semi-coarse variety, was completed yesterday, with the decision on the last fourth-part of the deal amounting to 25,000 tons, which was awarded to the Trade Grain Company at the price of 211.45 dollars per ton.

Eight companies took part in the bidding, with their prices as follows: Hathut Trading, 208.15 dollars; Cobrusul, 213.45; Bihawi Trading, 212.20; Lorico, 212.85; Interagro, 214.40; Trade Grain, 211.45; America Farm, 212.91; and A.B.A. Trade, 212.60 dollars.

It was learned that the Hathut Trading Company's bid, with the lowest price, was disqualified because it included several infringements and provisos, the most important of which delayed the shipping date until 10 April, whereas the stipulations of the contract required that this date be between the middle and the end of March. The matter was submitted to the minister of economy and trade, and his consideration was that the low bid was a price clearly inconsistent with the stipulations of the contract and could not be accepted. Therefore, the bid was awarded to the Trade Grain Company which had previously won two other parts of the deal.

After the conclusion of this deal and fixing the Canadian wheat deal at 100,000 tons the grain office will be able to complete purchase of all quantities required for domestic consumption for the current year. It is expected that the invitation for new bids will be announced shortly to obtain a reserve amount sufficient for consumption for 3 months.

7005

CSO: 4802

INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS REVIEWED

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 6 Mar 80 p 7

[Article: "Industrial Exports in February Total 136 Million Pounds; Increase of 30.6 Percent"]

[Text] Lebanese industrial exports, during last February, achieved an increase of 30.6 percent over January's percentage, since their value amounted to 136,134,000 Lebanese pounds, according to statistics issued by the agency for technical affairs and industrial services in the directorate general for industry, on the basis of reports issued by the directorate.

The value of industrial exports in January was 103,330,000 Lebanese pounds, a decline of 2.5 percent from December 1979.

Non-metallic mine extracts occupied first place among products; their value was 13.4 million pounds, and most of them were exported to Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria and Kuwait. They were followed by aluminum products, valued at 11.8 million, most of which was exported to Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan and Syria. Next, chemical products values at 11.4 million, going to Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq; mineral products at 11.2 million, most of which was exported to Iraq and Saudi Arabia; black cement at 10.4 million pounds, to Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Jordan; wood paneling and veneer at 9.6 million, 98 percent of which was exported to Jordan; articles of clothing at 7.9 million, mostly to Saudi Arabia; industrial machinery and mixing machines, 7.7 million, most of which went to Saudi Arabia and Iraq; electrical equipment at 6.4 million, mostly to Iraq; foodstuffs, 6.2 million, exported to various Arab countries, most notably Saudi Arabia; plastic products at 6.09 million went mostly to Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Exports of the following products decline: paper and cardboard products, oil cakes, household carpets and coverings, and accessories.

These exports were distributed among 29 countries, led by the Arab countries. Goods valued at 58 million Lebanese pounds were exported to Saudi Arabia, i.e., 42.8 percent.

Exports to the Kingdom used to represent about 50 percent; this decrease was to the benefit of Iraq and Jordan. Exports to Iraq were valued at 33 million pounds, or 24.86 percent of the total, a slight increase from past amounts. Exports to Jordan amounted to 20 million pounds or 14 percent of the total. This percentage used to be about 8 percent.

The percentage of exports to Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan and Syria declined from about 92 percent to 88.9 percent of the total.

Here are two lists, with the types of products exported and the countries to which they were exported:

Products

<u>Type of Product</u>	<u>Value (in thousands of Lebanese pounds)</u>
Foodstuffs	6,211
Oil cakes	2,595
Natural and mineral water	4,605
Beverages	1,869
Articles of clothing	7,916
Textiles	1,230
Household carpets and coverings	675
Tanned and processed leather	2,211
Shoes	1,342
Veneer wood	9,652
Wooden furniture and goods	1,803
Chemical products	11,370
Paint	2,819
Medicinal preparations	2,684
Paper products	802
Cardboard products	1,518
Non-metallic mine extracts	13,424
Black cement	10,438
Mineral products	11,264
Aluminum products	11,868
Accessories	242
Electrical equipment	6,410
Industrial machinery mixing machines	7,793
Plastic products	6,093
Miscellaneous goods	9,300
Total	136,134

Countries

<u>Country</u>	<u>Value (in thousands of Lebanese pounds)</u>
Saudi Arabia	58,280
Iraq	33,855
Jordan	20,225

<u>Country</u>	<u>Value (in thousands of Lebanese pounds)</u>
Syria	8,775
Egypt	1,767
Kuwait	3,744
Libya	73
Yemen	1,311
Abu Dhabi	1,298
Bahrain	132
Dubai	376
Qatar	516
Musqat	970
Sudan	529
France	278
Italy	299
Britain	1,165
West Germany	408
Denmark	29
Holland	525
Sweden	107
Norway	3
Austria	158
USA	11
Africa	11
Sharjah	214
Switzerland	1
Iran	165
China	940

7005

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

BANKS' LIQUIDITY PROBLEM--A notable relaxation was registered in the shortage of liquidity in the Lebanese pound at commercial banks. Banking circles said that the condition of liquidity had become stabilized, and the pressure which was apparent 2 months ago had lessened. This relaxation emerged from banks suspending the practice of resorting to the Bank of Lebanon for borrowing liquidity through "swap" operations, which amounted to around 300 million pounds during the past 2 months. Banking circles stated that the interest rate among the banks was still ranging between 11 and 12.5 percent. This slight decrease in the latter part of February is contrary to the norm, since it usually goes up towards the end of the month because of considerations pertaining to the banks' eagerness to adjust the average of their required reserves with the Bank of Lebanon. These circles consider the amount of 300 million pounds, which the banks were guaranteed by the Bank of Lebanon, to be sufficient for eliminating the liquidity problem. In addition, the state continues to pay monthly expenditures without being able to absorb any part of them. In other words, the treasury's weakness and its need to resort to borrowing from the Bank of Lebanon creates a constant cash flow. There are some who think that raising the interest on credit accounts has enabled some institutions to bring in new deposits, and has changed to some extent the geography of deposits in the banks. [Text] [Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 1 Mar 80 p 5] 7005

FOUR RECONSTRUCTION LOANS--The board of directors of the National Bank for Industrial Development and Tourism, chaired by Mr 'Abd al-Rahman al-Tayarah, met yesterday to consider some loan requests submitted to them by industrial and medical care organizations, which suffered damage as a result of recent incidents. The board approved four loans valued at around 16 million pounds. It was learned that among these loans was one for the American University hospital, valued at 4 million pounds. The chairman of the board announced that the bank would continue to study loan applications within the framework of the 400 million pounds loan, referring to the amount which is nearly depleted, and that the board of directors is once again searching for new sources of revenue. One should recall that payment of previous debts has not yet begun, since these loans included a grace period, not to mention the fact that withdrawal of amounts is not done all at once, but rather is in accordance with the borrowing institution's need. It suffices to say that interest is calculated only on those amounts withdrawn. It is well-known

that the 400 million pound loan was divided as follows: 300 million pounds for the development and reconstruction board and 100 million for commercial banks. [Text] [Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 1 Mar 80 p 5] 7005

NUMEROUS HOUSING LOANS--The housing bank has granted 290 loans in 10 months, i.e., since its establishment up to 29 February. They are valued at 26,777,500 Lebanese pounds. These loans were distributed as follows: 110 construction applications for total value of 9,373,500 pounds; 171 purchase applications for total value 17,085,000 pounds; 9 improvement and repair applications for total value 319,000 pounds. Construction loans accounted for 35 percent of the total loans, purchase loans amounted to 63.7 percent, and the improvement and repair loans amounted to 1.3 percent. The housing bank received, during the same period, 521 applications, valued at 43,434,000 pounds, of which 81 requests were cancelled, leaving 440 applications being subject to approval, valued at 41,199,500 pound. The number of applications pending is 150, distributed as follows: 54 requests which have been approved for 4,862,000 pounds; requests under study, none; 54 requests under study in the credit department, valued at 5,428,000 pounds; 17 applications under study in the technical department, valued at 1,743,000 pounds; 20 requests with insufficient documentation, valued at 2,057,000 pounds; 5 requests lacking official license, valued at 332,000 pounds. The total of loans actually granted or approved during the 10 months is 31,639,500 pounds, i.e., more than 60 percent of the bank's total capital of 50 million. On the other hand, a meeting will be held tomorrow at the housing bank, by the tripartite committee of the board of directors, which is tasked with studying the obtaining of additional resources for the bank. It is composed of the chairman of the board, Filadu Khalat, board member Tannus Fighali, and expert, Dr George Quarram. It was learned that the committee will draw up a list of sources which can be used for additional financing. The sources are specified in the bank's internal charter. [Text] [Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 7 Mar 80 p 5] 7005

IMPORTED INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY--The value of imported industrial machinery and equipment last February, according to statistics of the general directorate for industry, amounted to 69,963,000 Lebanese pounds. Its weight amounted to 12,587,451 kgs. Machines for non-metallic mining fields accounted for two-thirds of the total. Here are the details: Machinery for production of paper and cardboard, 9,585 kg, 285,800 pounds; shoe production machines, 75,975 kg, 1,184,000 pounds; machinery for textiles, 74,950 kgs, 2,177,500 pounds; machinery for production of foodstuffs, 193,075 kg, 738,900 pounds; machinery for plastic production, 114,090 kg, 2,380,500 pounds; machinery for chemical production, 36,600 kg, 1,125,000 pounds; machinery for non-metallic mining fields, 10,040,738 kg, 42,892,500 pounds; printing presses, 9,700 kg, 4,661,000 pounds; machinery for lumber production, 204,380 kg, 1,275,300 pounds miscellaneous machinery 135,263 kg, 2,794,500 pounds; machinery for metallic production, 1,205,800 kg; 8,448,000 pounds. [Text] [Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 6 Mar 80 p 7] 7005

MOROCCO

EFFECT OF TRIPOLI RESOLUTION DISCUSSED

Paris LE MONDE in French 17 Apr 80 p 5

[Article by Roland Delcour]

[Text] Rabat--The "summit" decision calling for recognition of the "Sahara Republic" has caused some concern in Morocco, the first question being: is the PLO committed by the recognition of the POLISARIO. Abou Marouan, the organization's representative in Morocco, has given assurance that the organization could not be committed by the resolution. Any other reaction by him would have been a significant blow to Morocco, since the king has recently, particularly during his visit to Paris, gone to great effort to defend the causes of Palestine and Jerusalem.

It is nevertheless true that the Tripoli resolution, even with its import thus reduced, represents some decline in Morocco's position in the Arab world. The case of Libya, declared support to the POLISARIO aside, it is Syria's decision that matters most [sentence as published]. This country is recognized to wield considerable weight in the Arab world.

On Monday, in the daily LE MATIN DU SAHARA, Moroccan journalist Aboul Khatib accused the BBC of broadcasting from Paris a "false interview" with Moroccan journalist Raphael Mergui, writer of an article on the recent Zaq battle published in the latest issue of JEUNE AFRIQUE. According to the criticized interview, the Moroccans had bought South African weapons and South African technicians had come to Morocco. LE MATIN DU SAHARA responds to these claims with a formal denial and attributes them to Algeria's "propaganda campaign" aimed, with an eye to the upcoming OAU conference in Freetown, at persuading some black African countries not to vote according to Morocco's wishes.

CSO: 4400

PERSIAN GULF AREA

OFFICIAL SEEKS DIRECT OIL CONTRACTS WITH GULF STATES

LD160907 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 10 Apr 80 p 2

[Report by Peter Kjølstrup: "Danish Oil and Natural Gas Company Wants To Buy Oil Direct From Qatar"]

[Text] Qatar--The first stop on Energy Minister Poul Nielson's week-long tour of three gulf states in search of oil has had the provisional result that continued negotiations in Qatar will be entrusted to Danish Oil and Natural Gas and Qatar's state firm General Petroleum.

Shortly after Poul Nielson's official call on Finance and Oil Minister Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz al Thani, Danish Oil and Natural Gas Director Gerhard Jensen had his first meeting with representatives of the Arabian counterpart to his organization. However, it is not expected that the introductory discussions will lead to the signing of a contract until mid-summer at the earliest.

Energy Minister Poul Nielson said after his meeting with his Qatari opposite number that both sides had agreed not to give any specific report of the talks, but characterized the meeting as positive, not only in so far as they touched on oil. Qatar was, for instance, interested in finding out what forms of technical expertise Denmark was able to offer.

His opposite number said that the direct, state-to-state discussions are to be seen in the light of Qatar's desire to insure stable oil deliveries to all European countries. Qatar, whose oil production is 1.5 times Denmark's consumption, has no plans to follow Kuwait's example and cut its output or to discriminate against the large oil companies. But the shaykh reproached the latter sharply for their spot transactions, which won them large profits. "We are against price rises, which can ruin the economies in the Western world and cause inflation," Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz said; he also said that there would probably be no increase in oil prices before the winter at the earliest, and that the increase would probably not be as great as in the past. And, before that, there is even a chance of a fall in price.

Even if there has been no official promise of Danish oil purchases, there is a general feeling in Doha, Qatar's capital that Denmark will be one of the first to participate in such state-to-state trade here. The limited oil production in the oil paradise, with its 250,000 inhabitants, makes a small country like Denmark an obvious guinea pig for such state-to-state trading. As an official spokesman put it, "We do not know how far you are for the Arabs, but we know that you are not against them. And we know that you are not trying to sell us a sugar-coated political pill."

Yesterday evening Poul Nielson left for Abu Dhabi, in the United Arab Emirates, and on Sunday his shopping trip continues to Kuwait. Unofficially his goal is contracts for oil of up to 2 million tons per year, corresponding to 12 percent of Denmark's yearly oil consumption. Of this, almost half can be expected to come from Qatar, if the negotiations now beginning lead to the signing of a contract.

Even if one of the Arabs' aims behind these state-to-state trade agreements is to decrease the influence of the large oil companies on the oil trade, the Danish purchase of oil is going ahead with the agreement of at least the Danish oil companies. The agreements now nearing completion in Denmark provide for a consultation procedure before the state oil contracts are concluded, since these will to a large extent benefit these companies, which will also bear the risks involved. This will affect OK Danmark, Esso, Shell and Gulf, which will also handle refining and BP and Norsk Hydro.

CSO: 3106

NEW REGULATIONS TO GOVERN REQUESTS FOR FOREIGN WORKERS

Dammam AL-IQTISAD in Arabic Feb 80 p 15

[Article: "New Regulations on Requesting Workers"]

[Text] The Interior Ministry has decided to add two new regulations to those concerning requests for workers by local contracting companies and organizations. The ministry announced that these two regulations will be effective regarding both new requests for workers and requests which are still being processed. It expressed its hope that citizens who are the owners of companies and organization will cooperate with the agency responsible for requesting workers, in compliance with the two new regulations, for the benefit of the public. The text of the ministry's statement is as follows:

"Inasmuch as the interior ministry has noted that there are local contracting organizations and companies without financial or technical means, which request workers but have no work for them to do. Consequently, the workers are left to look for themselves for work in the local labor market. The ministry has decided to add two new regulations to instructions concerning requests for workers by local contracting companies and organizations.

"The first regulation concerns a requirement to attach a certificate from a well-known regular or commercial bank. The purpose is to prove that the owner or owners of the company or organization does indeed conduct business with the bank from which the certificate is obtained. This is subject to limits on the number of workers requested according to classification schedules which define this. The owners of the company or organization must have maintained an account in the bank for at least 6 months. This shall be in accordance with the following schedule:

"First: Organizations or companies which request between 1 and 10 workers shall not submit a bank certificate if it has not previously requested more than this number according to data on file at the Worker Request Office.

"Second: Organizations and companies which request between 1 and 20 workers shall submit a bank [guarantee] certificate amounting to 100,000 riyals if they have not previously requested more than this number.

"Third: Organizations and companies which request between 1 and 40 workers shall submit a bank certificate amounting to 200,000 riyals.

"Fourth: Organizations and companies which request between 1 and 60 workers shall submit a bank certificate amounting to 300,000 riyals.

"Fifth: Organizations and companies which request between 1 and 80 workers shall submit a bank certificate amounting to 400,000 riyals.

"Sixth: Organizations and companies which request between 1 and 60 workers [as published; should be 90] shall submit a bank certificate amounting to 500,000 riyals.

"Seventh: Requirements for any number exceeding this shall be determined according to the foregoing.

"The following shall be exempt from the requirement to submit a bank certificate:

"First: Well-known domestic organizations and companies.

"Second: Local and foreign companies and organizations which are parties to contracts for work with government agencies, since these government agencies already require a bank guarantee.

"Third: Local industries, for which the ministry of industry determines the required number of workers; hotels and bakeries for which the ministry of trade determines the required number of workers; and farmers whose requests are determined by the ministry of agriculture. This exemption also includes workshops and tailor shops.

"The second regulation concerns the requirement to attach a certificate of payment of alms and income taxes, for a period of one entire year. All local and foreign companies and organizations shall be subject to this regulation without exception.

"These two new regulations shall come into effect on the date they are announced. They shall apply to requests of local companies and organizations which were submitted before the regulations were announced but were still not processed by the date of announcement.

"In making this announcement to citizens who are the owners of companies and organizations, the ministry of interior hopes that they will cooperate with the agency responsible for requests for workers as a token of their appreciation of the public good."

BRIEFS

CONTRACTOR CLASSIFICATIONS--The agency for the classification of contractors of the Ministry of Public Works and Housing is currently reclassifying Saudi contractors who were previously classified by the Saudi committee for the classification of contractors in 1974. The agency has issued new forms in accordance with which the new classification will be made. They will consequently render null and void the classification which was made valid by the committee for the classification of contractors in 1974. The new forms issued in this connection define the regulations necessary for classifying Saudi contractors and giving them a rank in accordance with specific commitments in which accuracy and the ability to perform are taken into account. A responsible source at the ministry urged all Saudi contractors, both classified and unclassified, to fill out the new forms so as to be awarded government work in keeping with their trade and their rank is classified by the ministry: [Text] [Dammam AL-IQTISAD in Arabic Feb 80 p 15] 7811

DEVELOPMENT PLAN SURVEILLANCE--Director General of Oversight of the Ministry of Planning Isma'il Sujayni stated that the Ministry is currently preparing a comprehensive system to oversee the Third Development Plan of 1980-1985 to ensure that the plan is completed on time and to evaluate the methods of implementation used by government agencies in this regard. He also said that the goal of the new system for monitoring the Third Development Plan was to search for ways and means to help achieve the goals of the plan; overcome obstacles which impede implementation as well as obstacles likely to arise later in the process of implementation; and pursue methods determined to be successful. Among other goals is the creation of a comprehensive information policy so that the citizen can know immediately the level of accomplishment of the plan, because the goal of the plan is to ensure the comfort of the citizen, to define his role in the development plan, and to eliminate any instinctive negative feelings he may have about the plan as a citizen. The official added that approved projects not completed during the Second Plan would be carried over to the Third Plan. The projects would be reviewed, with priority given to those which are the most important and compatible with the goals of the new plan. [Text] [Dammam AL-IQTISAD in Arabic Feb 80 p 16] 7811

DISTRIBUTION OF UNCULTIVATED LAND--The advisory committee of the Ministry of Agriculture held a meeting under the chairmanship of Minister of Agriculture and Water 'Abd al-Rahman Al al-Shaykh. The meeting was attended by undersecretaries for research, water and agriculture. A number of important matters were debated, including continued discussion of the water plan, the system of distributing uncultivated land and matters relating to instruction in agriculture. The system of land distribution is expected to be changed in order to encourage citizens to make use of uncultivated land throughout the kingdom. A responsible source at the ministry said that some regulations will be developed in the light of studies and information prepared by the ministry concerning the distribution of uncultivated land and the best way to exploit it. A number of geological studies on underground water were also discussed during this meeting. The source added that on the basis of studies conducted by the ministry concerning water resources, approximately 70 percent of the area of the kingdom has been surveyed to ascertain the amount of water available. Several reports on water resources were reviewed during this meeting. [Text] [Dammam AL-IQTISAD in Arabic Feb 80 p 20] 7811

CSO: 4802

EXILED OPPOSITION LEADER ATTACKS NUMAYRI

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 3-9 Mar 80 pp 9-12

[Article by al-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi: "Arabs! Do Not Support This Assassin; If Arabs Do Not Remember the Sudanese People, How Can They Forget Palestine? Anyone Who Does Not Oppose Numayri Cannot Confront Menachem Begin; We Are the Sudanese National Movement Party and We Have a Popular Majority; We Opposed Numayri's Regime From the Beginning and We Will Continue to Oppose It; We Will Accept Nothing Less Than Numayri's Resignation, the Amendment of the Constitution and Free Elections"]

[Text] The Situation in Sudan

The regime in the Sudan is trying to revive its declining, flabby and collapsing system which has lost all the means for survival. The regime is holding a conference for its lone party which it calls the Sudanese Socialist Union. This party is not a union; it is not socialist; and it is not Sudanese. Perhaps it is called the Sudanese Socialist Union only because a few Sudanese citizens were compelled by their interests or fears to join the party and endorse its resolutions. The resolutions of the party are those of one individual only and not those of a party, a community or a [collective] opinion. That individual is Ja'far Numayri. It has been the coup of Ja'far Numayri and not only the May coup, as we call it. Nor is it a revolution, as it has been called by a handful of dreamers who do not know the meaning and the truth about the origin, the history or the course of revolutions. This Numayri regime is just like that of the Shah, of Somoza, Jenghis Khan or Tamburlane. It is like any Fascist, individual, family, tribal or sectarian rule in ancient or modern history.

This is a fact that not even a blind, deaf or mute person can deny. It cannot even be denied by a beast with no opinion and no historic or patriotic sense or affiliation--a beast whose entire sense of belonging lies with his food, his drink, his satiety and his survival. We regret [the use of] all these unadorned expressions and descriptions, but we are in a stage during which we can only call things by their real and their plain names. Our people have lived under injustice, darkness and oppression which we cannot possibly overlook, forget, ignore or disregard. This is a national duty. No Sudanese patriot can reach that measure of treason, loss of sensitivity, short-sightedness and political and social cowardice so as to carry on a mere existence without affirming and defining that fact.

What is called the Sudanese Socialist Union [Conference] is being held under circumstances not the least of which are the fact that our independence is being threatened; our nationalism is eroding; our national, pan-Arab, economic, moral, livelihood, attitudinal, administrative and performance problems are at their worst; and our homeland--with all the meanings, facts, affiliation, autonomy, identity heritage, history and culture implied by that word--is being threatened or is rather on the verge of extinction. For all this, for more than this and for what is more serious than this anyone who does not rise to the heights of patriotism and nationalism is a mere traitor of this homeland and of all the commitments, feelings and emotions that a homeland embodies. There is no other description for such a person. We must now draw obvious, plain, evident and unequivocal lines that divide, limit and measure [such people] without equivocation or false and fancy diplomacy so that the Sudanese people, the Arabs, the Africans and all the free people of the world would know that Sudan still exists and that there still is a Sudanese citizen; that patriotism exists and that there still is a patriot; that nationalism exists and that there is a nationalist; that freedom exists and that there is a free man; and that democracy exists and that there is an advocate of democracy. There are no similarities or contradictions among all these symbols and descriptions. The age of compliments is gone, and we have gone beyond all tribal, ancestral, sectarian, social and party relationships. There is nothing in front of us now but the word of truth and justice. This is the word of the appeal, the sacrifice and death. Let all people know [this]--let Death himself know [it]: whoever wants to befriend us on any other basis is neither one of us nor are we one of him. He would be deceiving us and deceiving himself; he would be deceiving the homeland, the Arab nation, Islam, history, the heritage and all the models of accord and conciliation. All those sycophants that rise to the surface are hideous in their interests, in their relations, in their ambitions, in themselves, in their lineage, in their sectarianism and in their bestiality. They must go far away; they must be damned; and they must stay in their lairs. All those who represent the interests of the feudal, monopolistic, capitalist and commercial class and all those who disgrace the bourgeoisie with their cowardice, their national failures, their selfishness and their soft, lazy lives are to know that the serious hour has come and that they have reached the end of their rope. They have to choose between their homeland and their own personal, individual interests whatever these may be. Afterwards, there will be no time and no choice: good will become evident, and evil will become evident. We are of the Green Crescent [of Islam] and we do not believe in halfway solutions. We spent time, energy and effort to show them the way and to identify for them the course of action. They did not heed us or consider us, and now there is no time. They have to choose sides; they have to bear the full and complete responsibility; and they have to start doing so now. Let them be certain that this is the basis for the relationship between them and the Sudanese Popular National Movement inside the country and abroad. They are to adorn themselves with a patriotic and a nationalistic character, and they are to know that this is the basis for dealing with all of them. The time for hypocrisy and flattery is gone. The Sudanese Popular National Movement is on the verge of undergoing serious developments that

will affect its destiny. It will assume its responsibilities in those developments, the least of which will be self-sacrifice and not just the sacrifice of what is precious for its homeland and its nation. The movement will leave behind it every lackey, every protege, every hypocrite, every interest seeker, every intermediary and every coward. It will be satisfied with the honorable free fighters, even if they were a handful and not more than the fingers of one hand or less.

Let us leave all this, and let us respond to the queries, the questions, the correspondence, the messengers and the intermediaries of this stage. Let us tell them quite seriously, truthfully and impartially, and let us tell their friends among us who do not show their feelings, that the time for flattery, forbearance, loss, vacuity, bewilderment and apprehension is gone and should have been gone a long time ago.

The Real Reconciliation

1. Numayri is appealing for national reconciliation, national unity and agreement. We are people who would not refuse an appeal for unity and reconciliation, even if we were in the midst of a furious battle in which people were dying and becoming wounded. We are the ones who would grieve and suffer when any Sudanese citizen is killed, wounded, made homeless or subdued. We are the ones who would turn to peace if those who brag about power; who recall their ephemeral and their spurious strength; and who forget the power of God, of the people and of history turn to peace. We accept the invitation for unity and for reconciliation from a position of courage, strength and faith in our homeland, our goals and our mission. We accept and we welcome unity and reconciliation for our Sudanese homeland, for our religion and for our Arab nation. We welcome unity and reconciliation just like al-Imam 'Ali ibn Abi Talib did when the Korean was raised in front of him and he was asked to stop the battle--while he was victorious--and he complied. We are complying with the request, not from [a sense of] weakness or discouragement, and not because we feel we have been defeated and our outside positions have been defeated. Our compliance is rather premised on protecting the homeland and the nation both of which are experiencing the most critical positions [in their history] just as the story of liberation is throughout the world.

2. If Numayri is sincere in his appeal for unity and reconciliation and is not using this appeal politically, trying to gain publicity with it or to wrap himself in it so as to overcome a stage and a confrontation of temporary and temporal weakness, he must know the facts about his government, about his position and about his course. If none of those around him has the courage to speak the truth and to give advice and if those around him fear for themselves or their interests, or if they fear his tyranny and his power, Numayri has to be truthful with himself, with his homeland, with his people and with his nation. He has to become aware of the real position of his homeland and his nation, and he has to become aware of the internal and outside dangers that he is facing. He has to become aware of the state of

deterioration in politics, economics, morality, society, administration and performance that the country has reached. He has to recognize the quagmire of corruption, bribery, favoritism, influence peddling and the prevalence of the sycophantic classes that surround him. He has to fear God in himself, in his homeland, in his nation and in his history. He has to be courageous as he claims and professes to be, and he has to adorn himself with the morals of unity, reconciliation and national salvation, and he is to adopt these morals for his conduct and not as a slogan; he is to adopt them truthfully and not spuriously.

3. If Numayri were to assume the personality of any Sudanese among the 20 million individuals [in Sudan], if he had even a limited and a simple sense of patriotism and national insight—even if he only had his personal foresight and the mere instinct for self-preservation—he would have to give up power and board any one of his airplanes that are prepared and ready [for take-off] only a few steps away from him. He has to make this proclamation with courage in an attempt to save his country and himself. He has to let the Sudanese people decide matters and make adjustments any way they want.

4. Numayri has to abolish his Socialist Union not only on the basis of what he knows and what we know about its reality, its influence, its popularity and its course, but also on the basis of the 35 articles which had been drawn up less than 2 months ago. Each one of these articles is adequate cause for abolishing and terminating it. No one afterwards would believe how he convened the union, addressed it and continued with it as a popular or even an individual agency. How can he confront a nation, a homeland, or even one village or one individual in our country with the existence of this union?

5. Numayri has to know that his present constitution is nothing but non-rhetorical rhetoric and that he has violated and broken it with his Socialist Union; with the articles of his individual power and with the obvious violation of all the democratic rights of the popular masses, of all the principles of the separation of powers and of the independence of the courts. He has to know that the present constitution in its entirety consists of emergency orders against public freedoms and that it does not constitute any just, constitutional or legal principles for dealings between a nation and a ruler. He has to abolish this constitution with the stroke of a pen and to replace it with the former interim constitution. Under his present constitution no freedoms can be guaranteed; no elections can take place; no justice can be established; no law can be respected; no citizen can feel that he and his interests are safe; and the dignity of humanity or of mankind cannot be respected.

6. Time has obliterated the London Agreement which has grown old with time. Time has gone by the London Agreement; everything has changed; and it is no longer suitable for any reconciliation or national unity. No one could have imagined or understood that it would be suitable for every time and every place, for it is not the Koran, the Bible, the Torah or the Book of Psalms.

It is no more than a word of truth whose time has gone by and which is now being sought for evil purposes. It is not logical or reasonable for us to disregard the passage of time. Otherwise, we would have to bring back the legends of the consultative council and the legislative assembly. Numayri has to recognize that the movement of the masses and the throng of nations cannot stand idly by, ignoring the passage of days, months and years when it is the one that is observing the passage of minutes and hours or rather seconds. Numayri [also] has to count on his fingers how many changes took place afterwards in our country, in our Arab homeland, in our region and in the world around us. Is he a cave man, or are we the cave men letting the ages go by around us?

Camp David and the Opposition

7. Numayri must have heard--if he has not learned--that an agreement called the Camp David Agreement was signed between the Egyptian regime and the Zionist enemy. This agreement constitutes a clear violation of the rights of the Arab nation for life, existence and civilization. It demolishes the central question of the Arab nation in Palestine; it gives the Zionist entity concrete form and legitimacy; it distorts the rights of the Arab nation and the Palestinian people; it distorts our culture, our civilization and our identity; and it violates the resolution of the Khartoum Conference which was held in his country. Numayri knows the nays of this conference: no negotiations; no recognition; no peace and no infringement upon the Palestinian question. The Camp David Agreement includes negotiations, peace and recognition; it infringes upon, diminishes and abandons the central question in Palestine.

The least of our duties as members of the Arab nation is to reject, condemn and resist the Camp David Accords. We are to enforce the minimal resolutions of the Baghdad Conference and then of the Tunisia Conference in which Numayri had participated. We know that these resolutions constitute a minimum that does not rise to the level of the nays of Khartoum. These resolutions do not approach the ambitions of the Arab nation or the requirements of its duties and the descriptions of its burdens. Enforcing these resolutions would have constituted the least manifestation of faith. Where is Numayri from this least manifestation of faith? Where are the Sudanese people from it? Where is Arab affiliation? Where is Islamic affiliation? Where, oh where?!

Now then: there have been many conflicting rumors and whispers. The horizon has been scattered and filled with rapid and frantic visits. The ancestors and the grandchildren have taken out their holiday clothing from storage, and they have removed their uniforms and their coats from the hangers. Many went to medical experts and to beauticians. Others listened listlessly to news about the reconciliation and the distribution of suitcases. Those who become nimble when they are greedy and those who lag behind when they are fearful appeared [on the scene]. The airplanes became crowded with the power brokers and those who buy and sell nations. They all trampled the suffering

and the sorrows of our people as well as their national, pan-Arab and humanitarian tragedy. They forgot--and how ignorant their forgetfulness was--our 11 years march in the darkness of the forest and the cruelty of the desert. We had marched in fear, hunger, exhaustion, alienation, vagrancy, fragmentation, wanness of body and spirit and alienation from relatives, country, friends and society. They closed their eyes to the fact that we were banished to an alienation of the spirit, of thought, of a sense of belonging, of culture, of history and civilization, and we were imprisoned with people who were not of our race, our religion, our home country and our nation. They turned their backs deliberately, blindly and misguidedly on the martyrs of our nation whose spirits hover over us giving us mere life and making us the allies of sleeplessness, hunger, exhaustion, unhappiness and misery. Our modesty, our character and our traditions tempted them, and they imagined this was weakness and despair. They were wrong and ignorant. They lacked the reserve of power, courage, viciousness, faith, conviction and determination with which our hearts abound and our spirits overflow. They imagined and believed the rumors about the luxurious houses, the big cars, the expensive hotels and the atrocities of trade and money, and they believed that we were content for the opposition to continue and for Numayri to survive. How deep can their ignorance, their stupidity and their feebleness be?

God, the nation and history cannot sanction the spreading of shameful and detestable acts among the patient, impartial opposition, the allies of sleeplessness, hunger and battles who were brought to this by the destiny of the National Movement. They have faced this destiny and are still facing it with further acceptance, patience, steadfastness, contentment and faith. They are those who had no homeland, no relatives, no traits, no identity and no name in spite of the magnitude of all those things they have carried with them for more than a decade. They are those who were driven from their homes: they roamed eastward, westward, northward and southward, carrying with them wherever they went their ideas, their commitments, and their national and pan-Arab sense of belonging. Then when they leave, they carry their burdens along with their ideas and commitments.

The guardians, the keepers and the protectors of the question of the Sudanese people do not exaggerate; they do not barter; they do not change; and they themselves do not change. They are the ones who see in every Sudanese citizen, inside or outside the country, a father, a brother and a son. They share with him his worries and his problems during the time of banishment, humiliation, defeat, fear, hunger and the lack of honor, chivalry and courage which we are experiencing. The culture of spiritual humiliation and defeat and of intellectual and moral retrogression and decline that was infused by this regime to everybody made everyone believe that the Sudanese National Movement was an amorphous mass, an uncontrollable heap and an unorganized void. People thus became complaisant, and they thought evil thoughts about it and about its people. They let themselves be deceived by the marquee and by the banquets. They were so wrong, and they were so shallow and ignorant about the National Movement and about people's awareness of history during the age of space, of weightlessness and of the absence of national commitment and pan-Arab affiliation.

I believe it was this ignorance that was the historical gate keeper of colonialism; it was committed to being the only power. Those who were trading in Islam imagined that they were the only ones on the scene. The internationalists imagined that they were the essence and the best of the patriots. Even some of our friends who are nationalist in their affectations and organizational abilities--may God forgive them--thought that they were the only fighters. And the last straw was that Numayri became contentious and extended his power as though he were God's successor on His earth, the deputy of His messenger and the immortal one who will forever be there.

Who Are We?

Let all people know, if they do not know, and let them read history and summon up the past and look into the future. Let them put these facts behind them, in front of them and above them:

*We are the National Movement Party. We represent the broad, toiling Sudanese masses: the workers, the farmers, the students, the professionals, the soldiers, the merchants and the intellectuals.

*We have a popular majority in every city, in every village, in every quarter, in every farm, in every school, in every plant, in every barracks, in every urban area, in every rural area, in every prairie, and we have a majority among all those who are away from home.

*We are the guardians and the keepers of the march and the course of this nation, and we will protect the people's national gains and their pan-Arab affiliations.

*We are the socialists by our commitment to the questions of the toiling farmers and workers.

*We are Moslems by birth, by nature, by disposition, by instinct and by faith.

*We are nationalists by birth, by commitment, by affiliation and by history.

*We are the liberal democrats, free in our thoughts, in our struggle and in our course.

*We are the opposition to this regime, and we have been the opposition ever since this regime was born. We oppose this regime with a patriotic view and a pan-Arab understanding. We did not ally ourselves with the regime; we did not befriend it; we did not declare a truce with it; and we did not participate with it for one minute ever since it came into existence and to this day. [This will remain unchanged] until the earth with everything on it goes back to God.

*We are opposed to oppressive regimes, to dictatorships, to military regimes and to Fascist regimes as a fundamental and a central principle. Our opposition is not due to an interest, to participation, to foreign pressures or to strategic and tactical step by step parallels.

Who among you has not participated with, made a truce with and reconciled himself with this regime? Read your books and remember your positions. Pause, even for one hour, to remember; such recollection helps those who believe. Are we not his staunch, patient, persistent popular opposition which has been there ever since he began [his government]? This is a fact, a course and a truth that no one can deny.

*And then, let all people know that we are the vast majority among the masses of the Sudanese people.

*We are the vast majority among his armed and regular forces, and without us, he cannot continue as ruler or oppose an opponent.

*We are the ones who will do away with this regime. We will remove it sooner or later by any means, at any sacrifice and at any price.

Money and Oppression

*We are the sons of death whose banners flutter over us, and we will send him a sudden death because he has become tyrannical and powerful. Right, the law, patriotism, nationalism, religion and all the moving forces of revolution and liberation among people are on our side. He persisted, he became arrogant, he closed his ears to every advice, he exaggerated every big thing and he scorched our land, our families, our homes and our people. We no longer have any excuse. It is on his shoulders that the responsibility rests for all the desolation, the destruction and the extermination that will befall our country. He began all this; he has continued it; he is unjust and he is the most unjust.

Our people have no other choice but to fight for their freedom, their integrity, their humanity and their nationalism: they will either gain them or perish without them. There is no other choice. Let all the citizens of our nation remember that they are the grandchildren who fought battles for freedom, independence, unity, Arabism and Islam, that they had endured these battles in victory and in defeat and that they had tasted their sweetness and their bitterness, their ebb and their flow, in defeat and in victory. Let them keep in mind that they are the heirs of great revolutions with which our history and the history of the Arab and Islamic nation abounds. Let every Arab, African and international regime in all the corners of the world know that anyone who offers Numayri a penny, a drop of fuel, a supply of bread or a weapon is only tearing the insides of the Sudanese people, dismembering them and adding to their agony, to their torture, to their pains and to their distress. He would be assisting in their demise and their extermination; he would be assisting in their oppression and burial. He would be standing with those who oppress nations and sap their lifeblood, and he would be siding with corruption, and injustice, stabbing our people with his knife and shooting them with his gunpowder as they lie on the ground covered with their own remains and smeared with their blood, pleading for humanity, justice and the perseverance of nations. Let all of them know that our people will not forget this and that one way or another they will respond to that some day.

I believe it was this ignorance that was the historical gate keeper of colonialism; it was committed to being the only power. Those who were trading in Islam imagined that they were the only ones on the scene. The internationalists imagined that they were the essence and the best of the patriots. Even some of our friends who are nationalist in their affectations and organizational abilities--may God forgive them--thought that they were the only fighters. And the last straw was that Numayri became contentious and extended his power as though he were God's successor on His earth, the deputy of His messenger and the immortal one who will forever be there.

Who Are We?

Let all people know, if they do not know, and let them read history and summon up the past and look into the future. Let them put these facts behind them, in front of them and above them:

*We are the National Movement Party. We represent the broad, toiling Sudanese masses: the workers, the farmers, the students, the professionals, the soldiers, the merchants and the intellectuals.

*We have a popular majority in every city, in every village, in every quarter, in every farm, in every school, in every plant, in every barracks, in every urban area, in every rural area, in every prairie, and we have a majority among all those who are away from home.

*We are the guardians and the keepers of the march and the course of this nation, and we will protect the people's national gains and their pan-Arab affiliations.

*We are the socialists by our commitment to the questions of the toiling farmers and workers.

*We are Moslems by birth, by nature, by disposition, by instinct and by faith.

*We are nationalists by birth, by commitment, by affiliation and by history.

*We are the liberal democrats, free in our thoughts, in our struggle and in our course.

*We are the opposition to this regime, and we have been the opposition ever since this regime was born. We oppose this regime with a patriotic view and a pan-Arab understanding. We did not ally ourselves with the regime; we did not befriend it; we did not declare a truce with it; and we did not participate with it for one minute ever since it came into existence and to this day. [This will remain unchanged] until the earth with everything on it goes back to God.

*We are opposed to oppressive regimes, to dictatorships, to military regimes and to Fascist regimes as a fundamental and a central principle. Our opposition is not due to an interest, to participation, to foreign pressures or to strategic and tactical step by step parallels.

Who among you has not participated with, made a truce with and reconciled himself with this regime? Read your books and remember your positions. Pause, even for one hour, to remember; such recollection helps those who believe. Are we not his staunch, patient, persistent popular opposition which has been there ever since he began [his government]? This is a fact, a course and a truth that no one can deny.

*And then, let all people know that we are the vast majority among the masses of the Sudanese people.

*We are the vast majority among his armed and regular forces, and without us, he cannot continue as ruler or oppose an opponent.

*We are the ones who will do away with this regime. We will remove it sooner or later by any means, at any sacrifice and at any price.

Money and Oppression

*We are the sons of death whose banners flutter over us, and we will send him a sudden death because he has become tyrannical and powerful. Right, the law, patriotism, nationalism, religion and all the moving forces of revolution and liberation among people are on our side. He persisted, he became arrogant, he closed his ears to every advice, he exaggerated every big thing and he scorched our land, our families, our homes and our people. We no longer have any excuse. It is on his shoulders that the responsibility rests for all the desolation, the destruction and the extermination that will befall our country. He began all this; he has continued it; he is unjust and he is the most unjust.

Our people have no other choice but to fight for their freedom, their integrity, their humanity and their nationalism: they will either gain them or perish without them. There is no other choice. Let all the citizens of our nation remember that they are the grandchildren who fought battles for freedom, independence, unity, Arabism and Islam, that they had endured these battles in victory and in defeat and that they had tasted their sweetness and their bitterness, their ebb and their flow, in defeat and in victory. Let them keep in mind that they are the heirs of great revolutions with which our history and the history of the Arab and Islamic nation abounds. Let every Arab, African and international regime in all the corners of the world know that anyone who offers Numayri a penny, a drop of fuel, a supply of bread or a weapon is only tearing the insides of the Sudanese people, dismembering them and adding to their agony, to their torture, to their pains and to their distress. He would be assisting in their demise and their extermination; he would be assisting in their oppression and burial. He would be standing with those who oppress nations and sap their lifeblood, and he would be siding with corruption, and injustice, stabbing our people with his knife and shooting them with his gunpowder as they lie on the ground covered with their own remains and smeared with their blood, pleading for humanity, justice and the perseverance of nations. Let all of them know that our people will not forget this and that one way or another they will respond to that some day.

Let the Arabs know that Numayri has mocked them; he has scorned them, considered them weak and trampled their history underfoot, mocking them and disregarding their agreements, their alliances and the aspirations of their nation. He has provoked them, and he has allowed Zionism, international imperialism and colonialism to provoke them. He demeaned them and their question among the countries and the nations, and he took advantage of their weakness, their fragmentation and their partisanship. He revealed their broken down state and their corruption among the nations of the world. If you, [the Arabs], do not sever all your economic, political and security relations with him, no one will henceforth believe the propaganda allegations you make for the central, fundamental, nationalist, Arab and Islamic question. Even the stones of this world will know that you are incompetent, that you are weak and that you are incapable of even taking such passive actions. If they do not remember the question of the Sudanese people, how can they forget the question of Palestine and the questions of their civilization, their entity and their nation? If they become fearful, if they weaken and withdraw, who will respect them? If they believe that they have an excuse with al-Sadat, Carter and Ben Gurion, who will believe that they have an excuse with Numayri?

Is Numayri Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, Sinai or Gaza?

Numayri remembered his kinship to the Hittites, the Romans, the Ptolemies, the Circassians, the Mameluks and the Pharoahs, and he forgot his kinship to Ya'rib and Qahtan. He remembered his kinship to al-Sadat, and he forgot the close ties that the Sudanese people have with 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, Khalid ibn al-Walid, Salah al-Din and Muhammad ibn 'Abdallah. Where are their kinships and where are their ties?

Shame on us and shame on them! Where are the crowns of royalty and the scepters of leadership? Where are the titles of command? Where are the broadcasts and the slogans, and where are the revolutions? If you cannot oppose Numayri and by disciplining him keep in line everyone who scampers away from the Arab rank and deviates from the national consensus, how can you then oppose Menahem Begin?

What a loss for Arabs and for Islam! Your funds have grown to the point of becoming booty for every ship. With Numayri it is booty for every traitor. What a loss for us! What a loss for you! And what a loss for the capabilities of the Arab nation! What a loss for the Arab nation's central, fundamental and principal questions! Pay the price of treason with your funds; double the reward of traitors; and wait for the flood of traitors and the throng of deserters and losers. This is how you thank God for His favors; this is how you pay Him back for His blessings; and this is how you reward Him for His benefits. O miserable destiny, O miserable course and O miserable end!

We Are Not Subjects

Anyone who thinks that we are part of Numayri's possessions or a handful of his subjects has misread us and will have to look at us again with awareness, understanding and discernment. Our party is the microcosm of our homeland, and our homeland is the macrocosm of the party. Anyone in our ranks who is slack, who leans towards the government and who falls at the government's feet will have the same destiny as that of the regime and no less. There is no excuse for those who have been warned.

You must know that toying with us and with our question is playing with fire. This fire will burn, destroy and scorch. Our only expectation is to meet with our God any time He so desires, and we are very anxious and eager for this meeting. We are in a hurry for this meeting, and we are yearning for it. God has been close to us throughout these lean years, and we are now very close to Him. God granted us this long, broad and vast life that is full of danger, excitement and altruism, but we were not tempted by it even though others have been. Our eyes will remain open, steadfast and constant; they will remain focused on the question and on moving forward. They will remain so even if you were to shoot all your arrows into our eyes.

You have become accustomed to our simple, succinct and convincing explanations of our questions; we do not plead and we do not beg. This is the pride of Arabs and the character of Moslems. You have become accustomed to having our citizens who have university degrees sweep your streets and clean your airports. But, unfortunately, you have not uncovered our secrets, nor have you discovered our pride. These are characteristics that had left some of you ever since the dawn of Islam and Arabism. How appalling it is that these characteristics have now broken out of their depositories and opened their storehouses that are brimming with blood and fire!

Listen all of you! And let listen with you those who can hear and bear witness! Set your watches; hold your breaths; and wait for the nation of heroism and the generation of sacrifices to break out the armed popular revolution. It will scorch everything around it, everything behind it and everything in front of it; it will leave behind only the scorched land that is promising and gentle. This land will afterwards yield a child and agriculture and stock farming. Let the nations of the area learn from our poor, exhausted people the lessons of history, the warnings of battles and the fall of tycoons.

Let all those who stand with the oppressor feel their heads. Let them know that the time has come to cut them off. Let us shout in the face of all those who stand on the fence, "Ride with us, my son! Don't side with the oppressive people." There is a hypocrite for every slack person. You meek people, go to your homes, and let us tell you, the owners of the usurped land, you banished people, those whose cause has been lost, "Keep your hands off our country so that it would not become another Palestine or Lebanon!" Will you do this? Perhaps.

Last but not least!

Let everyone who believes that we are rejecting reconciliation and national unity read this statement!

Let everyone who believes that we are fighting desperately for the so-called nationalist government which is held in disdain read this statement.

Let the first one of them stone us.

And let the others stone us with all the stones they have up their sleeve.

Let history, the future and the homeland be the fair arbiter between us and them.

Famine and Fighting

The situation in South Sudan is very serious. There is no drought in East Equatoria, but there is a crushing famine and harmful fighting that is spreading to other areas. Today, all the leaders of the South, including Joseph Lagu are almost under arrest in Khartoum.

8592

CSO: 4802

DOMESTIC UNREST SEEN BEHIND GAFSA INCIDENT

Tunis DEMOCRATIE in French Mar 80 pp 1, 4

[Article by M. D.]

[Text] The Gafsa incident can now be explained. The leaders of Libya are using Tunisian nationals opposed to the regime against Tunisia, hoping, through them and mainly thanks to the alleged discontent of the Tunisian people, to overthrow the Tunisian regime and set up a satellite government.

The Gafsa incident therefore has two aspects: It was an attempt to gain outside control and it was also the result of a peculiarly Tunisian malaise that has lasted for several years and that is rapidly spreading. The crisis atmosphere in which we are now living should not make either aspect appear to be more important than the other. On the contrary, the crisis must be treated simultaneously in both its aspects.

However, the government and part of the opposition refuse to see but a single aspect of the Gafsa question, each choosing the one most suitable to it. This is an error that can be tragic for Tunisia.

The government only sees the foreign aspect of the affair. Consequently, it organizes by increasing the capacity of the Tunisian Armed Forces and by taking its complaint of aggression to the international community. If a military effort is necessary, if the mobilization of international opinion is necessary, they are far from being adequate and one cannot become stymied there. Choosing to solve this problem by the traditional path of the test of military strength or even dissuasion by the system of alliance chosen means disappointments and economic exhaustion and therefore, the encouragement of foreign intervention.

In addition, international mobilization has its limits and the current crisis has revealed them: Countries made their decisions, not based on the elements of the dossier presented by Tunisia, but rather, on their system of alliance. Their choices were made ahead of time and could be foreseen.

If the military and diplomatic approach to the problem is limited, one must then resolve to take up the endogenous causes of the current crisis. The government does not seem to want to do so. At any rate, it is doing nothing to make its will for reform credible and to try to make Tunisian public opinion depart from its most serious behavior under the circumstances: its detachment and reserve. What is more, in practicing the domestic status quo, in contenting itself with a posteriori marks of support for its own formulations and in neglecting the support of the opposition, is the government looking for the worst in order to justify a policy that would give it elbow room?

Furthermore, part of the opposition only wishes to see the domestic aspect of the current crisis. It is blind to outside aggression and reduces the crisis to a crisis of the regime. It concludes that one must hasten the fall of the regime and give it no respite, while stepping up pressure and promoting anything that might lead to the breakup of the regime.

This policy has two flaws:

1 -- The risk of foreign domination is real. Any patriot must therefore act accordingly -- that is, place the independence of Tunisia over everything else. This independence is naturally limited, as is the case of all countries in the region, but it is real. In no instance should hatred for the regime blind Tunisians to such a point that they play into the hands of foreigners. No Tunisian should aim for power by relying on outside help.

2 -- In pushing for the breakup of the regime under these circumstances of an outside crisis, the backers of this policy underestimate the capacity for resistance and adaptation of the regime, which could well abandon all pretense of respectability and simply adapt a South American-type regime, relying on the forces of order, business circles (now with their backs against the wall) and foreign intervention. To take an extreme example, if the regime should be on the brink of collapse, Tunisia could fall into a Mauritanian situation.

The supporters of the policy of the worst, dictated by a primitive feeling of hate or a Iranian or Nicaraguan strategy, must stop to reflect. We are not trying to give anyone lessons in patriotism. We simply want to present the problems and their consequences so that public opinion will have the elements needed to make an evaluation and a choice.

We believe that the Tunisian domestic problem has now been distorted by Libyan interference. Whatever the cost, we must therefore clear off the Libyan mortgage, which is a gift from heaven for the government and the backers of the do-nothing policy. We must come together as Tunisians in order to look at the Tunisian domestic problem in national terms. We must absolutely avoid the Machiavellian maneuver consisting of hoping to see the government make increasing appeals for foreign aid and thereby waiting

for it to fail, for if this policy should succeed, it would be the end of Tunisian autonomy. There are Tunisians who speak about Iran or Nicaragua, forgetting that these two revolutions were national in origin and only succeeded because they were national with a strong national base.

We propose to tackle Tunisian domestic problems head-on, immediately. The mobilization of public opinion against the attempt at foreign domination can only be obtained if public opinion is convinced that we are also proposing the means of a political and social renewal and if it is persuaded that the erring ways of the past are indeed past. Abandoning political immobility is the only way to solve the problem of the country's security.

The conditions of the renewal are within reach of the government, for whether we like it or not, the government is part and parcel of the crisis. Whether it be a question of gestures that must be made, unhealthy practices to be abandoned, men to be removed or reforms to be undertaken, everything is now possible in the interest of the country's welfare.

In contrast, the policies of the worst are doomed to failure. Choosing to rearm means bleeding the country, placing a burden on the social front and resorting to foreign aid that is ever greater, ever more paralyzing and alienating.

Only a sound conception of patriotism can now bring Tunisia out of the crisis.

11,464

CSO: 4400

CONDITIONS FOR MAJOR ESCALATION SEEN

Tunis DEMOCRATIE in French Mar 80 p 4

[Article by R. D.: "All in All"]

[Text] No matter how one approaches it, turns it upside down, palpates it or examines it; whatever past or present light is shed upon it; however one might view official information: feelings of sympathy, reservations or silence, especially with regard to the "logistical" aid given to Tunisia, the aggression against the village of Gafsa simply will not fit into the narrow, constricting framework of a mere "Qadhdhafiade," even if the Libyans are up to their necks in the affair and scarcely pretend that they are not.

Sooner or later, the Gafsa aggression will appear as the beginning of a major conspiracy, a carefully worked out, sophisticated plot whose essential and solidary objectives are to liquidate the Arab League and the Tunisian regime and to make Tunisia, along with Bizerte, a gateway between the two basins of the Mediterranean.

The conditions for a major war now exist: Egypt has fallen into the American-Zionist lap and is upsetting the balance on the African continent and in the Middle East; China is leaning to the Western camp in order to check Soviet power; Iran is freeing itself from American domination and searching for its identity; the Soviet Union has moved into Afghanistan in order to be closer to the Gulf and Arab oil; and finally, Tito, whose country will be extremely fragile without him, is dying.

Tunisia's welfare now and in the future is to be found in the commitment of all Tunisians to the practice of true democracy and their own brand of serious socialism.

All Tunisians are now aware that the act of aggression against Gafsa is, despite all its misfortunes, an opportunity to achieve national unity, solid, steadfast unity that will take into account all political trends and all social demands whose legitimate spokesmen are still shut up in prisons and dungeons.

Neither the French airplanes nor the American weapons will save us. Our salvation is to be found in our determination to remain free, to love one another, to have unfailing confidence in ourselves.

If the chief of state tell us unmistakably and without the slightest ambiguity that we now have the military potential to undo ten Qadhdhafis, then there is no longer any reason to maintain a general alert and this climate of high tension that could well lead to a veritable economic and social catastrophe.

11,464

CSO: 4400

ABU DHABI LOANS 1.3 BILLION DIRHAMS TO ARAB, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 2 Jan 80 p 8

[Text] The Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development (ADFAED) has awarded loans amounting to 1,323 million dirhams to Arab and developing countries. Tunisia, the Sudan, Oman, Morocco, Mauritania, and the Yemen Arab Republic received [a combined total of] eight loans from the fund during 1978/79 to finance certain agricultural, industrial and road construction projects.

The loans were as follows:

1. A loan of 218.8 million dirhams to the Republic of Tunisia for construction of a phosphate fertilizer plant. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) will be a partner in this project to the extent of 102.85 million dirhams. The project aims at tapping abundant rock phosphates formations, partly for use in agricultural development, but mostly for export.

Weaving Factory in the Sudan

2. The fund awarded a loan of 84 million dirhams to the Democratic Republic of the Sudan for construction of a cotton spinning mill in the Haj 'Abdallah region. The mill will have a production capacity of 7,700 tons of thick yarn for local popular clothing and 2,650 tons of fine yarn for export.

Developing Oman's Oil Fields

3. The fund also signed an agreement to loan 663 million dirhams for a project to develop the recently discovered oil fields in the southern part of the Sultanate of Oman, which will increase [Oman's] crude oil production by 80,000 barrels per day by the latter half of 1980. The loan will be repaid in 10 semiannual installments at 4 percent interest, with the first installment due in January 1981.

4. The fund signed an agreement to loan 40 million dirhams to Morocco for the western agricultural project aimed at raising the standard of living of the people in the western region by increasing job opportunities and [earnings of farmers] through the increased usage of agricultural areas. The loan will be repaid in 30 semiannual installments beginning January 1984, with an interest rate of 4.5 percent.

Two Loans to Mauritania

5. The fund signed an agreement to loan 40 million dirhams to the Republic of Mauritania for the Kifa-Ni'mah road project. The project will link the cities of Kifa, Ni'mah and Aioun el Atrous to one another and to the capital, Nouakchott, to facilitate public transportation and provide the services necessary for development. The loan will be repaid in 30 semiannual installments, with an interest rate of 3.5 percent.

6. Mauritania was awarded another 80 million dirham loan for its iron ore mines project. The mines are located in al-Qulub in the region of al-Fayn Mountains near the city of al-Zuwayrat. The loan will be used in mining, refining and molding operations to improve the product to be taken to the port of Nuwadibu for export. The loan will be repaid in 20 semiannual installments with a 5-year waiting period. The interest rate on the loan is 4.5 percent.

Two Loans to Yemen

7. ADFAED signed an agreement to loan 40 million dirhams to the Yemen Arab Republic for water and sewage projects of the city of Ta'izz. The project aims at providing pure drinking water to city residents and a waste disposal to protect public health and provide for the growing needs of the city. The loan will be repaid in 30 semiannual installments beginning August 1983, with an interest rate of 3.5 percent.

8. The YAR received another 5 million dirham loan during the same period for a Wadi Siham study project. Its purpose is to make a comprehensive survey of natural water resources in the Wadi Siham basin, recommend needed action for agricultural development in the region, and prepare engineering studies and designs for such development. The loan will be repaid in 30 semiannual installments beginning 1 January 1983, with an interest rate of 1.5 percent.

11 Loans to Developing Countries

ADFAED approved 11 loans to developing countries in Asia and Africa.

1. A 60 million dirham loan was awarded for an electric supply link between Tunji and Ishudri in the Republic of Bangladesh. This project will transmit electric power, generated through the use of abundant natural gas

resources, from the Eastern region, to the western region. It will save the cost of imported liquid fuel currently used. The project also aims at developing a unified power network for the whole country. The loan will be repaid in 30 semiannual installments beginning on 1 February 1983, with an interest rate of 3.5 percent.

2. An 8 million dirham loan was awarded for the Maldives Republic's Haluli airport expansion project. The project is intended to expand the main Maldives airport to enable large airplanes to land there. This would reduce the Maldives' dependence on its neighboring countries relative to transportation, and promote tourism which is considered the main source of income in the country. The loan will be repaid in 20 semiannual installments beginning 1 January 1982, with an interest rate of 3 percent.

Textile Factory in Uganda

3. The ADFAED signed a 25 million dirham loan to renovate the African textile factory in Uganda. This project will increase annual production in the existing factory at Kampala to approximately 17 million meters of cloth, i.e. four times current production. The project includes complete renovations of the factory's buildings and utilities, replacing or remodeling machines, providing necessary spare parts and internal transportation equipment, and establishing a quality control division. The loan will be repaid in 20 semiannual installments beginning January 1982, with an interest rate of 4.5 percent.

Studies on Senegal's Dams

4. The ADFAED signed a 4 million dirham loan to Senegal to finance the (Camopile) and (Bila) Dam studies. An engineering study is currently under way to pick the ideal locations and types for the two dams to prevent saltwater seepage to agricultural lands, and to prepare the necessary designs for construction of the dams, protective structures and drainage tracts. The loan will be repaid in 30 semiannual installments beginning in January 1983, with an interest rate of 3.5 percent.

Comoros Republic Projects

5. The ADFAED signed a 4 million dirham loan to the Federal and Islamic Republic of the Comoros to finance the port construction of the (Unjuwan) island airport. The project includes repairing and repaving the airport landing strip, which is considered the only gateway to this island. (Unjuwan) island is considered the richest region in the country. The project also includes renovation of the major facilities of the airport and runway, strengthening the existing overpass on the waterfront near the airport. The loan will be repaid in 30 semiannual installments beginning January 1983, with an interest rate of 2 percent.

6. The ADFAED signed a 3 million dirham loan agreement to Lesotho to finance engineering studies for Lesotho Airport. The project includes studies, engineering designs for construction work, and specifications of machinery and equipment necessary for the airport. The loan will be repaid in 20 semiannual installments beginning in April 1983, with an interest rate of 2 percent.

7. The Madagascar Republic received a 16 million dirham loan for the Roger electric power project. The project aims at generating electricity in Antragoaika and transmitting it to consumption centers at Antenina, (Riqof) and Moramanga. The project calls for construction of a dam, 30 meters high and 125 meters long, a tunnel 4 kilometers long, and a building to house 4, 28-megawatt generators. The loan will be repaid in 20 semiannual installments beginning on 15 September 1984, with an interest rate of 3.5 percent.

Developing a Port in Malta

8. The ADFAED signed a 28 million dirham loan to develop the port of Marsa (Shluk) bay in Malta. The purpose of this project is to increase the port's capacity for receiving ships, loading, unloading and storage of goods. The project includes construction of a breakwater for an area of 850 meters, a 450 meter long and 12-14 meters deep dock, and preparation of a 100,000 square meter storage area. The project also calls for construction of a dock, 420 meters long and approximately 10 feet deep, for barge maintenance, and improved port services, communications facilities and roads. The loan will be repaid in 26 semiannual installments beginning 1 January 1981, with an interest rate of 2.5 percent.

Two Agreements with the Seychelles

9. Last month the ADFAED signed 2 loan agreements with the Seychelles Republic. The first loan is for 800,000 dirhams to finance a complete ice plant. The plant will produce 12 tons of crushed ice daily to provide ice for fish storage and for the fishing fleet. The project includes construction of the ice plant and its equipment and an ice storage area with a 20-ton capacity, equipped with a cooling unit and related services. The loan will be repaid in 20 semiannual installments beginning in January 1982, with an interest rate of 4.5 percent.

10. The second loan is for 3.2 million dirhams to finance the Praline electricity project. The project will provide electric power to Praline Island, the second largest island in area in this republic. This will help develop and populate the island, as well as promote tourism and small industries and crafts. The loan will be repaid in 20 semiannual installments beginning in January 1982, with an interest rate of 4.5 percent.

[Eleventh loan to developing countries not given].

EMPHASIS ON NEW TECHNOLOGY IN INDUSTRIAL PLAN

Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 18 Jan 80 p 2

[Article by Ahmad Sa'id: "The Conference for Training Research Workers for the Next 5-Year Plan Focuses Attention on Modern Technology in Industrial Planning; Economic Growth and Associated Population Balance Are Discussed"]

[Text] The departmental committees of the conference for training research workers continued their deliberations on all aspects of preparing the 1981-85 state five-year plan yesterday.

In the committee on foreign trade, Dr Fa'iqah al-Rifa'i, Currency Council expert, said that relevant issues in this sector are: In what industries and projects could UAE products achieve a favorable competitive position in international markets, and what projects could be included in the developmental plan to produce local products as substitutes for imports?

Dr al-Rifa'i also said that in formulating projects giving direction to governmental or individual consumption, the question arises as to whether potential future financial resources, or accumulated financial resources of several past years up to 1979, are to be taken into account.

The discussion led to the conclusion that strategy should take into account both accumulated and potential future resources, because present utilization of accumulated resources is far from perfect. The discussion also led to the conclusion that development strategy should center on [subsidized] leading industries that use advanced technologies such as will enable the country to invade international markets and insure continued marketability of UAE products, taking into consideration the limitations of the present and future available workforce and the structure of the UAE population in the future. Also discussed was the possibility of selecting a group of agricultural crops that can be effectively cultivated to fully replace imports of same, as well as selecting a group of industries that could be successful, such as the industry of assembling electrical generators and air-conditioning units.

Dr 'Abd al-Hamid al-Tijani, member of the Arab Planning Institute in Kuwait and coordinator of the conference, emphasized that foreign trade strategy during the five-year plan should be in keeping with potential future capability and the general development strategy in the state. He also said that general strategy should depend primarily on productive activities in the industrial, agricultural, financial, and service sectors characterized by continuity and adaptability with other segments of the economy and with conditions in the world at large. In the agricultural committee, Dr 'Abd al-Mu'min al-'Ulabi and Dr Ahmad Salim talked about national statistical indicators relating to local production and import requirements; the elements of added capacity in the agricultural sector; exploration of all standards of measurement of agricultural production to guide the diversification of local production in general; and active use of national statistics of animal, agricultural and fishery resources in defining available alternatives in planning for the agricultural sector.

In the committee on human resources, Dr Duram al-Bassam and Dr Nadir Farajani drew a picture of the structure of the work force in the country and raised questions about the future of economic and social conditions. They then presented alternatives for economic growth for the coming years along with their potential impact on the structure of the work force and population balance.

Within the next few days, a meeting will be held to discuss the models used in the compilation of statistics on the work force and education in order to complete the training of human resource planners in the country and prepare them to share in the preparation of the next five-year plan.

9455

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

BALANCE OF TRADE SURPLUS--Muhammad Harasha reports that the surplus in the balance of trade of Abu Dhabi amounted to about 18.886 million dirhams in 1975, 23.2166 million dirhams in 1976, and 25.1247 million dirhams in 1977. This surplus decreased to 21.5736 million dirhams in 1978 as a result of limiting and reducing crude oil exports during that year. This appears in a study prepared by the Abu Dhabi Planning Department, on the development of foreign trade in Abu Dhabi from 1975 to 1978. According to the study, the Emirate's imports increased from 3,795 million dirhams in 1975, to 4,103 million dirhams in 1976, to 5,430.2 million dirhams in 1977, to 6,307.2 million dirhams in 1978. This is an increase of 2,512.2 million dirhams or a 66.2 percent increase over the past 4 years. The study reveals that machines and equipment amounted to about 61.1 percent of total imports in 1978, followed by nonnutritive consumer products (24 percent), with food products ranking third at 7.9 percent. The study also reveals that average prices of imports in Abu Dhabi followed an upward curve, increasing by 50.2 percent over the past 3 years. Average prices of imports had decreased in 1976. [Text] [Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 6 Jan 80 p 3] 9455

OVERTIME COMPENSATION REGULATIONS FOR 1980--'Abdul-Rahman al-Rustumani, director general of the Bureau of Employee Affairs and secretary of the Civil Service Commission, issued a circular to all ministries and government agencies to apply the cabinet decision regarding overtime compensation rules and regulations for 1980. Under these regulations, overtime compensation is not allowable to employees whose regular salary exceeds 2,000 dirhams per month. Also, overtime compensation cannot exceed 30 percent of an employee's regular salary, or a maximum of 500 dirhams per month. Overtime hours are counted after the employee has completed a 40-hour workweek. The circular requires each ministry or agency to prepare at the beginning of each month a list of those who were eligible for overtime compensation the previous month. This list will be approved by the minister or undersecretary concerned and sent to the Bureau of Employee Affairs for review and referral to the Ministry of Finance and Industry to arrange for payment after all appropriate forms and employee identifications have been verified. Overtime compensation will be paid within the

limits of appropriations for this purpose. The Bureau of Employee Affairs has requested a list of all employees and workers slated for overtime during 1980, taking into consideration the following rules: (1) Overtime should be authorized only in situations of absolute necessity. (2) Overtime should be limited to technical positions. (3) Overtime should cease as soon as the employee's assignment is over; (4) Overtime lists and hours should be very carefully reviewed so that money is not spent unlawfully. [Text] [Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 16 Jan 80 p 3] 9455

AID TO AFGHAN REFUGEES--The Moslem merchants of Abu Dhabi formed a committee to collect donations to aid the Afghan fighters and the Afghan people who were forced as a result of the recent Soviet invasion to take refuge in Pakistan. The committee was able to collect around 1.5 million dirhams. It was decided that delegates 'Abd al-Jalil al-Fahim and Fahd Ibn Rashid al-Dusari, would fly today to hand over the money to the Afghan fighters in Peshawar, Pakistan, near the Afghan border. The donations came from the following: 400,000 dirhams from 'Abd-al-Jalil al-Fahim; 400,000 from 'Umayr Ibn Yusuf; 190,000 from Sa'id Ibn Ahmad al-'Utaybah; 100,000 from Fahd Ibn Rashid al-Dawsari; 100,000 from Hamil al-Ghayth; 50,000 dirhams each from Darwish Ibn Karam, Muhammad 'Abd al-Jalil al-Fahim, and Sayf Ibn Darwish; 25,000 dirhams each from Abd al-Rahim al-Fahim and Ahmad Muhammad al-Fahim; 15,000 dirhams from Muhammad Rasul Khuri; 12,000 dirhams from Muhammad Sharif Fulazi; 10,000 dirhams each from Sa'id Ibn Abdallah 'Abd al-Jalil, Najim Ibn Muhammad, 'Abd al-Khaliq Khuri, Muhammad 'Abbas, and 'Abdallah Hasan Khandaqi; 5,000 dirhams each from Ghanim Ibn Hamdan and Shaykh Hamad Mahfuz; 3,000 dirhams each from Muhammad Salih Hamzah and Ahmad Ibn Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahim; 2,250 dirhams from Muslim Ibn 'Abdallah; 2,000 dirhams each from Sa'id Ibn Ahmad and Sayf Ibn Ahmad al-Fahim; and 500 dirhams from Muhammad Salim al-Hasan. [Text] [Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 20 Jan 80 p 2] 9455

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL APPROVES BUDGET--In a meeting presided over by Chairman Khalifah bin Zayid yesterday, the Executive Council approved the regular budget of the Abu Dhabi Emirate for the new 1980 fiscal year. The total budget amounted to 2,360,656,150 dirhams. The council also debated provisions of the general budget for the Emirate's development program for this year. It approved the tables of authorized positions in the departments. These total 21,625 positions, of which 18,526 are filled, 1,266 are vacant and 1,833 have just been created. Section One of the budget provides for 1,087 million dirhams, for employee salaries and pay increases; 874 million dirhams for general expenditures; 356.062 million dirhams for fixed assets and direct departmental operations; and 41 million dirhams for general services. [Text] [Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 21 Jan 80 p 1] 9455

CSO: 4802

SDAR PREMIER DISCUSSES IDEOLOGY, SOVIET RELATIONS

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 26 Mar 80 p 5

[Interview with Muhammed Lamine Ahmed, prime minister of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SDAR) by Mushahid Hussain, date and place not given]

[Text]

DURING the celebrations marking the 4th Anniversary of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic on February 27, nearly 200 foreign journalists (including several television crews) were present to cover the festivities. On this occasion, apart from a television programme with an Iranian government TV delegation, Premier Lamine Ahmed granted only one interview to a visiting journalist. The interview took place around midnight at the Polisario Front's underground headquarters near the Algerian town of Tindouf on the border with Western Sahara.

In this interview a number of important issues were elucidated by the SADR government spokesman including Polisario views on ideology, recent reports of Algerian-Moroccan 'secret negotiations' on the Saharan question, American aid to King Hassan's regime and SADR relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union. The most significant part of the interview related to the question of Polisario military tactics in the war against Morocco. For the first time, a high-ranking Polisario official confirmed that their military role had shifted from the classical guerilla combat (hit and run attacks in small numbers) to almost conventional level confrontation with King Hassan's over 50,000 troops in the Western Sahara. This change in Polisario tactics will not only raise

the level of fighting but will almost certainly bring the war deeper into Moroccan territory and closer to the three major urban centres—El Aiyun, Smara and Dakhla—that the Moroccans still manage to hold. Coupled with the increased tempo of diplomatic activity by the Polisario Front guerrilla effectiveness on the ground could well make 1980 the decisive year in this five-year old conflict. Premier Lamine Ahmed is in his early forties and apart from being head of government, also serves on the 9-member central leadership of the Polisario.

Q. Recently the Islamic Republic of Iran became the 36th country to recognise the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic. What do you think will be the impact of this move on the Muslim World?

A. The Saharan people are Muslim. They have been hoping that Islamic countries will be the first to support our struggle. We were wondering which Muslim country will be the first to recognise our Republic. This honour of recognition has gone to Iran. We hope that Pakistan will follow suit. As the Holy Quran says: "All Muslims are brothers and they should help each other."

"The recognition by Iran proves that the war inflicted on us is an unjust war. We are waiting for other Muslim countries to recognise us. We hope that by recognising our Republic other Muslim countries will demonstrate that they are as independent as Iran is."

Q. While the Saharan people are Muslim, your country's constitu-

tion calls for a socialist state. Do you see any contradiction between Islam and Socialism?

A: Islam is socialistic; that is how we understand Islam. Our fundamental law is the Constitution. In the first proclamation (article) it is clearly stated that Islam is our faith. In the second (article) there is mention of a Unified Orientation, which means unity of the Muslim World. Islam is not only our state religion; the basis of all our laws is Islam. Our people are Muslim as well as socialist. All Muslim people want to go to heaven but not on hungry stomachs. We believe our people must go to heaven with full stomachs.

Q: Recently there have been some new developments concerning the Western Sahara. The United States has started supply of substantial quantity of arms to Morocco. At the same time one feels that Polisario tactics on the battlefield are changing i.e. from the classical guerilla hit-and-run ambushes to more conventional methods of large-scale troop attacks. Could you comment on this.

A: We don't have the same logic as the imperialists. Imperialism believes that its interests are guaranteed by monarchic regimes. Instead of asking Morocco to stop the war, the imperialists are making peace more difficult. It is not a question of arms but of conviction. Our basic struggle (for the liberation of Western Sahara) remains the same but tactics have to be changed: from hit and run attacks to strong confrontation with the adversary.

Q: What is your comment on recent reports of secret negotiations between Algeria and Morocco on the Saharan Question?

A: First let me make it clear that there are no differences of a bilateral nature between Algeria and Morocco. The differences only exist between Morocco and Western Sahara. We have also heard reports to this effect (i.e. regarding Algerian-Morocco talks on Sahara). Even if these are true, they have

nothing to do with us. We would welcome any initiative to end the war. No one can talk on behalf of any people whose own country exists. We know that the war will end through negotiations between Morocco and SADR. All wars end like this (through negotiations). The situation, as it exists today is much different than it was in 1975.

Q: A favourite theme of the Moroccans is that your movement is Soviet and Cuban-supported although during my entire stay here and in the liberated zones, I found no evidence to support this. How are your relations with the USSR and Cuba?

A: The fact is that only last year Morocco signed a major agreement with the Soviet Union on phosphates. Uptil now, we have no relations with the USSR. Cuba has recognised our Republic in January 1980, as Mexico and Iran have recently done.

Q: Would you comment on American policy in the Western Sahara?

A: "The war in Western Sahara is not in the interests of American people and we know that people there are against U.S. involvement in the conflict. We have many friends in the American Congress and among the American people. No people can ever allow themselves to be exterminated. We have to look for support from anywhere that we can find.

Q: As the first Pakistani to visit your country, I feel really privileged and honoured because I learned so much about your struggle. Would you have any message that I could convey to the people of Pakistan?

A: We consider Pakistan a brotherly Muslim country and call on Pakistan to support our struggle for self-determination. We hope that the Government and people of Pakistan will be among the first to recognise our state. We would welcome representatives of the Pakistani press to visit our country and to see the situation more closely and clearly. We are glad that you have taken the initiative in this regard travelling from so far away to visit us.

POLISARIO REPORTEDLY INFLECTS HEAVY LOSSES ON MOROCCO

Paris LE MONDE in French 18 Mar 80 p 6

[Article by Daniel Junqua--passages between slantlines in italics]

[Text] The POLISARIO Front seems to have inflicted serious losses to Moroccan forces in the course of a series of engagements which occurred from 1-11 March in southern Morocco, near the strategic base of Zak, giving it control of the Draa wadi region. Journalists from the international press were allowed to visit part of the battlefield for 48 hours, inspect materiel unfit for use and question some of the 137 Moroccan prisoners, including Capt El Youssi. For the moment, Rabat has made no comment. However, speaking to the members of the government and the military chiefs on Saturday 15 March in Marrakech, King Hassan II declared: "Your devotion to the Sahara requires you, civilians and soldiers, to give body and soul for the defense of the territorial integrity of the country." This call to sacrifice could be an indirect confirmation of the severity of the recent losses.

Algiers--The Algerian press gave heavy coverage on Sunday, 16 March, to battles fought at the beginning of March in southern Morocco (LE MONDE of 15 March) along the Ouarkziz djebel which overhangs the Draa wadi. The special correspondents of EL MOUDJAHID and the Algerian Press Service who went into the field were able, thanks mainly to documents found in a "command car" of Colonel Arzaz, a Moroccan officer, to reconstruct the whole battle in terms of the intentions of the Moroccan troops placed under the command of General Dlimi.

The Royal Armed Forces had it seems been given a double mission: clean up the zone extending between the Draa wadi, in the north, and the border with Western Sahara, in the south, by wiping out the elements of the /"Army of Saharan Liberation"/ which circulate there continually; enable indispensable fresh provisions to be brought to the base at Zak not far from the Algerian border, facing Tindouf. The garrison, with a strength of 4 to 5 thousand men, has been in effect surrounded and cut off since last autumn.

The Moroccan general staff thus collected a force of some 5,000 men bolstered by tanks, automatic machineguns, and armored transport vehicles, at Lemsied, not far from Tan Tan near the Atlantic coast. Half of them were from special units of the "Ohoud" column, recalled for the occasion from the southern part of Western Sahara, and the other half were another unit recently formed under the name of the "Zellaga" column. These troops were to move east and in the Lebouirate region to meet up with the intervention forces based at Zak, these being some 2,000 men equipped, notably, with rapid SK-150 tanks and heavy mortars. The operation carried the code name "Iman" (the faith).

The troops at Lemsied were set in motion, according to the Saharans, on 27 February, the anniversary of the proclamation of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (RASD). They proceeded without incident for some 60 km as far as Ametti where they arrived on 29 February. On 1 March the POLISARIO commandos were dispatched to attack the units from Zellaga which were in the lead of the advance. The latter, composed, according to the Saharans, of young recruits, broke ranks and in their flight threw into confusion the more seasoned troops from Ohoud. The guerrillas then harassed the Moroccan soldiers for 6 days over a 120-km front, while they were retreating toward the Ouarkziz djebel where they took refuge. There they found other units equally broken up which had left Zak on 27 February to meet them and which had also run into the POLISARIO and themselves been forced to flee to the north.

A turning point in the war?

Still according to the POLISARIO, General Dlimi, after having regrouped and reorganized his troops and received reinforcements, then decided to execute at least the second part of his planned operation: breaking the siege of Zak. But the troops, making use of the N'Gueb pass through which the supply convoy was also to pass, were once again attacked, on 9 March, in the plain of Tighzert. After two days of battles, according to the POLISARIO, they had to retreat once again to the Ouarkziz djebel.

The testimony of the journalists, who went to the battlefield, leaves no doubt about the scale of the conflicts which resulted, according to the Saharans, in the /"removal from the conflict"/ of 2,000 men of the Royal Armed Forces, the capture of 130 prisoners, including several officers, the destruction of 250 vehicles and pieces of armored equipment, and the recovery of considerable materiel. The guerrillas' control of the region seems real.

If the Moroccan forces cannot recover the initiative, the battle of Ouarkziz could well mark a major turning point of the war. First of all, because the new strategy of mobile armored columns, developed by King Hassan II in recent months, failed the acid test. Next, because the base at Zak, which lost in this affair some of its defenders, could well find itself in a critical situation. The fall of this garrison would definitively put into the hands of POLISARIO the entire region situated to the south of the Draa wadi, and the next targets of the guerrillas crossing the Ouarkziz djebel could well be the towns of Goulimine and Assa. The Saharans, who frequently refer to the /"historic rights"/ they possess in this region even though they do not make formal claim to them, would thus hold a precious hostage.

SELECTIVE LIST OF JPRS SERIAL REPORTS

NEAR EAST AND AFRICA SERIAL REPORTS

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

WORLDWIDE SERIAL REPORTS

WORLDWIDE REPORT: Environmental Quality
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Epidemiology
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Law of the Sea
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Nuclear Development and Proliferation
WORLDWIDE REPORT: Telecommunications Policy, Research and Development

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

6 May 1980
D.D.